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19th century (1864-1878)

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HISTORY OF THE PAPACY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

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HISTORY OF THE PAPACY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

(1864–1878)

BY THE LATE

J. B. BURY, 1861-1927

D.Litt., LL.D.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY, AND FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE; FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY, ETC. ETC.

EDITED, WITH A MEMOIR,

BY

THE REV. R. H. MURRAY, Litt.D.

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PREFACE

For over thirty years I knew John Bagnell Bury, and to-day I continue to mourn his loss. I have met few men more unselfish and fair-minded, and no one of more absolute courage or more earnest in the pursuit and love of truth—and "this", in the words of an old writer, I say "not in flattery. I loved him in life and I love him none the less in death; for what I loved in him is not dead."

I desire to thank the following for information freely and courteously given to me: D. N. Anastasiević, A. Andréades, F. E. Adcock, R. C. Bosanquet, Mrs. Bury (his wife), the Rev. R. G. Bury (his brother), J. H. Clapham, S. A. Cook, the Most Rev. C. F. D'Arcy, C. Diehl, the Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, Mrs. Gray (his sister), J. R. Gumley, E. J. Gwynn, A. Hein, A. Heisenberg, G. Lapsley, A. E. Layng, the Rev. W. Lowrie, H. S. Macran, W. Miller, G. Murray, C. W. Previté-Orton, L. C. Purser, G. Ostrogorsky, A. B. Ramsay, Canon C. L. Robinson, E. Stein, J. R. Tanner, N. Wedd, and Sir A. Wright. I am afraid that this acknowledgment will raise hopes that this memoir will not fulfil. This is a matter of sincere regret to me.

With great kindness Mr. N. H. Baynes lent me the proof-sheets of his fine *Bibliography of the Works of J. B. Bury, compiled with a Memoir*. No one can read this bibliography without conceiving a fresh admiration for the many-sidedness of the intellect of the scholar.

ROBERT H. MURRAY

Pershore Abbey.

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INTRODUCTION

At first sight it might appear as if the historian of the Later Roman Empire had but little concern with the history of the Papacy in the nineteenth century. One can understand his interest with this great institution down to the tenth century, for it bore intimately on the period he was investigating. We must, however, always allow for the catholicity of Bury's mind in general and his desire to explore the conditions of the freedom of thought in particular. No old pupil of his requires to be told how deeply he cared for the problems of toleration or the reverse. Once I asked him what turned his attention to the history of the Papacy in our day, knowing full well the answer he would give me. He at once replied: "I consider it the other side of the history of the freedom of thought".

The set of lectures, which I edit, was given in 1908, and I print them precisely as he delivered them. The text is just as he left it, save for some corrections in the quotations. My task has been that of verifying all the quotations, and that has been far from easy, for Bury left no footnotes to his lectures. These I have supplied. Occasionally in the footnotes I indicate later authorities than those he used in 1908.

These lectures attest that their writer was as much at home in the world of the Vatican as he was in the

world of Constantinople. He has read, marked, learned, and digested all the standard authorities on the history of the Papacy, which he approaches with the detached standpoint he exhibited in his *Life of St. Patrick* and indeed in all his writings. I allow his title to stand, for in the three sets of lectures he gave he had practically covered the history of the Papacy in the nineteenth century. It is obvious that in this third set he confines his attention mainly to the period from 1864 to 1878, and within these limits he devotes much of his thought to a consideration of the *Syllabus* and to the history of the Vatican Council, with its momentous declaration of the infallibility of the Pope.

The reader will at once see that the historian does not in the least limit his attention to the standard authorities on the history of the Papacy. He explores with equal thoroughness the current literature of the time, the pamphlets and the newspapers. He has read, for instance, the issues of the *Civiltà Catholica*, *L'Univers*, and the *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg). It is not possible to read his luminous survey without at once seeing that he has taken the trouble to consult pamphlets now impossible to buy and difficult even to consult. Some of them cannot be found in any of our libraries here, *e.g.* the University libraries of Oxford and Cambridge, the British Museum, the London Library, Brompton Oratory, and Westminster Cathedral. Abroad much work has been done on the years from 1864 to 1878, but in England very little has been attempted.[1] Bury's

[1] Dom Butler, formerly Abbot of Downside Abbey, is about to publish his history of the Vatican Council.

book is sure of the welcome it deserves on account of his name. It is no less sure of a welcome for its fidelity to fact, its fullness of knowledge, and the penetrating insight that distinguishes it. The judgment that comes of thorough understanding and sound historical criticism is everywhere apparent. But these are qualities the reader will soon discover for himself. He will see too that the author is every whit as familiar with the writings of the Jesuits as he is with those of Acton, Döllinger, and Friedrich.

Those who delight in parallels will notice that Bury and his predecessor in his Cambridge chair, Acton, were fascinated by the annals of the Papacy, and at this fascination we do not very much wonder. There is much in common to the two historians. Both were born students even as boys, both were omnivorous readers, both possessed encyclopaedic knowledge, and both put this knowledge most generously at the service of the scholars who endeavoured to use it. Both were ardent lovers of liberty, devoted to the cause of toleration. Those who met Acton and Bury thought that they knew the secret of every book, the "pensée derrière la tête" of every man who ever wrote, "le pourquoi des pourquois", the chain of ideas leading to the origin of a thought. Soon Acton will be nothing but a name: already he is a legend, for he left no writing behind him worthy of his powers. In this respect Bury is, and will be, greater. He early realised what he could do, and he did it. His historical work remains, and it is his true and lasting memorial.

MEMOIR

John Bagnell Bury (1861–1927) was devoted to learning from his youth. A born student, he was also a born researcher. Not for him were the ways trodden by the authorities, classical or other: he must tread them himself in order to see if the sign-posts gave correct directions. The remarkable matter is that he struck out a new path after he became Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. At school he had taken some slight interest in Macaulay, and indeed how could a boy in Foyle College, Derry, where he was educated, do otherwise? With the passing of the years this interest ceased, and during his undergraduate days he never attended the lectures of Barlow in history, though, of course, he attended those in classical history. At all times he was Greek rather than Roman, and Greek to the core of his nature. What awoke his historical instincts was his perusal of Freeman's *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*. That book made him an historian, and, great as is the debt of the historical world to Freeman, this fact renders it even greater. With his brilliance of intellect and breadth of knowledge, with his power of work and his tirelessness of brain, it was a rather easy task to turn from classical history proper to that of the later Roman Empire.

Stubbs always insisted that the finest preparation for the study of modern history was a thorough grasp of the classics. If he is one illustration of the truth of this view, Bury is certainly another. The amazing matter is that in 1885 he was ignorant of the history of the later Roman Empire, and yet in 1889 he produced a masterly book on this very subject.

Although he had seen Ravenna only through the eyes of a classical student, Constantinople was beginning to weave her spell around him. The change in the direction of his studies is apparent in 1886 when he turned to mediaeval history, illustrated by his account of the Lombards and Venetians in Euboia, and to later Roman history, illustrated by his survey of the Praetorian Prefects and the divisions of the Roman Empire in the fourth century. In 1885 he had just won his Fellowship, and the following year he was fortunate enough to find his life-work. He soon recognised the need of extending his range of languages, learning Russian in 1885 and other Slavonic languages later. For in everything he was determined to see for himself. He always assumed that it was not possible to write history without a sound working acquaintance with the different languages in which the documents were written. Such an acquaintance he began to possess, and with the passing of the years he steadily widened it. He continued his classical studies as well as his historical, Freeman influencing him increasingly. He edited Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe*, and he also edited the book that impressed him so strongly, Freeman's *History of Federal*

Government in Greece and Italy, protesting in his preface against the ignorance of the Imperial Federationists.[1] In 1892 Bury confessed: "It is hard for one who owes as much as the present writer to Mr. Freeman's historical teaching, to speak of him, now that he is no longer here, without seeming to descend into the language of panegyric. The greatest thing perhaps that one man can do for another is to awaken a latent sense. Like others, I know from experience that Mr. Freeman's works can awaken a sense for history. It would be hard perhaps to say which of the two late Regius Professors of Modern History, Bishop Stubbs and Mr. Freeman, did more to stimulate historical students and guide historical research into right lines."[2]

Bury remained a pupil of Freeman, yet a pupil whom the master treated as an equal. The two became warm friends, and it is pleasant to know that Bury spoke similarly, though he never influenced him so markedly, of the work of Hodgkin. It was Freeman, however, to whom Bury unbosomed himself, and the two letters published in Freeman's biography afford some clue to the intimacy that subsisted between them.[3] This intimacy meant much to the young professor. For the encouragement given to the study of history in Trinity College in the eighties was exceedingly scanty, and accordingly Bury had to work on his own account. The influence of Gibbon is discernible in an imitation of the historian he wrote in *Kottabos* in 1888.

[1] Preface to Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, p. x.

[2] *Scottish Review*, vol. xx. (1892), p. 301.

[3] Stephen's *Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman*, i. pp. 259, 267; ii. p. 453.

In it, too, is reflected his grasp of the Irish politics of the day.

Bury held the view that the harder he worked at his writing, the better for the men who attended his lectures. Certainly they saw the working of a mind second to none in efficiency and accuracy. They also saw one who looked as young as the youngest of them. A junior freshman ran up to him under the impression that he was of the same status as himself. He inquired: "I say, can you tell me if that beast Bury is going to examine us this morning? Can you give me any tips?" The examiner smilingly replied: "I am the beast"; and if Temple was a just beast, so too was he.

With his lectures he took considerable trouble, and they held the attention of the better men. The mere passman found but little in them to attract him. With lectures, as with everything else, the lectured receives what he comes prepared to find. The more richly his mind is stored, the more he finds, and vice versa. Bury's lectures were lucid and thorough, and lucidity and thoroughness characterise all his work in writing as in lecturing. He took pains to travel to the same conclusion by several roads in order to leave it irresistible. Lines of argument, different in scope and purpose, converged upon the same point. The result was that the teacher left a decided impression on the abler men.

As classical scholars had read his articles and emendations, so too had historians read his articles and reviews, and both were prepared to greet his book with consideration, yet the historians in 1889 read the two noble volumes on *A History of the*

Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene (A.D. 395–A.D. 800) with a shock of surprise.[1] The seed had been sown in only five articles, yet how rich was the harvest! This Empire, the author proclaims, was neither Greek, nor Byzantine, nor yet Eastern, till the coronation of Charles the Great, but Roman *sans phrase*. The Empire was one and indivisible from Augustus to Irene, whether it was governed by Diocletian or Maximinian, by Justinian or by the Isaurian Leo. When old Rome suffered severely by the Gothic War, new Rome became the centre of the world's affairs. Long after the fabled extinction of the Empire in the west, it was a living power to Gregory of Tours and his barbarian kings, and the distant Caesar of Constantinople was still a *dominus rerum humanarum*. Bury approached the Empire from the point of view of one who was fascinated by the history of administration and of the institutions by which the administration is worked. He thus avoided direct comparison with Gibbon and Hodgkin or with Dahn and Hopf. He dwelt on the history of the financial machinery and of the official dignities generally, and discussed the origin of the Themes. With this conception of his vast subject he traced the history of the Empire through the four troubled centuries from Arcadius to Irene. In the days of Arcadius the State had been comparatively ancient, while in those of Irene it was modern. Through the Teutonic conquest of the west, the recovery and loss of Italy and Africa, the wars of Heraclius with the Persians and the Saracens, and the regenerative labours of the iconoclasts, the his-

[1] For the praise of Tozer and Freeman, cf. Baynes, pp. 6-7.

torian effected the transition from the ancient to the modern state.

These two volumes announced that there was a British successor to Gibbon and Finlay, and his labours for forty years confirmed him in that proud position. He was admirably fitted for his researches not only by his complete knowledge of his elaborate material but also by his grasp of the different Slavonic languages, enabling him to consult the important works published in Russia, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Assured master of the original documents and abreast of the most recent authorities, he was equipped to render—and did render—services of the highest order to the understanding of the later Roman Empire.

When he published these volumes Bury was only twenty-seven, and we instinctively think of another of the same age. For it is over 150 years ago that, after a sleepless night, Edward Gibbon "trod with a lofty step the ruins of the Forum". He tells us that "it was at Rome on the 15th of October 1764, as I sat musing amidst the ruins of the Capitol while the bare-footed friars were singing vespers in the Temple of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the decline and fall of the City first started to my mind".[1] Gibbon's achievement is distinctive in that his motive was almost as definite as his scheme was cyclopean. In stately English it was his object to rear a history which should serve as a scaffolding for the criticism of existing beliefs and a text for the development of philosophical theories. "I believed", he concludes, "as I still believe, that the propagation of the

[1] *Autobiography* (Bury's ed.), p. 160.

Gospel and the triumph of the Church are inseparably connected with the decline of the Roman monarchy. I have described", he urges in a final epigram, "the triumph of barbarism and religion." "The barefooted friars"—that is the burden of his lament—"had possessed themselves of the Temple of Jupiter. . . ." If we accept these conclusions at all now, we accept them in a sense that differs widely from that in which Gibbon envisages them. But even if we reject the historian's view, we are anxious to have his presentation at hand. Bury realised this, and from 1896 to 1900 he lavished his resources on the great edition of Gibbon we all know so well and consult so regularly. Accurate scholarship and research mark the notes and the appendices, and they contain the latest sources of information. To-day we see that Gibbon regarded history too exclusively as a registry of the crimes, the follies, and the misfortunes of mankind. Since his heyday Sir Walter Scott has invested the past with the glow of his genius, ushering in the Romantic Revival. Between us and Gibbon there stands the Wizard of the North. He makes us understand that Gibbon's contempt for the Monastic Ages was magnificent. But was it history? His covering theory was that Christianity was a sort of subcutaneous poison which had taken all the sap out of the good old Roman character. Finlay, Bury, Ramsay, and most subsequent historians have held, on the contrary, that Christianity retarded rather than precipitated the fall of the Empire.

The Roman Empire engrossed the thoughts of Bury, though his editions of Pindar's *Nemean Odes*

in 1890 and of his *Isthmian Odes* in 1892 sufficiently attest that his classical and literary studies had not suffered from neglect. Pindar attracted Bury, "for of all Greek poets he is the most Greek; or, rather, in his poems those distinctive qualities of the Greek temper which are alien to modern sentiments and ideas are more clearly reflected than, for instance, in the tragedians. The Greek tragedies deal with forms of human emotion which are universal; as we read them, the stress of common humanity tends to eliminate the differences between the modern and the ancient spirit; and hence we even find it difficult to avoid the importation of modern emotions into our reading of Sophocles and Euripides. Whereas there is no temptation to falsify Pindar in this way, or, as we might say, to modernise him".[1]

It is perfectly obvious that Bury read his Pindar for the sheer delight the poet gave him. He read literature for literature's sake, and no one who ever met him could doubt the pure joy it gave him. He loved poetry for its own sake, and did not peruse it and meditate upon it merely as a field for investigation. He had a special liking for literature somewhat esoteric in character, aloof from common life. One may instance the late Greek romances[2] or the neo-mediaevalism of Rossetti and Morris. At the same time it is easy to see that the lover of Pindar was also the lover of history, and that in fact the one could, from another angle, prove subsidiary to the other. For if Bury were able to pierce behind the

[1] *The Nemean Odes*, p. xi. Cf. the *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. iv. pp. 506-14.

[2] Cf. his 1911 Romanes Lecture on "Romances of Chivalry on Greek Soil".

interpretations of Pindar's poetry offered for the last two thousand years, could he not also pierce the meaning of the chroniclers from 395 to 800? Those who wish to view this aspect of his thought ought to read his penetrating article on "Anima naturaliter pagana. A Quest of the Imagination".[1] Its eleven pages are an eloquent plea for the writer's absolute desire to understand the past, so far as it is possible, as those who lived in that past understood it. Boileau, in an amusing satire, imagines a dispute between Horace and the Parisian *littérateurs* who were forming their language in the days of Louis XIV., and in this dispute Bury revelled. At every step the Roman poet falls into some blunder, using French words and phrases which could be justified according to the dictionary, but which in current usage were solecisms. At every step they correct him—one does not say "la rive" but "le bord" of a river-bank; one does not say "la cité" when one means "la ville de Paris", though one may say "la cité de Rome". Horace accepts their criticism, for how can he do otherwise? He ends the discussion with an ironic hope that they in turn will desist from an equally hopeless attempt to write verses in Latin, And this is legitimate satire; it only emphasises the deeper truth that if we wish to reap the full harvest of Greek literature we really require the "anima naturaliter pagana".

In imagination Bury travelled in the realm of the past, and this travel he assisted by the holidays he spent with his wife abroad. Mindful of Gibbon's advice, in 1889 they followed in the steps of Ausonius

[1] *Fortnightly Review* (1891), N.S. xlix. pp. 102-12.

during a walking-tour in the Moselle, and this tour had many successors. In 1895 they wandered about Greece, and this year he and R. C. Bosanquet visited the northern portion of the country.[1] In 1891 he wrote on compulsory Greek, vigorously defending it on the main ground that it serves no utilitarian purpose. "Greek is useless; but its uselessness is the very strongest reason for its being a compulsory subject in the University course. For the true function of a University is the teaching of useless learning. And if she attempts to do anything else, she is going beyond her proper province. If she is seduced into running after the useful, she is simply denying herself. If she sets before herself other objects than learning for its own sake, she is abandoning her birthright; nay, she is changing into something different from a University."[2] The high doctrine is preached that academic authorities will do well to beware of the Zeitgeist, which must at all costs be kept "at a civil distance".[3] If in this instance he was conservative, in the matter of votes for women he proved himself the liberal he undoubtedly was.[4] In his article on the insurrection of women in 1892 he welcomes the new movement, and he welcomes it on the characteristic ground that Clio is preparing for us one of her surprises. The true argument in favour of women's suffrage is that we have the chance of developing a new type. No such chance, he urges, has come into the world for nearly two thousand years. Christianity gradually shaped a

[1] Baynes, pp. 17-21.
[2] *Fortnightly Review* (1892), N.S., l. p. 813.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 815.
[4] *Ibid.* (1892), N.S., lii. pp. 650-66.

new type of woman, and that was one of its most important effects. May not this movement really prove one of ecumenical importance?

If the catholicity of outlook of Bury is plain in politics, it is no less plain in history. Hegel he continued to read, and he entertained the deepest respect for his modern exponent, M'Taggart, whom he regarded as the greatest metaphysician of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the single exception of Hegel himself. Nor could he ever regard philosophy as outside the scope of history. Men conceived ideas, and ideas produced effects. If he investigated the effects, why should he not also investigate the ideas producing them? In 1889 he read Bergson's *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*", and at once perceived the high place of this new star in the philosophical firmament. In his published work he but seldom alluded to the worth of ideas even in the later Roman Empire, yet no one could know him at all well without instantly noting how much they meant to him. They certainly coloured the background of his work, though they did not often appear in its foreground.

In 1893 the Board of Trinity College signified their appreciation of his work by electing him Professor of History. His predecessor, Barlow, had occupied this chair for thirty-three years, but during this time the books prescribed for the examinations remained for many years unchanged. It was not long before the influence of Bury was felt. He saw that the study of history had undergone a revolution as vast as the study of science, and he took care to broaden its scope. He introduced the subject of

Russian history to his audience, and he contemplated a biography of Catherine the Great. He lectured upon her, and none who heard him, even the most careless undergraduate, could help feeling how important Russian history would prove for the future of mankind. Certainly we shall never forget a June day in 1896 when he was describing the period of troubles in Russia at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the College Park outside his classroom men were playing a game of cricket. The Professor had come to the end of his lecture, and, throwing away his manuscript, he delivered himself of the message he must give. "Gentlemen", he declared, "Russia is rotten, politically rotten, to the core. The period of troubles brought anarchy to Russia for generations. What has happened in the past may well happen in the future in a land where to-day not a few of the aristocracy are immoral and ruined, where there is an underpaid and corrupt bureaucracy, and where there is no middle class. In the twentieth century there may be another period of troubles lasting quite as long as that of the seventeenth, and with even graver effects upon the destinies of the world." To the few present it seemed as if the Professor were unrolling the book of Fate before our eyes. As he stopped speaking there was a loud cheer outside as a cricketer scored a boundary. It is thirty-three years since he so spoke, and let the intervening years attest the accuracy of his judgment. Has not his foresight scored? Men during the World War used to recall the prescience of Acton when he declared that the bayonets of Berlin constituted the most serious menace to our Empire.

Such a position was quite clear any time after 1890. But was Bury's position in 1896 at all clear? He was in truth a prophet capable of impressing men with the seriousness of the study of history.

In 1893 he wrote *A History of the Roman Empire from its Foundation to the Death of Marcus Aurelius* (27 B.C–A.D. 180). It is a useful handbook, which has introduced many generations of students to its subject. Mommsen had begun such a history, but he only left a single chapter with the motto:

> Gern hatt' ich fortgeschrieben
> Aber es ist liegen blieben.[1]

Greenidge began it, and passed away. Arnold began it, and passed away.[2] Pelham began it, and he too passed away. All left no more than fragments of the *magnum opus* they had planned. Now Dessau is at work, and we hope that he will finish what so many have begun.

What moved Bury most was Greece and all that Greece meant to the world. No doubt he is the great historian of the later Roman Empire, yet, to quote his own words, he wrote that history because "the civilisation of the later Roman Empire was the continuation of that of ancient Greece. Hellenism entered upon its second phase when Alexander of Macedon expanded the Greek world into the east, and on its third with the foundation of Constantine by the waters where Asia and Europe met. Christianity, with its dogmatic theology and its monasticism, gave to this third phase its distinctive character and flavour, and Byzantine civilisation . . . is

[1] Pelham, *Essays in Roman History*, p. xv.
[2] Ward and Montague, *William Thomas Arnold*, p. 38.

an appropriate and happy name."[1] Fascinated as Bury was by the later Roman Empire, the Empire itself moved him but slightly. In his lectures, as in his writings, he used to point out that the Romans were destitute of creative and originative powers. In law they have left a decisive mark, but what have they bequeathed to mankind in political science or in finance, in warfare or in mechanics, in religion or literature or art? Absolutely nothing.[2] With Seeck he insists that this degeneration did not display itself merely in sterility, but was strikingly shown in the want of intellectual originality which marks the imperial period from the very beginning.[3] With ideas like these in his mind, we can well imagine the pleasure with which he turned to write his *History of Greece*, which appeared in 1900. As a piece of literature it belongs to a higher class than his *History of the Roman Empire from its Foundation to the Death of Marcus Aurelius*, for it throbbed with the intense love that declared itself in everything that concerned the history of Athens. From the beginnings of Greece and the Heroic Age he covered with sure step the ground down to the death of Alexander the Great. Athens is treated as the crown of a long development. The forces that were expended in the making of that frail and priceless fabric are traced back to the impulses awakened in the untamed northerners who settled in prehistoric times on the sunny shores of the Mediterranean—impulses which carried them through the stormy

[1] *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, iv. pp. 8-9.
[2] *Saturday Review*, June 29, 1896.
[3] *Quarterly Review*, cxcii. (1900), p. 134.

waters of piracy and mutual destruction to the haven of an ordered city-life. Nature imparted to Bury a vigorous imagination to which he allowed free scope. He had trodden the shores of Hellas with open eyes, and his great *History of Greece* is in no small degree the fruit of his *Wanderjähre*. To his faculty of observation we owe not a few suggestive parallels, which are real. He brings out the significance of the details of tradition and fragmentary records, and pieces them together with marvellous skill. He recognises, without exaggerating, the importance of geography, climate, and environment generally for the student of a people in the making; while he never employed his gift of word-painting to better purpose. The result is that his "History" can be read with keen pleasure and digested with ample profit by all lovers of ancient Greece. In 1898 the Board of Trinity College had appointed him Professor of Greek. As he retained his chair of history, he thus occupied the unique position of holding two chairs at the same time. Lord Acton planned *The Cambridge Modern History*, and in 1902 the first volume upon the Renaissance appeared. Bury contributed the swift review of the Ottoman conquest. He had not long finished his edition of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, and was busying himself with the authorities upon which the life of St. Patrick was based. He had a sound working acquaintance with Irish history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but he felt intrigued where he could discern the influence of another nation on the fortune of his native land. His aim was the high one of placing events in their

proper focus, of regarding them not as isolated fragments. He sought in facts in Irish history more of the history of the world than the average Irish historian was willing to allow, and he inevitably deepened and expanded the explanation of these facts. For every new fact we discover about a thing is a step in the direction of its explanation, as this fact, on closer inspection, is seen to contain a relation to other things, and thus to force us beyond the limits of the part to the whole to which it belongs, and which alone can render it more completely intelligible to us.

The mass of work done by Bury in College and in his writings was only possible to one who was exceedingly exact and punctilious in all business matters. He never failed to have his examination papers ready on the appointed day and always kept his appointments to the minute. A Dublin colleague writes that if he wanted to raise an objection, he would not seem to himself to have even begun to state it when Bury would say, "Suppose we alter it this way", exactly expressing the point at issue. His kindness to the real scholar was unvarying, and he would exert himself to the utmost on behalf of the pupil extending the boundaries of knowledge. No one ever heard him complain: no one ever heard him grumble. Of course he might mention that someone restored a line of Euripides with a dactyl in the fourth foot or things like that, but this was just a scholar's note.

In the ordinary routine of Trinity College he took but a faint interest. One of the few times he roused himself was when Bryce proposed to include the

College in a federal university. This, he thought, threatened intellectual freedom, and any threat to that evoked all his powers of resistance. He took no part in the administration of Trinity College: he was not even a member of the Council, though he might have been had he chosen. While a tutor he never sought pupils, and had very few. That was not his métier at all, Nor did he take any part in the working of the learned Societies in Dublin. He was not a member of the Royal Irish Academy or of the Royal Dublin Society, though he read a few papers before the former. In this policy we feel that he was really right. With his commanding intellect he did much better by the world at large by devoting it to the various subjects he touched—and adorned—than if he had spent his life wrangling in committees, the fate of too many scholars. From this fate he turned with scorn. Once we heard him say that some dons were like the sailors in St. Paul's shipwreck: they trusted to achieve their intellectual salvation on boards.

As an historian, Bury was a fortunate man. He had found many subjects of research suited to his gifts. Others had noted his employment of them, and accordingly it was no matter of surprise that the Crown, acting through Mr. Balfour, appointed him Regius Professor of History at Cambridge in 1902, and he became a Fellow of King's College. The government of this College ultimately rests with the whole body of Fellows assembled in Congregation: here all general questions of policy are decided. The routine business is managed by a smaller body, called the Council, which looks after

administrative business. Bury was never asked to serve on the latter, for it would have been a gross waste of talents like his to employ them on mere matters of detail. But in his attendance at meetings of the Congregation he was most conscientiously regular; he did not take an active part in debates or administrative affairs. He knew, however, everything that was taking place, often discussed doubtful points beforehand with his more intimate friends, always bestowed close attention upon the discussion, and his vote, though given in silence, expressed a well-considered judgment. As an elector to Fellowships he was peculiarly well fitted both by his attainments and by his natural gifts. He was endowed with a particularly fine mental balance, a judicious poise of judgment, and a flair for discovering the essential point amid a mass of detail.

On January 26, 1903, he delivered his Inaugural Lecture, and it rivals in attractiveness the famous one delivered by his predecessor in the chair, Lord Acton. The new Professor declared the lofty doctrine that though history "may supply material for literary art or philosophical speculations, she is herself simply a science, no less and no more".[1] Critics so fair-minded as John Morley and S. H. Butcher misapprehended this doctrine, supposing that Bury meant that the presentation of the results of historical research is not an art, requiring the tact and skill in selection and arrangement which belong to the literary faculty.[2] But this was sheer misapprehension. He explained the statement of his historical

[1] *An Inaugural Lecture*, p. 42.
[2] Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, p. viii.

creed in the paper which he wrote on the place of modern history in the perspective of knowledge.[1] In it he related history to the whole social development of which it is a part. Seeley, another predecessor in the Cambridge chair, had taught that the only or the main value of historical study consists in its auxiliary services to the study of political science, and against this view Bury protests as energetically as ever Sir George Prothero had protested. Nor is the study of history to be subordinate, as Saint-Simon, Comte, Herbert Spencer, and some American professors demand, to sociology. The philosophy of history "means the investigation of the rational principles which . . . are disclosed in the historical progress due to the co-operation and interaction of human minds under terrestrial conditions. If the philosophy of history is not illusory, history means a disclosure of spiritual reality in the fullest way in which it is cognisable to us in these particular conditions. And, on the other hand, the possibility of an interpretation of history as a movement of reason, disclosing its nature in terrestrial circumstances, seems the only hypothesis on which the postulate of 'history for its own sake' can be justified as valid."[2] The student of Hegel and Bergson peers at us in the position that "this fundamental problem belongs to philosophy and lies outside the scope of the discussion",[2] and indeed in this very paper there is a criticism of the attempts of Hegel and Krause to trace the rational element in the general movement of

[1] Published in the *Congress of Arts and Sciences* (St. Louis, 1904), pp. 142-52.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 144.

humanity, and both attempts are characterised as splendid failures. Clearly, "all that philosophy can do is to assure us that historical experience is a disclosure of the inner nature of spiritual reality".[1] He is a disbeliever in the naturalism which leads Comte to assign a low position to history. He is an idealist who holds that "thought is a presupposition of physical existence and not a function of matter", and, accordingly, history is "a disclosure of the evolution of thought" with "an independent realm of its own and demands a strict interpretation, to prepare for which is the aim of historical research".[2]

To Bury modern history began with the sixteenth century, and at the same time he insisted on the continuity of all history. As the historian of the later Roman Empire, how could he do otherwise? In 1905 he produced his *Life of St. Patrick*, viewing his labours from the point of one to whom Rome meant the heart of the world. True, it was the heart of the world, but did the patron saint of Ireland so regard it? It is not too much to say that the biographer knew far more about the working of the Empire than St. Patrick ever knew. We cannot help thinking that Tacitus's expression "medio inter Britanniam atque Hispaniam sita" testifies to the slight connexion between Ireland and the world of Rome, especially when we remember that it is written by the son-in-law of a general who had once himself received a fugitive Irish prince into his camp. And yet if it be a fault to view Irish history too

[1] Published in the *Congress of Arts and Sciences* (St. Louis, 1904), p. 147.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 152.

imperially, it is a fault that a scholar of Bury's temperament could hardly avoid committing. Old Ulster associations gave him the large outlook of the province that has sent forth proconsuls to India and Canada. St. Patrick to him was much more than an apostle of Ireland: he was an apostle of the Roman Empire. Accordingly the biographer presses the evidence to the conclusion that the saint paid a visit to Rome in 441–443. But can we afford to ignore the significant silence as to the Roman mission or authority of St. Patrick maintained in the genuine writings of the saint, the equally significant silence of Prosper, and the silence in the contemporary hymn of St. Secundinus, the hymn of St. Fiacc, and the biography of Muirchu Maccuncachtheni?

From the indirect method of approach to his own favourite subject we come to the direct in his 1906 paper on the treatise *De administrando imperio*, in which his love of institutions and his thorough grasp of them are evident in a masterly piece of analysis. In the following year he continued his labour by his examination of the Ceremonial Book of Constantine Porphyrogennetos. In 1910 he delivered his Creighton memorial lecture on the constitution of the later Roman Empire, setting it forth most luminously. The next year he elaborately examined the imperial administrative system in the ninth century, furnishing a revised text of *The Kletorologion* of Philotheos. Scholars of the standing of Diehl, Hein, Ostrogorsky, and Stein attest their lively admiration of these four papers. Diehl accounts the survey of the administrative system in the ninth century as "an edition accompanied by a

judicial commentary of impeccable authority upon the dignities and the responsibilities of Byzantine officials".[1] Hein thinks it displays Bury's linguo-historical knowledge in a brilliance more characteristic and more outstanding than in any other of his writings.[2] Ostrogorsky deems it "indispensable to students",[3] and to Stein it is "a mine of information concerning the relation of the mid-Byzantine Empire to its barbarous neighbours. Nowhere else is Bury's brilliant and striking knowledge of language so remarkable. He seems to have understood at least two Slavonic languages as well as Magyar. With admirable brevity he sets forth the chronology and significance of important events, and discriminates between what has falsely been retained by others. His researches in the history of the neighbouring States throw light upon the Byzantine."[4]

On March 11, 1908, Bury sailed from Liverpool for the United States to deliver a course of lectures on an old subject, the ancient Greek Historians, at Harvard University. He maintained that if the Greeks had possessed records extending over the history of two or three thousand years, they might have founded scientific history. This means that the conception of development is the essential factor in the creation of the science of history. Though Wilamowitz-Möllendorff implies rather than states that antiquarian research was unknown to the Greeks, surely Bury is right in believing that the

[1] In a letter to the author.
[2] *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xxvii. (1927), pp. 239-40.
[3] In a letter to the author.
[4] In a letter to the author.

creation of antiquarian study is one of the numerous precious services rendered by the Greeks to the progress of human culture. The chapters on Herodotus and Thucydides are wholly delightful, reminding one of characterisations in his *History of Greece, e.g.* on Socrates and Dionysius. The lecturer endeavours to penetrate the elusive secrets of the workshop of Thucydides. He puts forward the suggestion that the obscurity which has proved such a stone of stumbling to ancient and modern interpreters is not merely intentional, but is confined to such passages or speeches as convey the historian's own reflections. In the last chapter on views of the ancients concerning the use of history the lecturer throws out many *obiter dicta*. "To comprehend the significance of the present we must be acquainted with the history of the past."[1] "The a priori synthesis of universal history which was launched on the world by the early Christian fathers, in the interest of their religion, threw the cyclical theory (of history) into the background."[2] Nor was the man who acclaimed history as a science afraid of the charge of inconsistency. In these very lectures he lays down: "I know for myself that on days when I am a determinist I look on history in one way, and on days when I am an indeterminist in quite another".[3] Newman held a similar position when he asserted: "In a higher world it may be different, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often". We may feel assured that whenever Bury

[1] *The Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 249.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 248.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 204.

changed he was advancing to a finer point of view, one he had not perceived before.

To the 1909 volume on *Darwin and Modern Science* Bury contributed his view of the influence of the teaching of the great biologist upon history. He links this view to his Harvard lectures, for he once more points out that with the Greeks and Romans history had been either a descriptive record or had been written in practical interests. "For Machiavelli, exactly as for Thucydides and Polybius, the use of studying history was instruction in the art of politics."[1] The idea of progress was unknown save in the rudimentary form in which Seneca held it. Was history causal or casual? Naturally he leans to the view that it is causal, though he is too clear-headed not to discern the share taken by contingency and by the great man. "This element (of chance coincidence) must have played a part in the events of organic evolution, but it has probably in a larger measure helped to determine events in social evolution. The collision of two unconnected sequences may be fraught with great results. The sudden death of a leader or a marriage without issue, to take simple cases, has again and again led to permanent political consequences."[2] Nor is it possible to ignore the part played by the great man. "If the significance of the individual will had been exaggerated to the neglect of the collective activity of the social aggregate before Condorcet, his doctrine tended to eliminate as unimportant the rôles of prominent men, and by means

[1] *Darwin and Modern Science*, p. 530.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 538.

of this elimination it was possible to found sociology. But it may be urged that it is patent on the face of history that its course has constantly been shaped and modified by the wills of individuals, which are by no means always the expression of the collective will; and that the appearance of such personalities at the given moments is not the necessary outcome of the conditions and cannot be deduced. Nor is there any proof that, if such and such an individual had not been born, someone else would have arisen to do what he did. In some cases it seems evident that the actual change was inevitable, but in default of the man who initiated and guided it, it might have been postponed and, postponed or not, might have borne a different cachet."[1] Obviously, if history is a science, it is a science at the mercy of chance coincidence and of the fortuitous appearance of the great man.

Wolf's *Prolegomena* to Homer ushered in methods of investigation which the historian applied. Hegel conceived the successive periods of history as corresponding to the ascending phases or ideas in the self-evolution of his Absolute Being. Wolf and Hegel influenced Ranke, who boldly announced in 1824 that his sole concern was to show how events actually happened. Savigny made this teaching his own when he founded the "historical school" of law, the school which discerned the growth of law out of custom, precedent, and a hundred other fashions, as well as out of judicial decisions and parliamentary statutes. What Ranke and Savigny had been outlining in Germany, Con-

[1] *Darwin and Modern Science*, p. 538.

dorcet and Comte had been outlining in France. Ranke and Savigny had outlined historical and legal development long before Darwin, and, after Darwin, Lamprecht had followed in their steps and in Marx's. Marx and Lamprecht turned their attention to economic history, where perhaps the problem set by the appearance of the genius interferes least in the whole domain of history, though the appearance of so many great English inventors from 1760 to 1785 suggests that even in economic history we can never quite arrive at general laws independent of the accidental arrival of the inventor. Conflicting courses lie before the national leaders, and, as Bury perceives, the laws Lamprecht confidently enunciates do not enable us to determine why they choose this course instead of that. He reduces—or rather attempts to reduce —history to general concepts. It is a task eminently well worthy trying, but the point is, does he succeed? He argues that events show a psychical character, and that these events give rise to a phase of civilisation. The given phase of civilisation forms "a collective psychical condition" controlling the period, "a diapason which penetrates all psychical phenomena and thereby all historical events of the time". Lamprecht does not hesitate to work out a series of such phases, "ages of changing psychical diapason", and his object is to exhibit these diapasons in other social developments. But does he exhibit them? Bury entertains doubts. Chance, accident, and the presence of the genius alike disagree with the existence of these diapasons. The truth is that no matter how loudly we proclaim that history is a science we are confronted

with all sorts of exceptions, and these exceptions go far to nullify the operation of laws in history. "One may venture to say that no historical change or transformation will be fully understood until it is explained how social environment acted on the individual components of the society (both immediately and by heredity), and how the individuals reacted upon their environment. The problem is psychical, but it is analogous to the main problem of the biologist."[1]

Though *Kultur-Geschichte* does not bulk largely in Bury's books, no one who had the good fortune to know him would doubt that it formed the background of his thought.[2] In 1912 he contributed a preface to Ruffini's *Religious Liberty*, and in 1914 he published his outline of *A History of Freedom of Thought*, which is not written with the accuracy characteristic of all his other writings. For the accuracy of Bury is that of Ranke and Stubbs, of Gibbon and Thirlwall. The growth of the freedom of opinion fascinated him as it fascinated Lecky. His early work was apparently inspired by the successes of Hallam and Buckle. The *History of Rationalism in Europe* surveys European thought in some six essays. The nineteenth century was still satisfied with itself. It was persuaded that it was more rational than all its predecessors. And certainly, if we select such topics as religious persecution, magic and witchcraft, and the belief in casual miracles, the persuasion may appear plausible. If we approach

[1] *Darwin and Modern Science*, p. 542.

[2] Let anyone turn to Blackwell's catalogue (No. 228) of his library.

other questions discussed in this book, such as trade restrictions and political theory, the conclusion is not self-evident. The treatment of the subject is, however, vigorous, lucid, and orderly; the range of reading shown by the author wide; the arguments are clear and plausible. But the whole inquiry is too plainly dominated by the presupposition. The facts do not inspire the ideas; the ideas direct the course of investigation, and determine the choice of facts. Immense as is the ground covered, the reader is left with the uncomfortable feeling that, since no man can be master of the whole field of observations, and since in any case only a small part of the material evidence can be contained in this book, it is possible that a wholly different set of facts might be collected in another book, to establish, with equal plausibility, the opposite thesis.

The success of Lecky's first book [1] encouraged him to continue on the same lines, though in his next work he was apparently content to impose upon himself some voluntary limits. A *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne* would be of immense interest, if it could be written. The theme also affords scope for philosophic inquiry of the widest kind; every point affords opportunity for those intoxicating generalisations which Lecky, at this period of his career, loved so dearly. The strength of the prevailing school of Utilitarians was such as to incite a young, daring, and brilliant opponent to desire the breaking of a lance; and on historical ground they were peculiarly vulnerable.

[1] We omit his *Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland.*

The relation of religion to morals is and was, especially in the sixties, a highly stimulating topic. Taking the point of view of the day, the subject was well chosen. But the historian himself must have felt, before his task was completed, that his knowledge was inadequate for a final solution of his problem. The learning displayed is indeed remarkable. A number of theses are developed and illustrated with great skill by anecdotes drawn from a great variety of sources. The treatment of the Imperial times is, as Bury used to hold, the most satisfactory part of the book. There the material had been handled and rehandled; it was ordered and nearly ready for use. On the other hand, so far as mediaeval morality is concerned, the author had not lived into his age. Nor had he met with any interpreter who could put him into intimate communication with the almost inaccessible mind of the Dark Ages, which, in spite of Maitland's gibe, are still dark even to those who know them at first hand. The result is an interesting and lively series of disquisitions and a collection of quaint and curious stories; the history of European morals in the Dark Ages remains, however, to be written.

In his next book on *Kultur-Geschichte*, Bury severely limited himself in 1920 to the history of the *Idea of Progress*. I am responsible for the appearance of this fine book. As I attended the lectures of my Professor, it was soon evident that the question of the gradual advance of toleration was never far from his thoughts. I planned my book on *Erasmus and Luther: Their Attitude to Toleration*, and as I planned it I was constantly impressed by the cir-

cumstance that very few men in the sixteenth century entertained the idea of progress. The possession of this idea cuts at the roots of persecution, which is founded upon the view that a body holds complete truth. If there is a growth in knowledge, persecution, *ipso facto*, becomes impossible. Erasmus is quite clear that knowledge of the past and knowledge in the past have increased. Is he clear that fresh ideas, which the scholars of old never knew, will come to light? The more I ponder his writings the more I realise how hampered he was in his outlook by his adherence to the ideals of the world of antiquity, which does not grasp the conception of progress. Seneca is the solitary classical writer who believed in progress in our modern sense. The appendix to my *Erasmus and Luther* deals with this absorbing subject. As Bury always manifested the kindliest interest in all my writing, I wrote to him, telling him of my point of view. I sent him my manuscript, through which he carefully looked, and then he informed me that he had gathered material on the growth of the idea of progress, and that the perusal of my manuscript determined him to present it for publication.

Bury's *Idea of Progress* is marked by that insight we have long learnt to associate with his name. He brings his investigation from classical times down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The outstanding feature of his illuminating volume is the attention paid to the decisive steps in the growth of the conception. In it there is encyclopaedic knowledge, but there is also a rarer quality, and that is the penetration with which the investigation is conducted.

The civic ideal of the classical world, the monastic ideal of the early Middle Ages, the chivalrous ideal of the later Middle Ages—these are written so plainly on the pages of history that no one can ignore them. Each of them in turn passes away, and we are interested in the causes of the passing. The inquirer of to-day perceives the altered ideal, and he naturally desires to note the trend of events when an ideal is translated into action. In a word, he assumes that there must be progress. The idea of progress, however, is wholly modern, and, as Bury proves, was inconceivable before the sixteenth century. Bury, unlike Lecky, has not written a history of thought. He has accomplished what can be accomplished, and that is the history of the growth of a particular thought. He has read and meditated; and he helps us throughout to realise how wholly modern is the very idea of progress. As we turn over the writings of the sixteenth century we catch a glimpse of the true spirit of the Renaissance. Do we remember sufficiently how long it was before the spirit of the belief in progress was destined to prevail? If, on the one side, there are Rabelais, Campanella, and Francis Bacon, on the other we find Machiavelli, Bodin, and Montaigne. It was barely possible to conceive the idea of progress before their day. For the doctrine of continuous change has for its basis the notion of the unity of mankind; it envisages the tribes, the cities, the nations as so many members of a great family. It assigns to each of them a providential rôle in the immeasurable career in which humanity advances. Now, not only were these underlying truths unknown to the classical and

mediaeval worlds; the members thereof were profoundly antipathetic to them. The discovery of printing, the impossibility of another *Völkerwanderung*, the greater ease of international relations, all combine to reject a system by which Machiavelli condemns the human race to eternal oscillations between truth and error. Ideas like these were fundamental conditions of the thought of Descartes, as Bury reveals. He broke completely with the past. It was a matter of pride to him—of horror to Bury—that he had forgotten the Greek he had learned as a lad. Knowledge of philosophy and science furnished him with the key to the elevation of mankind. Reason was the test to which he submitted everything; and from the use of reason he deduced laws of Nature which were invariable in their operation. Accordingly, Bury reckoned him the first great apostle of progress.

The dispute on the merits of the ancients and the moderns is related to the subject of the book, for behind this dispute lies the question, Do we progress? For if we do not, the question is foreclosed. In 1772 the Chevalier de Chastellux published his book *On Public Felicity, or Considerations on the lot of Men at the various epochs of History.* Gibbon at this very time was plunged in a similar speculation. We may remember that he declared that, if a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would without hesitation name the period between the death of Domitian and the accession of Commodus. "If the angel of the Lord", according to Mommsen, "were to

strike the balance whether the domain ruled by Severus Antoninus was governed with the greater intelligence and the greater humanity then or now, whether civilisation and general prosperity have since then advanced or retrograded, it is very doubtful whether the decision would be in favour of the present." Doubts akin to Mommsen's did not cross the mind of Chastellux.

Bury characterises the two distinct types of theories of progress. "The one type is that of the constructive idealists and socialists, who can name all the streets and towers of 'the city of gold', which they imagine as situated just round a promontory. The development of man is a closed system; its term is known and within reach. The other type is that of those who, surveying the gradual ascent of man, believe that by the same interplay of forces which have conducted him so far, and by a further development of the liberty which he has fought to win, he will move slowly towards conditions of increasing harmony and happiness. Here the development is indefinite; its term is unknown and lies in the remote future. Individual liberty is the motive force, and the corresponding theory is liberalism; whereas the first doctrine naturally leads to a symmetrical system in which the authority of the State is preponderant, and the individual has little more liberty than a cog in a well-oiled wheel; it is not his right to go his own way."[1] Though Fourier, Saint Simon, and Comte attempted to ascertain the causes of the laws of progress, they signally failed. Fourier and Saint Simon dreamed of industrial socialism. It is a dream,

[1] *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 236-7.

an impressive dream, of the importance of Labour in the world. The two types of theories of progress still remain, and we are all familiar with them. There is no need to point out that Darwinism increases the value of the second type.

Evolution discredits all attempts to assign to the future a fixed term. Is not progress confined by the limitations of the human faculty? Is the boundary to which this faculty extends capable of indefinite approach? Laue at Munich, De Broglie at Paris, and Bragg in England have been passing X-rays through crystals and getting effects by reflexion from planes of molecules in the crystals which very nearly reveal to us the individual molecule in its fixed position in the crystal. The X-rays appear to be of exceeding small wave-length—perhaps 18,600 times less than that of light—and we have already a further instrument which shows that no finality in this direction need be expected. We may realise the atom itself in some way, though we may not be able to detach and handle it. That it has a material existence seems as probable as anything we know.

The limits of research, then, are very hard to define. When we get (apparently) to the bottom of material structure, synthesis may begin, and we may build up from atoms structures that have natural properties and repeat natural things. Is it hopeless to look forward to the construction of the very complex molecule of protoplasm? and, if it can be done, will it live? In truth, there is no limit to research save that imposed by our senses. Our material senses must be affected in some way by the matter that is the subject of the research. What our eye is unfitted to see

may perhaps convey some sensation to smell or hearing, or may be so enlarged by our artifice that its image (which is, in the last resort, all that we ever see) shall become appreciable.

These are no idle speculations, for such a keen observer as Lord Balfour discerns progress in the modern alliance between pure science and industry. It would seem that the Labour Party regards nationalisation as a great step in progress. Socialism provides the ideal solution. The pity is that paper schemes which inaugurate an age of universal bliss have never been adjusted to the actualities of the world as it exists. The vision of the Golden Age lay in the past for the men of the later Roman Empire and, for the most part, for the men of the Renaissance. It began to lie in the future for Descartes and the men he moulded. Science, which has altered so much, has also altered the value of the dogma of progress. Evolution will not hear of finality. For "if we accept the reasonings", inquires Bury, "on which the dogma of Progress is based, must we not carry them to their full conclusion? In escaping from the illusion of finality, is it legitimate to exempt that dogma itself? Will not that process of change, for which Progress is the optimistic name, compel ' Progress' too to fall from the commanding position in which it is now, with apparent security, enthroned? Ἔσσεται ἦμαρ ὅταν . . . A day will come, in the revolution of the centuries, when a new idea will usurp the place as the directing idea of humanity. Another star, unnoticed now or invisible, will climb up the intellectual heaven, and human emotions will react to its influence, human plans respond to its guidance.

It will be the criterion by which Progress and all other plans will be judged. And it too will have a successor."[1]

Sir Henry Maine used to insist that, though the invasions of the barbarians smashed up the shell of the Roman Empire, yet they saved Europe from falling into the comatose condition of China. The transition from Bury's study of the growth of the idea of progress to *The History of the Roman Empire*, which he published in 1912, is not accordingly so sharp as might be supposed. The great monographs of the years 1906 to 1911 formed the foundation of his survey of the period from 802 to 867, the Amorian period. It was a welcome continuation of the *History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene*, extended to the death of Michael III. The new work was on a much larger scale. The earlier work covered 407 years, the later one only 65. As in Gibbon, domestic affairs are first explained, and then follow foreign affairs. This volume covers the growth of the Frankish Empire in the West, the regulations of its relations with New Rome, the close of the Iconoclastic controversy, which seems so strangely futile to us but which was in reality a significant phase of the struggle between Eastern and Western Christendom, and, above all, the conversion of the Slavs. In this conversion the historian sees political or ecclesiastical motives lying behind the devoted labours of the Slavonic apostles, but is this really so? Is it not truer to the facts to discern the main motive to be the conversion of the heathen? In truth, it seems as if Bury, like Gibbon, failed to

[1] *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 351-2.

appreciate the ecclesiastical side of Byzantine history. Only once did he concern himself with a special study of the Church and her dogmas, and that was the case of the heresy of Justinian. The historian could scarcely realise that the Iconoclast controversy and similar disputes were of real interest to all Greeks, just as to-day the Kalymniote sponge-fishers are absorbed in the question whether the Church of the Dodekanese should or should not be separated from the Ecumenical Patriarchate and be made autocephalous, because when politics are forbidden the Greeks take to theology. Here speaks the true spirit of Byzantinism, and we sometimes wonder how deeply Bury realised this outlook. At the same time, he was the master of all who have studied Byzantine history in our generation.

No doubt the Amorian age meant a new phase of Byzantine culture, yet we cannot point to such achievements in the way of expansion or consolidation as fall to the credit of the Isaurians who went before, or the Macedonians who followed after. Besides, the sources of our knowledge of this epoch are far from trustworthy. Bury admits not only that much of his narrative belongs to *fables convenues*, but that it would not be just to the leading men of this period to attempt to draw their portraits. "The data are entirely insufficient." The truth is that we know much less of the men of the Amorian age than we do of others who lived in times far more remote. It was said of a great savant that to him all facts were born free and equal, and there is a touch of this in this book. He has to do his best with the material at his disposal. He justly emphasises the

fact that the chroniclers upon whom we are forced to rely wrote in the interest of the Basilian dynasty, which had established itself on the throne by a brutal murder, and therefore pursued the memory and blackened the repute of the Amorian rulers with deliberate and malignant detraction, Bury has, notwithstanding, done all that was possible in the present state of our knowledge to construct an intelligible narrative. He shows his special familiarity with the work of Russian scholars, who have done so much for the history of the hearth at which the torch of Russian civilisation and Russian Christianity was kindled. He casts his net widely afield. The excavations of the Russian Archaeological Institute of Constantinople at Piska are brought into due prominence, and, in spite of their tantalising obscurity, skilful use is made of the inscriptions which throw light on early Bulgarian history. Of course none of the recently published literary sources—such as the anonymous chronicle brought to light by Cumont, which definitely fixed the attack of the Russian pirates on Constantinople in the year 860—have been neglected.

Theophanes, Gnesius, and the rest spend their strength on the unedifying scandals of Court and Church, and yet even out of them Bury pieces together their hints on the changes taking place in Byzantine society, culture, and administrative methods. In a consideration of the last he naturally uses what he extracts from the titles of the official hierarchy preserved in the *Kletorologion* of Philotheos. It affords some information on the financial reorganisation of which the results are

patent in ninth century documents; but the difficulty is to know when and by whom these changes were carried out. Was Nicephorus the Arab, the first professional financier to ascend the Imperial Throne, responsible for much? It is at any rate clear that the formation of the great landed estates, which had been checked by the Isaurian Emperors, went on apace during the ninth century, until the Crown was compelled to enter upon a struggle with territorial magnates which formed a leading factor in Byzantine history in the tenth and eleventh centuries. It was suggested by Finlay that the rebellion of Thomas of Gaziura partook of the character of a social revolution, and the term Jacquerie has been applied to it in more recent times; but Bury rightly is disposed to regard it as the cause rather than the effect of the ruin of the small proprietors of Asia Minor. The materials for the economic interpretation of Byzantine history are poor, and Bury never evinced any deep interest in such interpretation of history.

The last great work to be published in his lifetime was *A History of the Later Roman Empire from the Death of Theodosius I. to the Death of Justinian*, which appeared in 1923. His first book on this subject had appeared in 1889, and without haste and without rest he had pursued his fruitful toil throughout the intervening years. Mommsen once said that, were he granted a second lifetime, he would devote it to the Later Empire. What Mommsen desired to achieve, Bury achieved, and his last book crowns the labour of a lifetime. Throughout these two massive volumes there is no sign that his mental eye-

sight had decayed, though, alas, his eyes were beginning to give him grave trouble. The first volume concerns itself with the constitution of the monarchy, followed by a survey of the administrative machinery, topics in which he was thoroughly at home. The section on compulsory social organisation is not without bearing on some of the changes then taking place in our own social structure: these he passes by. He attempts to estimate the number of the barbarians who overran the Empire, reducing them to very much smaller figures than those that used to be reckoned. The fighting forces of the Vandals and the Ostrogoths were to be counted by tens, not by hundreds of thousands. In spite of Seeley, he maintains that there is no evidence of a less population in the Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries than in the first. In spite of Gibbon and Seeck, he holds that Christianity did not exercise a disintegrating power, at least in the West after the defeat of Arianism, "and the effect of Christianity was to unite, not to sever, to check rather than to emphasise national or sectional feeling . . . nor is there the least reason to suppose that Christian teaching had the practical effect of making men less loyal to the Empire or less ready to defend it".

The collapse of the Ostrogothic rule in Italy, the successive sieges of Rome, the defeat of Totila at Busta Gallorum and of Teias at Mons Lactarius, and the reorganisation of Italy at Narses are duly chronicled in the second volume. The lover of toleration lifts his hands in horror at the lack of it shown by almost all the rulers. It was only the "barbarian" Theodoric who, according to Cassiodorus, held that

"religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur ut credat inuitus". The closing of the Athenian schools by Justinian, who receives ample consideration, was not due to any special animosity towards Athens: it was simply part of his general policy. Our view of the character of Justinian and Theodora will depend on the acceptance or the rejection of the *Historia Arcana* of Procopius. Bury entertains no doubt of the authorship. Procopius wrote it, but his statements are to be accepted with grave reservations. "Malice need not resort to invention. . . . It can serve its purpose far more successfully by adhering to facts, misinterpreting motives, and suppressing circumstances which point to a different interpretation." During all the years the author was pouring out these books and articles, the Fellow of King's College and the Regius Professor of Modern History were conscientiously discharging their respective duties. To the call of the committee he refused to respond: to the call of duty he was prompt to respond. The World War did not surprise him, for his knowledge of German and Russian history, to say nothing of that of the smaller Slavonic States, had prepared him for the explosion. His only son served in the war, and suffered severely. Probably the only excursion he took into contemporary politics was when he wrote in 1915 his pamphlet on *L'Allemagne et la civilisation slave*, and in it he refuted the claim that the war was at bottom the struggle between Teutonic Kultur and Slav barbarism.

He planned *The Cambridge Medieval History* and *The Cambridge Ancient History*, and his colleagues

in these enterprises were not slow to acknowledge the active share he had taken in them. During the last five years of his life his health was not very good, and for the last year at least he was a very ill man indeed, and what perhaps one admired in him most was his courage and the way in which his ill-health never weakened his judgment or wearied his patience. He brought his encyclopaedic knowledge to bear upon any problem the editors or the contributors suggested, and he brought it to bear with all his old readiness and his sureness of judgment. He set great store on lucidity and had an instinct for what people less learned than himself needed to be told. He had not that devouring interest in minutiae which is one of the virtues—and vices—of editors, and he had no desire to force his own opinions on other people. He was always courteous and never made any parade of his great knowledge. Whether he left a fellow-editor to settle matters or not, he was always ready to shoulder the responsibility for any mistakes committed, and he was the most loyal of colleagues and the most kindly of advisers.

To-day we can look back at the books and the articles he wrote, and we can see how splendidly he vindicated the claims of Byzantine history, claims that Gibbon, under the influence of Montesquieu, had steadily ignored. To-day, thanks to his toil and genius, we realise the unspeakable benefits conferred by the Eastern Empire on Western Europe. We see it safeguarding Europe for many centuries from Asiatic barbarism, its functions as the classical schoolmaster of Europe before the Renaissance, its

maintenance of European commerce, its diffusion through a savage and half-civilised Europe of the rudiments of law, culture, and refinement, its keeping alive the idea of the Roman Empire, and its embodying a principle of stability and permanence when the rest of Europe generally was in a condition of unstable equilibrium and political unrest. Bury never would use the term Eastern and Western Empires, which of course expressed a separation never supposed to exist, even during the reigns of Odovacar and of Theodoric in Italy.

In 1916 he had explored the relation between the causal and the casual in history in an article entitled "Cleopatra's Nose", and in his 1923 volumes he returned to another consideration of it. He shows himself an utter disbeliever in the inevitable. He rejects all general explanations of the fall of the Roman Empire, beginning with Gibbon's "principle of decay", which demands an explanation. He affirms that the collapse of the Roman power in the west and the success of the barbarians in penetrating and founding States in the provinces were "the consequences of a series of contingent events", and these events were the irruption of the Huns, the disaster of Adrianople, the mismanagement of Theodosia, and the inheritance of the Empire by the feeble-minded Honorius. At the same time, he admits that these four events need not have led to disaster had it not been for the "singular misfortune" of Stilicho, who was forced to defend the Empire against Germans without and within its bounds. The causes of the fall of the Roman Empire have been analysed by many investigators. Gibbon

had laid stress on the excessive power of the army in the early Empire and on the partial dissolution of its strength at the beginning of the fourth century by the policy of Constantine. He had also noticed the deterioration of discipline in the army as a main cause of the fall of the Empire, and, of course, to him Christianity had powerfully assisted. Seeley had insisted on the importance of the decline in population, which Bury had shown to be erroneous. Seeck had thought that a general consciousness of the degeneration of the world made men less inclined to propagate the race, and thus intensified the disease. Men suffered from what Bury in another connexion termed loss of nerve. He had also offered the view that the best individuals in Italy were effectually extirpated by the terrible proscriptions which are associated with the names of Sulla and the Triumvirs. Hodgkin had set out under six heads his efficient causes, and they were the foundation of Constantinople, Christianity, slavery, the free distribution of corn, which pauperised the Roman proletariat, the destruction of the middle class, and barbarous finance.

The views of Gibbon and Seeley, of Seeck and Hodgkin, are swept to one side, and we are asked to replace them by four contingent causes. No doubt history is a science, yet it is a science in which the casual as well as the causal takes its due share. No one was clearer than Bury that the course of history has been deflected by accident and the presence of genius. Was Gibbon right in his belief that if Charles Martel had been defeated at Tours the creed of Islam would have overspread the greater part of

Europe? If Mohammed had been killed in one of the first battles he fought, would a great monotheistic creed have arisen in Arabia? What turn would events have taken if Alexander, the son of Philip of Macedon, had been as incompetent as Commodus, the son of Marcus Aurelius? In the spring of 323 B.C. the control of the framework of civilisation, from the Adriatic to the Punjab, rested upon the single will of Alexander. He was snatched away, and the union, perhaps premature, of East and West passed away with him. What form would French art have assumed had not Charles VIII. set out on his expedition to Italy, thereby making France feel the influence of Giotto, the founder of modern painting? It is easy to speak of the inevitable working of cause, course, and consequence, but is it true? Had Frederick the Great never lived, would Prussia have begun the war of 1740, which started the country on the career which made the World War possible?

The plight of history is not at all unique. Physical science was never in a more exciting state. Its recent discoveries have outrun the power of composing them into a consistent scheme of the universe. In the nineteenth century observation and theory combined to support the belief that light was a series of waves in an all-pervading ether. Great advances in knowledge were based on that belief, and many inferences from it were verified. There was no question of its truth in the ordinary sense. In the twentieth century, however, new observations and new theory combined to support the belief that light was particulate, a stream of small particles. This belief also passed the experimental test, inferences

from it being justified by new observations. But could radiation be at once a continuous wave and a stream of discontinuous particles? It seemed incredible, and yet physicists have to accept both, working on one hypothesis, say, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, on the other on alternate days, in each case being justified by their results. Similarly Bury was at one time a determinist, at another an indeterminist.

Ill-health persisted, and he gave his last lecture in the spring of 1926. In the autumn he went to Rome and there his illness increased, and he passed away on June 1, 1927. His body lies buried in a plot in the cemetery called the Cemetery of Poets and Artists, quite close to the ancient Aurelian wall surrounding it. A Celtic cross is over the grave.

Few men can have lived more whole-heartedly for knowledge than John Bagnell Bury, who for years had to be his own pilot through everything that he studied. He had neither the inclination nor the temptation to accept the world as it stands. This, combined with his intense shyness, early drove him to live to himself, and by instinctive self-protection he preserved that simplicity and purity of mind which is the foundation of all that is good whether in thought or in conduct. In that contemplative detachment from conventional valuations, human sensibility is heightened both in delicacy and emotion by a profounder perception of reality and all that lies behind it. Liberal by temperament and conservative in the end by conviction, he never lost interest in the ideas and iconoclasms of youth. Comparatively few persons in any country are fully

qualified to estimate his scholarship, which had made his name known all over the world. But all could appreciate the breadth of his sympathies and the impartiality of his judgment. Humanist and historian, he added to his profound learning a keenly critical faculty, as well as a scrupulous sense of fairness which was manifested in every sphere of work he undertook. One of his most attractive qualities was the help he extended to those trying to extend the bounds of knowledge, and such men he was never tired of helping and encouraging. He left his impress upon the scholars whom he inspired. To these men he gave the same unselfish and penetrating attention; and none of them ever went away from his rooms without having gained some new point of view or finding some new avenue in which to look for fresh information. His incidental remarks came from the mint of a great historian, and like the bezants of the later Roman Empire—until the Comneni—admitted no variability or superfluous alloy. As a professor, he was perhaps more effective in private than he was in the lecture-room. In his relations with other scholars he was happy and high-minded. He rallied them around him to contribute to *The Cambridge Medieval History* and *The Cambridge Ancient History*. He was an admirable colleague.

With all his great intellectual gifts he was one of the humblest and most unselfish of men, full of thought for others. John Morley once said of him to Mr. Herbert Fisher: "Bury does not cast his shadow on the page". It sometimes seemed as if a difference of opinion, however serious, actually endeared a

friend to him; at least, it was often followed by some unobtrusive act of kindness. He had a strong sense of duty, and dealt in a masterly manner with any business to which he put his hand. He was never oppressively serious, but it was impossible not to recognise his high standard of right, and his detestation of anything mean or base. He lived the life of an historian for the sake of truth and not for his own glorification. He deserved the honours which he earned, and the affection of friends as well.

NOTICES

The Times, June 2, 1927; Letter from the Rev. R. H. Murray, *ibid.*, June 4; Letter from Canon Gamble, *ibid.*, June 6.

The Irish Times, June 2.

The Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. ii. pp. 191-4. An impression by J. P. Whitney. "His views on the Science of History with a recent letter on personal bias in the writing of history" (contributed by F. E. Adcock), *ibid.* pp. 194-7.

History, vol. xii. pp. 135-6, by N. H. Baynes. Cf. his "John Bagnell Bury, 1861–1927" in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. xiii. (13 pages), and his *A Bibliography of the Works of J. B. Bury* (1929).

English Historical Review, vol. xliii. (1928) pp. 67-72, Miller's article, with letters of appreciation from K. Amantos, A. M. Andréades, N. A. Bees, P. I. Koukoules, G. A. Soteriou, and Prof. Adamantiou.

Byzantinische Zeitschrift, vol. xxvii. (1927) pp. 237-40, by August Heisenberg.

Izvestiya Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R., 1928; "Classe des Sciences Historico-Philologiques", 10 pp. By F. I. Uspensky.

"Semonarium Kondakovianum", *Recueil d'études*, Prague, 1928, vol. ii. pp. 329 ff. By G. Ostrogorsky.

I

THE SYLLABUS

When the temporal power of the Papacy was tottering to its fall, in consequence of the Liberal movement and the political ability of the Sardinian Government, Pius IX. flung down the gauntlet of challenge and defiance to Nineteenth Century civilisation. His immediate predecessors, in their conflict with liberalism, had issued Encyclical Letters condemning modern doctrines; but even the fulminations of Gregory XVI.'s *Mirari vos*[1] were taken quietly and rather as a matter of course. Not so the *Quanta Cura* of Pius IX. and the Syllabus of Errors which accompanied it. Appearing thirty-two years later than the *Mirari vos*, it struck with amazement a generation which was so much further away from the days of the Holy Alliance. With the majority of educated people in Europe, the liberal ideas which were winning their victory about 1830 had already become commonplaces, and they were astonished by a drastic and authoritative reminder that the Papacy was as mediaeval as ever in its attitude to modern society and civilisation, and uncompromis-

[1] It was read on the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, August 15, 1832, *Bullarium Romanum*, xix. pp. 126 f. In French in *Sylvain*, pp. 362 f.

ingly hostile to the ideas which commanded the assent of the most civilised sections of mankind.

The originator of the idea of cataloguing and condemning modern errors was not Pius IX., but his successor Leo XIII. At the Council of Spoleto in 1849, Pecci, then Bishop of Perugia, proposed that the Council should request the Pope to condemn the most flagrant errors of the day respecting the authority of the Church and the rights of property. It was characteristic that he should have initiated this idea, concerning as it did, not theology, but politics and civilisation. When he was elected Pope in 1878, Gambetta remarked that he was more a diplomatist than a priest. The idea recommended itself to the Jesuits; and in 1851 the central organ of ultramontanism, the *Civiltà Catholica*,[1] suggested that it would be wise to issue a condemnation of modern errors, simultaneously with the promulgation of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, for which preparations were then being made. Cardinal Fornari was directed by the Pope to ask the opinions of prelates and other Catholic leaders on this question; and the result was that it was deemed advisable to issue a list of errors in conjunction with a special Bull, and not connect it with the Bull on the Immaculate Conception. The Commission which had been appointed to prepare the latter Bull, when its work was over, was turned on to consider the subject of

[1] Friedrich, *Geschichte des vatikanischen Konzils*, i. pp. 502-4. On the Jesuit agitation and the liberal opposition cf. Frommann, *Geschichte u. Kritik des vatikanischen Concils von 1869 u. 1870*, pp. 13-21. Cf. *Encyclique* (of Pius IX.) *aux évêques d'Italie, texte lat. avec trad. franç.*, etc., by G. Mazzini. Cf. also *Historische Zeitschrift*, v. p. 563 (1908).

the errors, and it worked till 1860. It included the learned Thenier, as well as Passaglia, Schrader, and Perrone.[1]

In 1860 Bishop Gerbet of Perpignan issued a Pastoral Instruction to the clergy of his diocese, in which he enumerated a series of 85 erroneous doctrines, of socialistic or rationalistic nature.[2] It caught the attention of the Pope, and a larger Commission was appointed, which made Gerbet's list a basis to work on. This body produced in 1862 a catalogue of 61 theses, with corresponding theological censures; and this was laid before a council of bishops which had been summoned for another purpose at Rome. In an Allocution, *Maxima quidem*, in June of this year, the Pope condemned these theses, and the assembled Bishops assented to the Papal condemnation. But in October a Turin paper, *Il Mediatore*, published the text of the list, which had been hitherto kept secret. It created a sensation and called forth the remonstrances of Liberal Catholics. Dupanloup, the Bishop of Orleans, urged that it was inopportune.[3] The effects of this premature disclosure induced the Pope to postpone and modify his action. He appointed a new Commission, under the presidency of Luigi Bilio, which prepared the final list of 80 errors, which included 30 of the former 61; but the theological censures were omitted. It was published, with a special En-

[1] Hettinger, *Aus Welt u. Kirche*, i. pp. 106 ff.

[2] Richard, *Gerbet et Salinis*, pp. 172 ff.

[3] For opposed estimates of his career contrast Lagrange's appreciation with Maynard's depreciation. Cf. Lagrange, *Vie de Mgr. Dupanloup*, i. pp. 278 ff., and especially ii. p. 474; Pfülf, *Mgr. v. Ketteler*, iii. pp. 3 ff.; Pelletier, *Dupanloup*, p. 96.

cyclical, on December 8, 1864, and had the incidental significance of appearing as a sort of reply to the September Convention[1] between Italy and France, which had caused great indignation at Rome.

It is important to observe that the ultramontanes strongly desired the issue of the *Syllabus* for the special reason that it would be a weapon against the Liberal Catholics. The old leader, Montalembert, read papers at a religious Congress at Malines on the text of a Free Church in a Free State. They moved the ultramontane Bishop Pie of Poitiers to appeal to Pius IX. to take measures against the author of such heretical pronouncements in regard to the liberty of belief.[2] It was an offence to the Pope that this doctrine, which Cavour had wished to realise in Italy, should be preached at a Catholic Assembly. His reply to Bishop Pie intimated this, and admitted the principle that freedom of conscience should be asserted in countries (like Russia and Sweden) where Catholics were in a minority, but not in Catholic lands.[3] After this Pie had issued two manifestoes in the course of 1864, to prepare the way for the *Syllabus*.[4]

The Encyclical letter which was sent out to the Catholic prelates along with the *Syllabus* provides the condemnation *in globo* of the classes of errors which the *Syllabus* enumerates *singulatim*. The leading ideas which are associated closely with modern progress are described as *monstrosa opi-*

[1] Nielsen, *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*, ii. pp. 251-2. On the true inwardness of this Convention cf. Thouvenel's remarkable *Le Secret de l'Empereur*.

[2] Baunard, *Le Cardinal Pie*, ii. p. 214.

[3] *Ibid.* ii. p. 215.

[4] *Ibid.* ii. pp. 223 ff.

nionum portenta, and those who propagate them are designated as slaves of corruption who design to demolish society, *civilis societatis fundamenta convellere*.[1] The head and front of their offending is that they would hinder and remove "that salutary force" which the Catholic Church ought to exercise not only on individuals but on nations, peoples, and governments. After a preface, to this effect, on the general iniquity of the *Zeitgeist*, the Pope goes on to signalise what he calls the "impious and absurd principle of naturalism", which means that "the highest interests of public society and civil progress require that society should be governed without taking account of religion, as if it did not exist, or at least without recognising any difference between the true and false religion", and that "that State is best which declines to acknowledge the obligation of punishing violators of the Catholic religion except so far as public order demands". Thus the Pope uses the term "naturalism" to include toleration and secularism; it is, in fact, the antithesis of the mediaeval order. He begins his comments on this doctrine by quoting with approval a passage from the *Mirari vos* of his predecessor, where liberty of conscience and the right of each man to practise his own religion are described as *deliramentum*. Such liberty, says Pius, citing St. Augustine, is *libertas perditionis*. He then produces an argument. If you take away religion from the fabric of civil society,

[1] On Pius IX.'s project cf. Maynard, *Dupanloup et M. Lagrange*, p. 134. On the Syllabus cf. Goetz, *Der Ultramontanismus als Weltanschauung auf Grund des Syllabus*. Cf. Mourret, *Le Mouvement catholique en France*, pp. 130-33.

you substitute instead of true justice and lawful right "material force" (*vis materialis*); and that is why some dare to proclaim that the will of the people, when it declares itself, is the supreme law, unbound by any divine or human principles of *jus*, and that in politics *faits accomplis*, "facta consummata", just because they are *consummata*, have legal force. "Who does not see that human society, loosed from the chains of religion and true justice, can have no other aim save that of acquiring and heaping up wealth, and can follow no other law save the desire of serving personal pleasures and interests?" The general drift, you see, of the argument is: liberty, toleration, secularism, and democracy are closely bound together, and what they mean is materialism.

The Encyclical then touches on some particular points in which modern society had revolted against the claims of Ecclesiasticism; first of all, the drastic limitation placed upon religious societies; then the objection to compulsory cessation of work on Sundays; then the assumption by the State of the duty of educating children, a principle which is denounced as communism and socialism. After this it passes to the claims of Canon law to recognition and obedience; it censures the errors that the ecclesiastical laws are only binding in conscience when they are published by the civil power; that the decrees of the Pope in religious and ecclesiastical matters require the confirmation or at least the assent of the civil power; that the apostolic constitutions, which forbid secret societies and excommunicate their members, are not valid where the government

tolerates such societies; that the excommunication, pronounced by the Council of Trent and Popes against those who usurp ecclesiastical property, fails to discriminate as it ought between secular and spiritual things, and aims at purely mundane wealth; that the Church ought not to ordain anything to coerce the consciences of the faithful respecting the use of temporal goods; that the Church has no right to discipline offenders against the laws by temporal chastisement [the principle here involved includes death for heretics]; that it is not inconsistent with theology or public law to vindicate for the State the property of goods possessed by Churches, religious societies, and pious institutions. The Pope further condemns the view that the Ecclesiastical *potestas* is not divinely distinct and independent of the civil *potestas*, and that the recognition of an ecclesiastical power independent of the State necessarily means that the sphere of the civil power will be invaded by the Church.

The Encyclical concludes with an expression of confidence in the power of the Immaculate Virgin, who is said to destroy all heresies in the Universe, and is curiously described as standing, on her Son's right hand, in a dress of gold and *circumamicta varietate*, with a cloak of divers colours.

Altogether in this document the Pope has condemned 16 errors; I follow the analysis of ultramontane interpreters. These 16, however, do not include a censure of the freethinkers who deny the divinity of Christ:[1] this is the only theological part

[1] There is implicit censure of Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, published in 1863. Cf. Baunard, *Hist. du card. Pie*, ii. p. 199.

of the Encyclical. Wrapt up in religious phraseology, it is really a political document, setting forth an ideal of civilisation and declaring principles of political import.

The positive principles which it asserts by means of condemning their negations may be summed up thus: The State must recognise a particular religion as regnant, and submit to its influence, and this religion must be the Catholic; the power of the State must be at its disposal, and all who do not conform to its requirements must be compelled or punished. The duty of governments is to protect the Church, and freedom of conscience and cult is madness. Not the popular will, but religion, that is the papal authority, is the basis of civil society, otherwise it will sink into materialism. The Church is superior to the State, and therefore the State has no right to dictate to her, and has no power over religious orders. The family and the education of children belong to the Church, not to the State. The Pope can decree and prescribe what he chooses, without the State's permission, and his authority is not limited to doctrines and morals.

It is of importance to determine the relation of this Encyclical to the *Syllabus*, because the interpretation and the authority of the *Syllabus* are nearly affected by it. Those who wish to explain away the *Syllabus* attempted to disconnect it from the Encyclical. This contention cannot be sustained. I have said that the two documents were distributed to the bishops together, and they were accompanied by a covering letter of Cardinal Antonelli, which is quite decisive. Antonelli says: "The Pope has already

in Encyclicals and Allocutions condemned the principal errors of this most unhappy age. But all of you may not have received all the pontifical acts. Therefore the Pope wished a Syllabus of these Errors to be drawn up for the use of all the Catholic bishops that they may have before their eyes the pernicious doctrines that he has proscribed. I therefore send you a printed copy of the Syllabus on the same occasion on which the Pope thought it well to address another Encyclical Epistle to Catholic prelates."[1] This letter leaves no doubt that the *Syllabus* was intended to have a dogmatic value, and to be interpreted in connexion with the *Quanta cura* and the preceding utterances of the Pope on the subject of modern errors. All the ultramontane critics have recognised this connexion. The *Syllabus* is not verbally identical, nor is it conterminous in the compass of its topics with the Encyclical; but it has been pointed out by an ultramontane critic that 41 theses are implied in the Encyclical, and these 41 are the most important. It follows that at least for the condemnation of these 41 theses the same authority must be claimed which belongs to the Encyclical. It is futile for a recent writer,[2] of great learning, who is prominent among the German liberal Catholics, to say that the *Syllabus* has not a dogmatic character, that its scope was merely historical and temporary, that it was no more than a momentary

[1] Rönneke, *Pius IX. Encyklika u. Syllabus*, xiii. The able and astute Cardinal Antonelli was the evil genius of Pius IX., who was a man of most mediocre ability. Cf. Woodward, *Three Studies in European Conservatism*, pp. 296-7.

[2] Ehrhard, *Der Katholizismus u. das zwanzigste Jahrhundert*, pp. 260-65.

counterstroke to defend ecclesiastical authority against the extravagant attacks of the liberals against the Church in the middle of the nineteenth century. Such explanations are only the desperate resorts to which those have to betake themselves who try to reconcile the polar opposites, liberty and papal authority, progress and ecclesiasticism.

Not only liberal Catholics, but ultramontanes when they do not wish to confess the incompatibility of the Church with modern civilisation, have attempted to mitigate the meaning of the *Syllabus*. We shall see afterwards how M. Dupanloup endeavoured to explain it away. We must not allow ourselves to be embarrassed by these devices. We have perfectly sufficient means of securely determining its interpretation. We have in the first place the Encyclical, and in the second the commentaries of various ultramontane writers, who, as the document originated entirely in ultramontane circles and in the ultramontane interest, can be relied on to explain it. And most important among them is the book of the Austrian Jesuit Schrader, who was a member of the first Commission, entitled *Der Papst und die modernen Ideen*.[1] Next to this is the collection of eight studies by different Jesuit writers, which appeared separately in the Jesuit organ *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*[2] between 1865 and 1869, and were then published in one volume, which build up on the basis of the *Syllabus* a system of theoretical ultramontanism. It is of course very technical, but provision has more recently been made for the popular

[1] Vienna, 1865. Cf. Friedrich, *Geschichte des vatikanischen Konzils*, i. p. 291.

[2] Freiburg im Breisgau, 1869.

diffusion of the principles of the *Syllabus* among German Catholics by a little book of the Jesuit Brors, called "Modern A B C for Catholics of all Classes, Short replies to modern attacks on Catholicism".[1]

As the *Syllabus* states the errors which are to be rejected, in order to obtain the true doctrine, we have to convert the negation into a positive form. And in performing this operation, the ultramontane interpreters lay down that we must take not the logical contrary, but the logical contradictory. As a matter of fact, Schrader has done this for us.[2]

The title at the head of the document runs: "Syllabus embracing the chief errors of our age (*praecipuos nostrae aetatis errores*), which are censured in Consistorial Allocutions, in encyclical and other apostolic letters of our most holy lord Pope Pius IX.". You observe that it is only the chief errors; and although they are not all censured in the pronouncements referred to in the same degree, they are all errors rejected by ultramontane doctrine; and Berlinghieri wrote a book in 1865, which the Pope approved, entitled *The 80 heresies of our age*.[3]

The 80 propositions are divided into 10 subject groups with special headings. The first group is entitled "Pantheism, Naturalism and absolute Rationalism"; the second, "Limited Rationalism".

[1] Berlin, 1902. Its title is *Modernes A B C für Katholiken aller Hände*. As three German editions appeared in 1902, it had a considerable circulation.

[2] In his *Der Papst u. die modernen Ideen*. His *Die Encyclica* forms Heft 2 of his *Der Papst*.

[3] Roberto Berlinghieri, *Le 80 eresie del nostro secolo condannate dalla Santa Romana Chiesa quali si legono nel Sillabo*. Roma, 1872.

The fourteen items of these groups contain the doctrinal foundation for the rest. On the first group we need not linger. It contains theses which were condemned by all pious Christians, as a matter of course; and a month after the publication Döllinger wrote that "a solemn repudiation of these errors by a special pronouncement verges on the comic; it is almost as if Rome were to proclaim that it is wrong and heretical to believe in the divinity of Juno or Apollo, or consider Mohammed a prophet".[1] The criticism would be just if these theses stood by themselves, but from the point of view of the whole document they are not unnecessary or superfluous. The errors here collected all touch the truth of revelation, and as the absolute authority of revelation is the ultimate base of the whole ultramontane system, the document would be not theoretically complete without this portion. The fifth thesis, for instance, is obviously of great importance. It runs: "The divine revelation is imperfect and therefore subject to a continuous and indefinite progress corresponding to the advance of human reason". This is a proposition which nowadays many non-Catholic and some Catholic Christians would assent to. Converting it into the true doctrine, we get: "The divine revelation is not imperfect, and therefore it is not subject to continuous and indefinite progress, corresponding to the advance of human reason". This proposition is indispensable to ultramontane theory.

[1] There is implicit censure of Döllinger, who, in September 1863, had read a paper at Munich on *Die Vergangenheit u. Gegenwart der kath. Theologie* (Kl. Schriften, pp. 161 ff.), and in it he bitterly censures Scholasticism. Döllinger wrote the *Römische Briefe*. In their English form they are entitled "Letters from Rome", by Quirinus.

The second group of errors, under the title Limited (Moderatus) Rationalism, was particularly suggested by doctrines taught in the philosophical works of Professor Frohschammer of Munich.[1] It is important because it sets forth the ultramontane doctrine of the relation of the Church to science. I will reproduce it in the positive form, *i.e.* the propositions which are opposed to the errors.

(1) As human reason cannot be co-equalised with religion, therefore theological studies cannot be treated like philosophical studies.

(2) It is not true that all dogmas of the Christian Church without distinction are the object of natural science (*naturalis scientia*) or philosophy; and human reason cannot, of its own natural powers and principles, attain to the true knowledge of all, even the obscurest dogmas, even if these dogmas are presented to reason as an object.

The point of these two theses is to exclude human reason from religious doctrine, and make this the exclusive domain of theology, or in other words ecclesiastical authority.

(3) We may draw a distinction between the philosopher and philosophy; but the philosopher has not the right or obligation to submit to the authority which he considers true; while philosophy can and must submit itself to authority.

This means the subjection of science to ecclesiastical authority.

(4) The Church may not only at all times take proceedings against philosophy but she may not

[1] Friedrich, pp. 310, 311, 318, 383.

even tolerate the errors of philosophy or leave it to philosophy itself to correct those errors.

This principle implies the institution of the Index.

(5) The decrees of the apostolic Chair and the Roman congregations do not hinder the free progress of science and learning.

This declaration reminds us of the case of Galileo. Desjardin says in a pamphlet entitled *Encore Galilée* (1877): "The Church has a sovran right to delay certain developments of science if she believes that in the existing circumstances they could be dangerous to the far higher interests of faith".[1] This at least is an outspoken admission of the logic of the ultramontane doctrine. Ehrhard, the liberal Catholic, does not go so far, but he tries to excuse the Roman Congregation in Galileo's case, on the ground that "its behaviour might have been morally less estimable if it had so easily abandoned the traditional interpretation of the Bible".[2]

(6) The method and principles, by which the old scholastic doctors pursued the study of theology, are at least in agreement with the needs of our time and the progress of science.

This startling statement was based on a letter of Pius IX. in 1862 to the Archbishop of Freising, in which he declared scholasticism to be the true Catholic method. It corresponds to the largely successful movement of the Jesuits to suppress all modern developments of Catholic theology and make

[1] *Encore Galilée*, pp. 50-51 (second edition). This is much more a paraphrase than an exceedingly free translation.

[2] Ehrhard, *Der Katholizismus u. das zwanzigste Jahrhundert*, p. 152.

the system of St. Thomas Aquinas authoritative. Pope Leo XIII., who had been brought up in the Jesuit Collegium Romanum, particularly favoured and furthered this policy. In little more than a year after he became Pope, in August 1879, he issued the Encyclical *Aeterni patris*, known as the Thomas-Encyclical, in which he raised St. Thomas, the prince of the scholastics, to the rank of patron of science and declared his works to be the supreme norm for the pursuit of all science and learning. In this curious document Leo XIII. says that all human science must hope for progress, and may expect a very considerable advance from a revival of philosophy on the lines of St. Thomas.[1]

Scholasticism is one of the chief planks in the ultramontane platform.

(7) Philosophy must not be studied independently of revelation.

In other words, philosophy must be the handmaid of theology.

This group of theses closes with the following note: "N.B. The errors of Anton Günther are mainly con-

[1] Cf. his brief of 1880: "We are convinced that the Thomist doctrine possesses, in a pre-eminent degree, a singular force and virtue to cure those evils by which our epoch is afflicted. We are of opinion that the time has arrived to add this new honour to the immortal glory of St. Thomas Aquinas. Here, then, is the chief motive which so determines us; it is because St. Thomas is the most perfect model in the divers branches of science that Catholics can take to themselves. . . . His doctrine is so vast that, like the sea, it embraces all that has come down to us from the ancients . . . because his doctrine, being composed of, and, as it were, armed by principles permitting of a great breadth of application, satisfies the necessities, not of one epoch only, but of all time; and because it is very efficacious in conquering those errors which are perpetually being reborn."

nected with the system of rationalism. They are condemned in papal letters, of 1857 to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cöln and of 1860 to the Bishop of Breslau."[1] Günther was a Catholic philosopher and theologian who died in 1863, who worked out a system of his own, and had a large circle of disciples.

The general object and effect, as you can see, of this paragraph of seven errors is not to reject reason or condemn science, but to render both reason and science the slaves, bound hand and foot, of ecclesiastical authority.

The next paragraph brings us to politics, although the subject concerned is religion. The principles implied are as follows:

(1) It is *not* lawful for the individual to accept and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he considers true.

(2) Man cannot by practising any religion find the way of eternal salvation and reach eternal bliss.

(3) Good hopes cannot be entertained of the eternal happiness of all those who are not in the Church of Christ.

(4) Protestantism is not merely a different form of the same Christian faith, in which God can be pleased as well as in the Catholic Church.

Of course all these propositions are well known orthodox tenets of the Catholic Church. The significant point is that they should be introduced here. The Pope flings in the face of Europe those drastic tenets that either offend or amuse non-Catholics. But this is done in order to assert the unreserved

[1] Friedrich, ii. pp. 305-7.

opposition of the Church to the constitutions generally prevailing in Europe, which made freedom of conscience fundamental. The inwardness of the paragraph is this ecclesiastico-political bearing, and it forms a transition to the rest of the Encyclical.

The next paragraph does not state a number of particular erroneous theses. It enumerates generally a mixed group of condemnable errors and institutions. It runs thus:

Socialism, communism, secret societies, Bible societies, societies of liberal clergy: such pestilences are often and in the severest phrases condemned in Encyclicals of 1846, 1849 and 1863, and in Allocutions of 1849 and 1854.

What is common to these things is that they are pestilences in the eyes of ultramontanism. A reference to the documents shows that of the secret societies the principal one in view is Freemasonry, which it has always been the object of the Catholic Church to demolish. No Pope has been more active in combating Freemasonry than Leo XIII. In this Encyclical *Humanum genus* of April 1884 he marshalled all the documentary evidence he could discover against that black sect, and at the same time the Congregation of the Inquisition sent an elaborate instruction to the bishops and clergy as to the methods they should use to fight against Freemasonry. Another Encyclical in 1894 denounced the Freemason sect again, as an uncanny load pressing upon the Catholic nations. In a brief especially intended for Italy in 1892 he advised a method almost equivalent to boycotting persons suspected of belonging to the sect, for instance, doctors. It is

delightfully humorous to find that when he himself became extremely ill in 1899, his horror of the pernicious society did not deter him from employing the Freemason surgeon Mazzoni to perform the necessary operation.

The bitter hostility of the Papacy to Freemasonry in the second half of the last century had, of course, its special cause in the part which the Freemasons played in bringing about the unity of Italy, and afterwards in determining the attitude of the Italian State towards the Church. The Jesuits and their organ, *Civiltà Catholica*, worked hard to stir up a general feeling of fear and aversion towards Freemasonry. They represented the Freemason Society as "spreading itself like an iron net over two hemispheres, and under the mask of progress and culture aiming at a general social revolution and the destruction of Christianity".

In the fifth paragraph, which includes 20 errors, we have the formal declaration of war on the Modern State. It is entitled "Errors concerning the Church and its Rights", and its most important theses are specified in the Encyclical *Quanta Cura*.

The Church is a true and perfect, entirely free society, and it preserves its own permanent rights conferred on it by its divine founder; and it is not the business of the State to determine what are the rights of the Church and within what limits it may exercise them.

This principle touches the centre of the controversies respecting the relation of the Church to the State. It asserts that the Church, as an independent society, is not bound to submit to the laws of the

State. It may be illustrated not only by the struggles on important questions, but by matters in which it might not be thought there would be any conflict. The Jesuit Wernz says: The Church is not obliged *vere et proprie* to observe the civil laws of the State passed for the public safety and sanitary reasons (respecting cemeteries), because they are State laws.[1] Other theses in the *Syllabus* are closely connected with the principle. The next is a logical corollary from it.

(2) The ecclesiastical power may exercise its authority without the permission and consent of the secular power.

(3) The Church has the power to decide dogmatically that the religion of the Catholic Church is the only true one.

This principle implies the doctrine that all baptized Christians, to whatever sect they belong, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church, in contradistinction to Jews and heathen. If the Church cannot exercise that jurisdiction actually over heretics, and if the heretics themselves are quite unconscious of this obligation, the theory comes into force when a heretic is converted. Pius IX. applied the theory when he wrote to the Emperor William in 1873 that every baptized person belongs in some way to the Pope. The Emperor wrote back: "The Evangelical religion to which I, as your Holiness knows, belong, with my forefathers and the majority of my subjects, does not allow any mediator in our relationship with God, except Christ".[2]

[1] Cf. F. X. Wernz, *Jus decretale* (1901). There was a third edition in 1913.

[2] Nielsen, *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*, ii. p. 444.

(4) The obligation which binds Catholic teachers and writers is not confined to that which is prescribed as an article of belief by the infallible voice of the Church.

This thesis rather belongs to the context of the third paragraph, which concerns the attitude of the Church to science. How the ultramontanes interpret this principle in regard to history will be apparent from a couple of quotations from Catholic writers in Germany on the subject. One lays down the following precept: "A Catholic historian must consider it his strict duty to base his own historical view of the Reformation on the view held by the Church, which is alone right and therefore objective". Another writes: "The Catholic historian must take his standard for estimating events from the eternal objective principles of the Church as the *columna ac fundamentum veritatis*".[1]

(5) The Roman Popes and the general councils have not transcended the limits of their power; they have not usurped the rights of princes, or committed errors in defining matters of faith and morals.

In this thesis Pius IX. certainly did not intend to convey that no Pope had ever committed a mistake in his policy or actions. The object of the thesis is to defend the hierocratic system, as it was conducted by Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages, and to assert that the Popes who kept themselves within the limits of that system were not guilty of usurpation; for the system recognised the right to depose secular princes and abrogate secular laws. On July

[1] Hüffer.

21, 1871, Pius expressly declared to a deputation that "the Papal right to depose princes rests on temporal reasons, and as these do not exist now, the right is no longer used". It is hardly unfair to say that if they do not use it now, it is because they cannot; in theory they claim sovran authority over the world, governments as well as peoples. The right simply lies in abeyance.

(6) The Church has the power to employ external force; she also possesses a direct and an indirect temporal power (*potestas temporalis*).

This is one of the most important principles in ultramontane theory, and its declaration here was a considerable stumbling-block to Catholics who were not extreme. Even some of the ultramontane interpreters have tried to weaken its significance. The milder explanation is that it merely expresses the general theocratic doctrine of the indirect authority of the Church over the temporal sphere. We must look to the ultramontane explanation, which accords with the plain meaning of the words. Schrader in his commentary says significantly, "it is not merely the spirits of men that are subject to the power of the Church".[1] The most authoritative organ of the Roman Church, which was influential in promoting the publication of the *Syllabus*, the *Civiltà Catholica*, in 1853 described the Inquisition as a "sublime spectacle of social perfection". It is, in short, the ideal. The *Analecta Ecclesiastica*, a Roman journal, in 1895 exclaimed: "*O benedictas rogorum flammas*, O blessed flames of funeral pyres

[1] His "Vorwort". Cf. Acton, *History of Freedom*, p. 502.

by which, with the sacrifice of a few crafty wretches, hundreds of regiments of souls were saved! O glorious and venerable memory of Thomas Torquemada!"

Of course, prudence and policy dictate that this theory, which cannot at the present day be reduced to practice, should be kept in the background. Brors, in the little manual I have already mentioned—intended to diffuse ultramontane principles among German Catholics—has this passage on the Inquisition: "A heretic is a man who knowingly and against his conscience falls away from the true faith. That is a great sin, for which he deserves eternal punishment in hell. A heretic has also merited earthly punishment."[1] Liberal journalists discovered this sentence, and Brors had to try to explain it away. The attitude of the Society of Jesus may be found in the most recent official edition of their constitution, the *Institutum Societatis Jesu* (1869). There in the rules it is laid down that "pupils who attend the schools of the society shall not go to public spectacles, to see comedies or games, or to witness the execution of criminals, *nisi forte haereticorum*".[2] The most moderate expansion of the theory, in the Staatslexikon of the Görres Society by Schanz, runs: "The Church exercises jurisdiction over its subjects, and for this end must employ also external punishments, like any organised society".[3] This claim evidently includes everything that in this regard the ultramontane theory requires: it is simply the Inquisition.

[1] F. X. Brors, *Modernes A B C für Katholiken aller Hände*, § 131.
[2] ii. p. 114. [3] Second ed., 1901-4.

In the next lecture I will continue the analysis of the *Syllabus*. It is indispensable to study it carefully for anyone who is interested in watching the behaviour of the Roman Catholic Church in the present age.

II

THE SYLLABUS

I PROCEED with the remainder of the fifth paragraph of the *Syllabus of Errors*, relating to the Church and its rights. You will remember that I convert the theses into the positive form which expresses the true doctrine.

(7) Besides the power which inheres in the Episcopate, the Episcopate does not possess another temporal power expressly or tacitly conceded to it by the State, and therefore capable of being revoked if the State wishes.

The point of this is that concessions made by the State cannot be revoked.

(8) The Church has an innate (*nativum*) and legal right to acquire and possess property.

This requires no special commentary: its fundamental importance is plain. It asserts the principle of the Dead Hand, and protests against the practice of modern States to limit the acquisition of Ecclesiastical property—as, *e.g.*, in Italy, France, and Germany.

(9) The consecrated servants of the Church, and the Roman Pontiff, are not to be excluded through-

out from all management and dominion of temporal things.

This touches, among other things, the question whether ecclesiastics as such should be ineligible as representatives in Parliament. It is one on which Catholic opinion seems to be divided.

(10) It is lawful for bishops without the permission of the civil government to publish Apostolic letters.

(11) Graces granted by the Roman Pontiff must not be considered invalid though they have not been asked for by the government.

These two theses repudiate the *placetum regium* which was required in Bavaria, Saxony, and other German Catholic States, as well as in France.

(12) The immunity of the Church and ecclesiastical persons is not derived from the civil law.

Immunity means freedom from secular jurisdiction, taxes, public burdens, and military service; and the point is that these principles are not revocable. Of course, no modern State recognises these principles, which are purely mediaeval.

(13) The jurisdiction of Ecclesiastical Courts (*Forum ecclesiasticum*) for clergy in secular cases, both civil and criminal, is not to be entirely abolished even without asking the Apostolic Chair or against its protestation.

In the Concordats, the Pope surrenders the *privilegium fori*, but this thesis expresses the theory which is still taught by the ultramontanes: the practical abandonment of the claim to ecclesiastical jurisdiction is due to the circumstances of the time.

(14) Without a violation of natural right and equity, the personal immunity of the clergy from military service cannot be abolished; civil progress does not demand such abolition, even in a State whose Constitution is liberal.

(15) It belongs exclusively to the ecclesiastical sphere of jurisdiction, by its own proper right, to direct theological studies.

This repudiates the claim of the State to exercise any supervision over theological seminaries and the education of candidates for the priesthood. It was a question that was to come up, as we shall see, in Bismarck's campaign against ultramontanism in 1873.[1]

(16) The doctrine which compares the Roman Pontiff to a free Prince exercising his sovranty in the universal Church is not a doctrine which came into prevalence in the Middle Ages.

On this Schrader observes: This doctrine "corresponds to the constitution of the Church and therefore must prevail in all ages".[2] It represents the dogmatical as opposed to the historical conception of the Papacy.

(17) There *are* reasons which forbid the transference of the Pontificate from the Roman Bishop and from the city of Rome to another bishop and another city, whether by the decree of a general council or by the act of all the peoples (*universorum populorum facto*).

[1] Cf. K. von Schlözer (uncle), *Römische Briefe*, and K. von Schlözer (nephew), *Letzte römische Briefe*. They set forth Bismarck's relations with the Vatican. Goyau, *Bismarck et l'Église*, 4 vols., are useful.

[2] P. 61.

The reason, of course, is the doctrine of the Primacy alleged to have been entrusted to Peter by the Founder of Christianity. It is enough to say that the doctrine has been affirmed by the authority of the Vatican Council.

(18) The decision of a national council admits of further discussion (*i.e.* it is not final) and the civil government cannot appeal to this decision.

[*I.e.* the assent of the Pope is necessary.]

(19) No national Churches can be instituted which are withdrawn from the authority of the Roman Pontiff and completely separated.

(20) Excessively arbitrary acts on the part of the Roman Pontiff have not contributed to the schism of the Eastern and Western Churches.

This thesis, of course, has only significance as a canon fettering the judgments of Catholic historians.

The most numerous and most important parts of this paragraph, of which I have reproduced the contents, concern the relation of the Church to the State. The next paragraph covers a good deal of the same ground but from the other side, from the point of view of the State. It is entitled "Errors concerning civil society both in itself and in its relation to the Church", and contains 17 theses. It is intimately connected with the preceding.

(1) The State (*status respublicae*) does not possess, as origin and source of all rights, an unlimited right.

Taken abstractly this proposition may command wide assent. The Jesuit Riess has paraphrased it as follows: "If some rights have their source in the

State, it is not the origin of *right in general*, which is rather to be sought in God, by whom rights can be granted independently of the State".[1] This *right in general* is, of course, the right of the Church. In a manifesto addressed to the Prussian Ministry by the Prussian Roman Catholic bishops in 1873 on the promulgation of the anti-clerical laws, they wrote thus: "The Church cannot admit the principle of the Luther State that the laws of the State are the ultimate source of all right, and that the Church possesses only those rights which the Legislature and Constitution of the State grant it, without denying the divinity of Christ and the divine nature of His doctrine and institution, without making Christianity itself depend on the arbitrary will of men". As a matter of fact, both this declaration and the *Syllabus* ascribe to the State a claim which is not usually made for it.

(2) The doctrine of the Catholic Church is not contrary to the prosperity and weal of human society.

(3) The government of the State has not an indirect negative power in religious matters, and the less so if it is exercised by an unbelieving prince; thus it has neither the right of *exequatur*, nor the right of appeal which is known as *ab abusu*.

The denial of the right of *exequatur* is a repetition of the denial of the *placetum regium* in a previous thesis, and concerns the legislative and adminis-

[1] Florian Riess, *Die moderne Irrlehre oder Liberalismus*, p. 39. It is to be found in that convenient collection, "Stimmen aus Maria-Laach", which comments on different aspects of the Encyclical of December 8, 1864.

trative activity of the Church. The appeal *ab abusu* is the limit imposed by the State on the Church's judicial activity. It existed in France under the old régime, and it exists in the Catholic German States to-day. It was introduced into Prussia in 1873 and abolished in 1886: Bismarck described its effect as striking water with a sword.

(4) In case of a conflict between the laws of the two powers, the civil power is not the superior.

This is one of the most often cited principles of the *Syllabus*, and is fundamental in Papal doctrine.[1]

(5) The civil power has not the right to limit, to interpret, or to abolish solemn conventions (commonly called Concordats) concluded with the Holy See concerning the exercise of rights pertaining to ecclesiastical immunities, without the consent of the Holy See, or in the face of its protests.

This repeats in another form a principle laid down in a former thesis. It had a historical motive in an event of 1860. A Concordat had been concluded with Baden in 1859. In 1860 Baden annulled it, superseding it by a State law. The Pope desisted from his opposition when the government stood firm. We have a recent example in the Separation Law in France, which annulled the Concordats of 1801.

The strict ultramontane theory of the Concordats is one-sided, and this is a natural consequence of

[1] Cf. Cardinal Lépicier, *De Stabilitate et Progressu Dogmatis* (1910), pp. 193-217, and especially the Appendix, for a modern statement of this position. He dwells upon the right of the Church to constrain heretics, whether members or non-members of the Church. Pius X. expressly approved of this book, and published a letter expressing his approval.

their principles. They consider the Concordat as a privilege which the Pope grants and can revoke when it pleases him; while on the other hand the State has no right to withdraw. But practically they do not press this logic, and they regard the Concordat as a contract.

(6) The civil power can *not* interfere in matters of religion, morality, and ecclesiastical government. Hence it cannot judge concerning the instructions which the pastors of the Church issue by virtue of their office to guide consciences; nor can it decide concerning the ministration of the divine sacraments and the dispositions necessary to receive them.

Observe that in the last clause the *sacramenta* include marriage: on that subject more is said. This thesis repeats the repudiation of supervision or interference by the State, already laid down in previous theses of this paragraph, and implied elsewhere; but it goes further and applies the principle to the field of morals, as if the State had no right to interfere in matters of morals, except under the direction of the Church. Catholic writers have been at some pains to weaken or soften the meaning; but the principle is part of the logical system of ultramontanism.

The next four theses are of great importance, because they embody the Papal theory of education, the gravest question nowadays on which Church and State come into sharp collision.

(7) It is not true that the whole management of public schools, in which the youth of a Christian State is educated, with the exception only in a

qualified way of episcopal seminaries, can and ought to be assigned to the civil authority in such a way that no other authority should be recognised as having a right to interfere in the school discipline, in the arrangement of the studies, in the granting of degrees, and in the choice and approval of teachers.

(8) *A fortiori* the method of studies in the clerical seminaries is not subject to State supervision.

(9) The best social-political system does not require that the popular schools which are open to children of all classes, and in general the public institutions which are intended for the higher instruction and education of youth, should be removed from all authority, management and interference on the part of the Church and submitted fully to the will of the civil and political authority, so as to be guided by the views of the government and the common opinion of the age.

(10) Catholics cannot approve of a kind of education which quite ignores the Catholic faith and the authority of the Church, and which regards exclusively, or at least as the chief aim, only the knowledge of nature and the ends of secular (earthly) society.

In this theory of education two points are to be observed. In the first place, though it is not referred to here, you will find in orthodox Catholic expositions that the principle on which the objection to compulsory State education is based is that the education of children is the indefeasible right of the parents and the parents alone. But the Church is the universal educational institution established by God; and the parents therefore stand in their educational function under the guiding influence of the

Church. Hence the parents have not the position of sovran power in respect of the Church, but are merely organs of the Church. Thus the parental right is insisted on merely to hand it over to the Church.

In the second place, education is inseparable from instruction. The Church insists on control of instruction in secular subjects, choice of teachers, etc.

This is theory. In practical politics, what the Catholics strive for is to have, besides the State schools, free schools of their own exclusively under clerical guidance, which means an ultramontane education.

(11) The State has no right to hinder the bishops and the faithful from freely communicating with the Roman See.

At the present day there are virtually no hindrances in any State.

(12) The secular government has not of itself the right to present bishops and cannot require them to enter upon the administration of their dioceses before they receive from the Pope canonical institution in the Apostolic letter.

(13) And the State has not the right to depose bishops from the exercise of their pastoral office, and it has the obligation to obey the Roman Bishop in what concerns the Episcopate and the institution of bishops.

We have an instance of the violation of this principle in the deposition (and imprisonment) of Cardinal Ledochowski, Archbishop of Gnesen and Posen, by the Prussian Government in 1874.

The next two theses concern religious orders.

(14) The State cannot by its own right change the age prescribed by the Church for taking religious vows by men or women, nor forbid all religious orders to allow any one to take such vows without permission of the government.

(15) Those laws should not be abolished which concern the protection of religious orders, their rights and duties; further, the secular power cannot afford its support to all who wish to desert the religious order they have entered and break their solemn vows; nor can it utterly abolish such religious societies or collegiate churches or simple benefices even if they be under the right of patronage, or submit and consign their property and revenues to secular administration and disposal.

These theses are directed against the laws which most States found it necessary to pass. Recent French history is an eloquent comment.

The last two theses of this paragraph are of a general and sweeping kind.

(16) Kings and princes are not exempt from the jurisdiction of the Church; and in the decision of questions of jurisdiction they are not superior to the Church.

This is, of course, already implied in the general theory of ecclesiastical supremacy. Schrader's comment is: "Princes should remember that their power is entrusted to them not merely to rule the world, but chiefly to protect the Church".

(17) The Church is not to be separated from the State, nor the State from the Church.

This is the mediaeval theory, by which the Church was the State, the only sovran State in the full sense. Catholics accept separation only as a lesser evil.

Recently, in regard to the Separation question in France, this thesis of the *Syllabus* was appealed to by the organ of the Vatican, the *Osservatore romano*, in (August) 1904.

We now pass to the seventh paragraph, containing 9 theses, on Errors relating to natural and Christian ethics. The first two concern the basis of rationalistic ethics; the second two deal with the special doctrine of materialism; the rest treat of practical consequences of such views for society.

(1) Moral laws require divine sanction, and it is at least necessary that human laws should be made consistent with natural law, or should receive their binding force from God.

(2) The science of philosophy and ethics, and the civil laws, shall not and ought not to deviate from divine revelation and the authority of the Church.

I may quote a passage from the little manual of Brors (already referred to) which will illustrate the practical consequences deducible from these principles: "The Church has the power to declare null and void those ordinances of the State which injure the moral and religious interest of men. The Church must take care that her subjects do not suffer spiritual hurt by the ordinances of the secular power."[1]

(3) Other forces must be recognised besides those which reside in *matter*, and all moral discipline and goodness ought not to be placed in accumulating

[1] Cf. *Modernes A B C für Katholiker aller Hände*, § 131.

and increasing riches by every means and enjoying pleasures.

(4) Right (*jus*) does not consist in material fact, nor are all duties an empty name, nor have all human deeds a valid right (*via iuris*).

(5) Authority is something different from numbers and the sum of material forces.

The point of this is to denounce the sovranty of the people and democracy as resting on a purely materialistic basis. It is, however, rather awkward that many Jesuit theologians have maintained the theory of popular sovranty. And as a matter of fact the Centre in the German Reichstag are supporters of universal suffrage.

The next two theses touch the question of *faits accomplis*, that we saw was treated in the Encyclical *Quanta Cura*.

(6) A successful injustice is detrimental to the sanctity of right.

The application, of course, is the loss of the Papal States.

(7) The so-called principle of non-intervention is not to be proclaimed or observed.

As this principle that has come to be recognised as fundamental in modern international law secured the Italiancy of the Papal territory and afterwards the abolition of the temporal state entirely, and as it stood in the way of Papal hopes of recovering the temporal power, it was of crucial importance to the Pope. We shall meet the question again in 1871.

(8) It is not allowed to refuse obedience to legitimate princes nor to rise against them.

This has not such importance now; in the ultramontane theory it has to be qualified by the consideration how far the prince's power is legitimate, *i.e.* how far it does not contradict the will of God, interpreted by the Church.

(9) The violation of the most holy oaths and all criminal actions are not to be approved of, and are absolutely unlawful, when done from a patriotic motive.

The next paragraph contains ten errors on the theory of Christian marriage. I will not quote all the theses in full, but only what is of most importance.

If according to natural law the marriage bond is not indissoluble, yet in various cases divorce proper cannot lawfully be granted by the secular authority.

The Church has the power of laying down impediments to marriage, and therein she uses her own right, and not a right committed to her by the State.

The form of marriage laid down by the Council of Trent is obligatory, on penalty of the marriage not being valid, even when the secular law prescribes another form and makes validity dependent thereon.

True marriage of Christians cannot exist by a mere civil contract.

Matrimonial matters do not naturally belong to a secular court.

The sum of all this is the theory that marriage exclusively concerns the Church, and the State should have nothing to do with it—exactly like

education. In both questions the ecclesiastical ideal and the principles of the modern State are diametrically opposed. It is important to observe that this is the ultramontane ideal, not by any means admitted by all Catholics in such an uncompromising form. The Catholic Martin, in his work on *Der Simultanstaat*,[1] recognises the necessity of the secular principle. Here is what he says: The extremists (*i.e.* the ultramontanes) "mistake completely the nature and features of the State, in thinking that civil marriage is a mere frivolous experiment of anti-clerical liberalism, aiming at de-Christianising the State and destroying religion. If a State in the interest of religious freedom refuses to make ecclesiastical observances compulsory, or to visit the neglect of them by civil disadvantages, and if it declines to favour the ecclesiastical organisation of our confession above those of others, hardly any course remains for it but to prescribe a definite form of marriage and to leave to the individuals to fulfil the ecclesiastical obligations if they choose."

The paragraph is followed by a note: "Here may be mentioned two other errors concerning the abolition of the celibacy of the clergy, and concerning the superiority of the state of matrimony to that of celibacy; these errors are stabbed to the heart (*confodiuntur*), the first in the Encyclical of November 1846, the second in the Apostolic letter of June 1851".

[1] 1892, Bremen, 4 vols. Bury gives this information. On the other hand, the officials of the British Museum, the Bodleian, and the London Library cannot trace this book. Bungeroth wrote *Der Simultanstaat* (Bremen, 1892–93), but I searched his four volumes in vain for any quotation even distantly resembling the above.

The next paragraph consists of 2 theses on the temporal power of the Pope.

(1) The sons of the Christian and Catholic Church are *not* divided in opinion as to the compatibility of the temporal sovranty with the spiritual.

(2) The abolition of the temporal sovranty which the Apostolic Chair possesses would not contribute in a high degree to freedom and the happiness of the Church.

Then follows a note: "Besides these errors explicitly censured, several are implicitly reproved, by the assertion of the doctrine which all Catholics most firmly hold, as to the temporal sovranty". (The allocutions and letters are cited in which the doctrine is set forth.)

The last paragraph of the *Syllabus* denounces four errors of modern Liberalism, and maintains the following principles:

(1) It is still expedient in our days that the Catholic religion should be treated as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other worship whatsoever.

(2) It was therefore not a good thing that in certain Catholic countries the free exercise of their worship was guaranteed by law to persons settling in them.

(3) For it is not false to say that the freedom granted by the State to every worship and the permission to all to profess openly all kinds of opinion and views lead to the corruption of the morals and minds of the peoples and to the propagation of the pestilence of indifferentism.

These three theses form an argument: The first

lays down the general principle of intolerance, the second condones its practical application, the third brings forward a reason for its adoption. They represent the orthodox ultramontane theory of intolerance; but in countries where Catholics are in a minority and it is their policy to appear tolerant, the ultramontanes have sought to migitate the doctrine by all sorts of subtle interpretations. The practical principle applied, of course, is to denounce toleration of Protestantism in Catholic lands, with an appeal to the ultramontane doctrine, but to claim toleration of Catholicism in Protestant lands, with an appeal to the modern doctrine of toleration. But theoretically, as the *Syllabus* and the Encyclical *Quanta Cura* lay down, toleration is unreservedly false, and if the Catholics had the power in the world no toleration would be defensible. There is an emotional expression often cited of the abhorrence of toleration in the work of Roh, a German ultramontane, entitled *Die Grundirrthümer unserer Zeit.* "Tolerance!" he exclaims contemptuously, "fair word for superficial people, and the highest that three and a half centuries could produce! . . . We use the word *tolerate* of something which ought not to exist and we should like to abolish. For instance, every animal tolerates parasites, who pay for their lodging by pricking and biting. . . . Whenever the word *tolerance* is used, I feel a chill in my heart. It hides hate and bitterness! Away with Toleration! But, O divine charity, remain always with us."[1] The inquisitors considered their work as *charity.*

[1] P. Roh, *Die Grundirrthümer unserer Zeit,* pp. 61-2.

We now reach the last thesis of this paragraph and of the *Syllabus* itself.

(4) The Roman pontiff cannot, and ought not to, reconcile himself and come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilisation.

This drastic declaration is the more impressive, coming as the finish of the document. It is a perfectly logical consequence of the whole theory, perfectly in accordance with the spirit of the doctrine of the *Syllabus* and the *Encyclical*, which are uncompromisingly mediaeval. In interpreting the thesis, the ultramontanes distinguish between true and false civilisation, true and false progress, and say that the Church is not opposed to true civilisation. This distinction does not take us any further; for their true civilisation means that which corresponds to the doctrine of the Roman Church, *i.e.* mediaevalism, and so the question is merely a verbal one. Leo XIII. saw in the opinions, views, laws, and life of contemporary society a retrogression to heathendom. His Encyclical *Libertas* of June 1888 is a condemnation of liberalism as immoral. It has been called the classical heresy of the nineteenth century.

The *Syllabus* and the *Encyclical* were welcomed with enthusiasm by the ultramontanes, and with malicious joy by freethinkers and Protestants. To Liberal Catholics it was a painful blow, as it was intended to be. The Bishop of Orleans, Dupanloup, stepped into the breach,[1] and published a pamphlet

[1] Acton, *Zur Geschichte des Vatikan-Konzils*, p. 3; Friedrich, *Geschichte des Vatikan-Konzils*, i. pp. 649 ff., ii. p. 374. Many of the French bishops, and even Dupanloup, were under the delusion that a Council would curb intemperate zeal.

on "The September Convention and the Encyclical", which created a great stir.[1] It was a clever tactical device to unite the Roman question on which he took the offensive, with the *Syllabus* on which he maintained the defensive. He defended it by means of theological distinctions and definitions, seeking to show that the Pope did not really condemn freedom and progress. Comparing the documents on which the *Syllabus* was based, he tried to point out that misunderstandings arose when they were taken out of the context. But it was the Pope who had taken them out of the context. Then he elaborated the proposition that such terms as liberty, liberalism, progress, civilisation are ambiguous; and that these things were condemned only in certain extreme senses.

The Pope had been rather alarmed at the sensation created by his pronouncements, evoking cries of hatred and defiance. In Belgium especially, where the whole political system rested on freedom of worship, there was consternation, and in February 1865 the *Civiltà Catholica* found it necessary to assure the Belgians that the *Syllabus* and *Encyclical* did not attack the Belgian constitution nor touch the rights, duties, and political liberties of Belgian citizens. In France, the government on January 1 forbade the bishops to publish the documents till further notice, as containing matter opposed to the constitution of the Empire; and a few days later this prohibition was withdrawn, except as regards the first part of the *Encyclical*. Some of the prelates were recalcitrant, and read the forbidden part, for which an action was brought against them.

[1] Lagrange, *Vie de Mgr. Dupanloup*, iii. p. 90.

In the circumstances, the pamphlet of the Bishop of Orleans toning down the Papal meaning was not unwelcome to the Pope, and he received a letter (February 4) officially acknowledging it in terms which seemed to be approbative. But afterwards the Pope approved of Schrader's commentary on the *Syllabus*, which was absolutely different from that of the Liberal Catholic. The ultramontanes repudiated and censured Dupanloup's interpretation, which they called the Anti-Syllabus, and described as "violating the teaching of the Holy See so far as to make it mean what it really condemns". "The Encyclical", said the writer of the *Univers*, "would have united all Catholics; the Bishop of Orleans has made everything doubtful. . . . My opinion is that the Bishop is courting the Tuileries."[1]

How is it that two such different interpretations as that of the Liberal Catholic Dupanloup and the ultramontane Schrader could be alike accepted by the Vatican? How is it that ultramontanes themselves, when they choose, can explain away what seems the plain and obvious meaning of the *Syllabus*, and accept principles to which it seems to be opposed? The answer lies in the distinction between *thesis* and *hypothesis*. The *Syllabus* is concerned with *thesis*, the laying down of principles, which are of absolute validity, and would prevail in an ideal society when the Church possessed the power of enforcing its authority, as it did to such a vast extent in the Middle Ages. But in modern times the Church in

[1] D'Ideville, *Journal d'un diplomat en Italie*, pp. 282 f. Bury paraphrases the last sentence; it is not a translation. Cf. Séché, *Les Derniers Jansénistes*, iii. pp. 200 f.

practice has to deal with *hypothesis*, *i.e.* it has to determine its actions to meet certain given conditions which it cannot control; it has to compromise and conciliate its theoretical principles, up to a certain point, with actual circumstances. This it has had to do in the interests of self-preservation; the Concordat of 1801 began the policy. But notwithstanding this unwilling and necessary condescension, the Papacy never abandoned the theoretical principles which are the logical consequence of its claim to independent sovran authority, superior to the civil authority; they remain in the background as the ideal, like a utopia, which the Church would realise if it could. On the other hand, the Pope had no illusions that there was any chance of realising them at present. Thus the ultramontane interpretation of the *Syllabus* as thesis was perfectly correct; on the other hand, the softer interpretation of the French Liberal Catholic was, though not literally sound, yet in spirit at least *just*, in so far as it went to show that there was no practical danger that the Papacy would not continue to compromise and find, however reluctantly, a *modus vivendi* with modern political institutions.

What, it may be asked, was the purpose or use of publishing and advertising the theory, which modern society was beginning to forget, and accentuating the fundamental antagonism between the Church and the modern State in such a way as to excite and aggravate the suspiciousness with which the Church was regarded by statesmen? The explanation of this, I believe, lies in the spread of liberal ideas among bishops and clergy in France and

Germany. The *Syllabus* was a blow aimed at liberal Catholicism; it was intended to crush the *thesis* of Liberal Catholics that liberalism and modern constitutional liberties were good in themselves. To ultramontanism, in playing its long game, this is a matter of supreme importance. The first and essential condition of ever attaining to a partial realisation of its ideal is to ultramontanism the Catholic world; and here its foe was and is liberal Catholicism. Hence the *Syllabus* is far from being a dead document of mere historical interest. It is still alive, and forms one of the main foundations and sources of the ultramontane literature of the present day. In 1903 the Cardinal Archbishop Fischer of Cöln said in his pastoral letter to his clergy: "The Syllabus of Errors is a touchstone of our own time; by which we can decide what agrees with Catholic truth and what contradicts it. It is to be regretted that recently some Catholic writers have ventured, in order to sustain their own opinions, to lessen or set aside the force and authority of this important document." The reference is to the writers of the new Catholic reform movement in Germany.

Thus it is equally important for the Papacy, in pursuance of its aims, to propagate the true theoretical doctrine regarding the relations between Church and State among Catholics, that is the *thesis*, while in its dealings with governments and its public policy it acts on the *hypothesis*. Its ideal is supremacy; what it claims is freedom. Bismarck in 1884 (November 26) in the Reichstag thus addressed the Centre: "You are fighting, you say, for the freedom of the Church! What do you mean by freedom of

the Church? You really mean the rule of the Church. As soon as your rule is endangered, you talk of a Diocletian persecution, slavery and oppression; ruling is born in your bones from old traditions."[1] This is rhetorical, but it contains the truth that the kind of freedom which is claimed on the plea of liberal principles is a step to the domination which is claimed on ecclesiastical principles.

I may say a word more on the ecclesiastical theory of history which is implied as we saw in some of the theses of the *Syllabus*. One of the features of the ultramontane view is that it refuses to distinguish between historical periods. It will not recognise that the early Church of the Graeco-Roman world was different from the Church of the Middle Ages, and that the modern Church must be different from the mediaeval. This unhistorical view is necessitated by the adhesion to the secular pretensions of the mediaeval Church; which pretensions in turn have to be made good by the alleged theory and practice of the early Church. Further, the history of European civilisation is judged according as in a particular period it was or was not under the guidance of the Roman Church. This way of looking at things is a fundamental point of opposition between the Church and modern thought. No conciliation is possible between the dogmatic point of view and the historical principle, which is one of the most important acquisitions of the nineteenth century. Cardinal

[1] Cf. *Briefe Bismarcks an Leop. v. Gerlach*, pp. 121-4; Busch, *Our Chancellor*, i. p. 158. The quotation is in Bismarck, *Politische Reden*, x. (1894) p. 259. The new edition of Bismarck's *Werken* has not yet reached 1884.

Manning felt this when he said that the dogma must conquer history.[1]

[1] Fénelon argues similarly, for he holds that the Church is supreme over fact as over doctrine. Is she not the supreme expounder of tradition, which is a chain of facts? Fénelon writes: "Oserait-on soutenir que l'Église après avoir mal raisonné sur tous les textes, et les avoir pris à contre-sens, est tout à coup saisie par un enthousiasme aveugle, pour juger bien, en raisonnant mal?" Bury recurred to this *obiter dictum* in his *Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 238: "This was the first appearance of the principle which Cardinal Manning expressed . . . in his famous saying that dogma must overcome history, and which guides all the historiography of the Ultramontane school". Dupanloup held, "surtout, méfiez-vous des sources". Cf. Manning, *The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, pp. 202-3; his *Pastoral on the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff*, p. 126. Above all, cf. Quirinus, *Letters from Rome*, pp. 69, 348, 443. On p. 69 we read: "The dogma has triumphed over history, as Manning has so admirably explained in his last Pastoral". On p. 443 we read: "To quote a significant phrase in constant use here during this winter, 'the dogma must conquer history'." The footnote connects this phrase with Manning.

III

THE VATICAN COUNCIL

We now come to the final act which completed and crowned the programme of ultramontanism, carried out in the pontificate of Pius IX.[1] I have already pointed out that the definition of the Immaculate Conception in 1854, the issue of the *Syllabus* in 1864, and the definition of Infallibility in 1870 are connected by a close logical interdependence; and though circumstances determined the time and mode of action, the various parts of the scheme were all contemplated in the early period of the pontificate.[2] I showed that the design of issuing a *Syllabus* of modern errors dated from the first years of Pius. I will now show more particularly the connexion of Infallibility with the Immaculate Conception.

In 1848 the French ultramontane party had announced a programme of which the four chief points were to procure (1) the promulgation of the Immaculate Conception, (2) the universal adoption of the Roman liturgy, (3) the canonisation of Bellar-

[1] Cf. Bury in the *R.P.A.* (1917). "The outstanding figure of the nineteenth century was to be, not Pius the Ninth, but Darwin" (p. 26). Cf. also Mourret, *Le Councile du Vatican*, p. 3.

[2] De la Gorce's chapter on the Vatican Council in his *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. vi., is exceedingly imperfect.

mine as the father of ultramontanism, and (4) the definition of the personal infallibility of the Pope. Pius IX. had already, in the *Encyclical* of November 9, 1846—of which more than 10,000 copies were distributed—declared his infallibility in faith and morals, and in the same letter he had called Mary *immaculata*. In his exile at Gaeta he determined to raise the Immaculate Conception into a dogma, and on his return to Rome he began to work for that purpose with the ardent co-operation of the Jesuits, who had always set special store by this doctrine.[1] At Granada in the year 1588 some Jesuits had discovered a coffer containing tablets of lead and a parchment which among others furnished apostolic evidence for the Immaculate Conception. It was promptly shown by learned Dominicans that this testimony was a forgery.[2] And Urban VIII. in 1639 forbade any appeal to be made to the Tablets of Granada, and in 1682 Innocent XI. pronounced them forgeries and put them on the Index.[3] As to the doctrine itself, the Popes allowed it to remain open; but it spread greatly in Spain and Italy, and much pressure was put on Gregory XVI. to adopt it. Pius IX. first of all consulted the bishops;[4] the majority of replies was favourable to his project, and then he appointed a commission of theologians, including Perrone and Schrader,[5] to consider whether

[1] *Regensburger Zeitschrift*, "Das alkumenische Konzil vom Jahre 1869", i. p. 225.

[2] Preuss, *Die römische Lehre*, pp. 118 ff.; Döllinger, *Akad. Vorträge*, i. p. 249. [3] Reusch, *Index*, ii. pp. 245 ff.

[4] Cecconi, *Storia del Concilio ecumenico Vaticano*, i. pp. 68 ff.

[5] *Ibid.* i. p. 80. On the members of the different commissions cf. Granderath, *Histoire du Concile du Vatican*, vol. i. pp. 92-6.

a dogma could be defined on the basis of tradition alone, without the testimony of Scripture. The commission decided that tradition was sufficient, and that tradition was proved if in various ages a number of witnesses can be produced. Then in November 1854 about 140 bishops came to Rome. Meetings were held in the Vatican; the Pope intimated that he was pleased at their presence at the definition of the new dogma. But let them not for a moment imagine they were a council, or express any opinion as to the opportuneness of the promulgation. The matter entirely rested with the Pope. The Bull was then read aloud, and they were invited to make remarks.[1] They criticised some of the daring assertions which it contained as to early evidence for the doctrine; some suggested that the wishes of the bishops should be mentioned; but this was met by the reply that the action of the Pope in making the decision alone revealed the infallibility with which Christ had invested his Vicar. The dogma was proclaimed in St. Peter's on December 8, 1854.

The event was of great importance, not of course on account of the nature of dogma itself, but on account of the method of its adoption by the Church.[2] It was a clear and unmistakable assertion of the infallibility and absolute sovranty of the Pope. He arrogated the right of making a new dogma an article of faith by his own sole authority, and his claim was not opposed except by isolated protests.

[1] The Bull Ineffabilis Deus is printed in *Lettres apostoliques de Pie IX*, p. 124.

[2] Nielsen, *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*, ii. pp. 195-6; Baunard, *Cardinal Pie*, ii. p. 401; Friedrich, *Tagebuch*, p. 294; Granderath, ii. pp. 295-9.

The general of the Dominican Order had been won over to the doctrine before the accession of Pius, and care had been taken to silence the opposition of that order, which, however, was no longer influential. The presence of the bishops on the occasion of the proclamation was a triumph of the Papal authority over the episcopate. The novelty of the act is fully acknowledged by the Jesuit Schrader in his work dealing with the *Syllabus*. "It is", he says, "an act to which no former pontificate can show a parallel; for the Pope defined the dogma of his own sovran authority, without the co-operation of a council; and this independent action involves practically, if not formally, another dogmatic definition, namely that the Pope is infallible in matters of faith in his own person and not merely when presiding at a council. The act of December 8, 1854, virtually claimed infallibility for the Pope."[1] It is also not unimportant to note that in both aspects the act was a great triumph for the Jesuits, and inaugurated the predominating influence they possessed throughout this pontificate. They had been always, like their founder, impassioned upholders of the doctrine; and henceforward they were to commemorate every year the heart of the Immaculate Mary with masses or fasts.

The Encyclical of 1846 to which I referred above declared, as the proclamation of the Immaculate dogma *implied*, the principle of Infallibility; but before proclaiming that principle itself, it was

[1] *Pius IX als Papst u. als König*, p. 12. Accompanying this work is "ein päpstliches Belobungschreiben". Cf. Friedrich, *Geschichte des vatikanischen Konzils*, i. pp. 345-6, 426-8.

thought necessary to make preparations which involved considerable delay, in order to invest it with a semblance of legality. A systematic agitation for this end was carried on; the revival of scholasticism and the issue of the *Syllabus* were important steps in the advance to the Vatican Council.

It is also to be observed that the definition of the Immaculate Conception not only assured Infallibility, but also, and just for that reason, rendered it necessary in the eyes of Pius to define it.[1] Until it had been formally defined as an article of faith, and set above all doubt, there was always the possibility that after his death his act might come to be considered a usurpation. This was a haunting nightmare which may have had a considerable effect in urging Pius along the path on which the Jesuits guided him.

I may digress here to call attention to certain psychological traits in Pius IX. which predisposed him to co-operate vigorously in a development which was mainly guided by the Jesuits and extreme ultramontanists.[2] He was exceedingly superstitious, in the common sense of the term, and credulous of legends and prophecies. In his youth, as Count Mastai, he had been cured of epilepsy by "water of Jesus of Nazareth" which was given him by a well-known prophetess of the day, Elizabeth Canori-Mora. Later, a more celebrated woman, Anna Maria Taigi, who was a great power in Rome, exercising

[1] Friedrich, *Tagebuch*, p. 294.

[2] Ollivier, in his *L'Empire libéral*, sketches the character of Pius IX. with power and pregnancy. The Pascal story, for instance, is really illuminating.

influence over cardinals and prelates, honoured successively by Pius VII., Leo XII., and especially by Gregory XV., was known to Pius, and she foretold his pontificate and the definition of Infallibility. As Pope, he often spoke of her prophecies, and he raised her memory to the ecclesiastical rank of "honourable" in 1863. Rosa Columba Asdente also prophesied his pontificate, and Marie Lataste foretold the definition of the Immaculate Conception. Leonardo of Porto Maurigio was canonised by Pius; in his tomb were found parchments with prophecies, of which one prognosticated the Immaculate Conception and declared it would abolish heresies and bring peace to the Church. In 1858 at Lourdes the Mother of God appeared and made a statement which to a profane ear seems meaningless: "I am the Immaculate Conception".[1] Pius favoured the Lourdes cult;[2] in 1876 he had the image crowned, and the bishops who were present referred to the epiphany of 1858 as confirming the proclamation of 1852.

In 1846 the Virgin appeared to two children at La Salette. She gave each of them a secret communication for Pius. He was very anxious to receive them and they reached him in 1851. He was highly pleased, but did not communicate the secrets to anyone. The message of Melania, however, apparently contained a prediction of the definition of Infallibility, for in writing the secret which was to be transmitted to Rome she asked how to spell Infallibility and antichrist. Missionaries soon settled

[1] Nielsen, ii. p. 197.

[2] Cf. Lafond, pp. 11, 91; Ollivier, ii. p. 324; Baunard, *Cardinal Pie*, ii. p. 401.

at La Salette; it became a place of pilgrimage and miracles; and the "Annales de Notre Dame de la Salette" were founded, to publish the wonder that occurred.

It is not an insignificant fact, in illustration of the Pope's mentality, that the letter containing Melania's secret reached the Pope's hands on July 18, 1851, and the dogma of Infallibility was declared on July 18, 1870. Archbishop Manning asserted that the Pope himself was not anxious for the definition of Infallibility; it mattered little to him, and he only acquiesced in the wishes of the Catholic world. This is simply false. Pius disavowed Manning's history of the Council, and sealed with his approval the history of Plantier. From it we learn that Pius recognised from the very beginning that Infallibility was to be one of the glorious tasks of his reign, and, convinced of this, he allowed nothing to deter him from carrying through the Council. He believed he had a special mission, and here we touch upon the point of contact between the Vatican Council and the miracles of La Salette. The destinies of the Church were affected by the visions and prophecies of neurotic women.

There grew up also something resembling a cult of the Pope himself, which was not surprising considering what he claimed to be. His claims were sometimes expressed by himself in a form which, if he were not a Pope, we should describe as megalomania.[1] He said in 1866, "I am the way, the truth

[1] Roman Catholic opposition in its various forms, learned in Germany, national in Italy, and liberal in France, was directed steadily against the Pope's claims.

and the life".[1] The *Civiltà Catholica* said about the same time, "When he meditates, it is God who thinks in him", and compared the mystery of his vicariate to the mystery of the sacrament—an analogy of which you can easily see the implication.

As that paper, the *Civiltà*, played an important rôle in the years immediately preceding the Vatican Council, it is necessary to point out, firstly, that it was edited by Jesuits, and secondly, that in February 1866 the Pope issued a Brief elevating it into something of the nature of a congregation. By this arrangement, the *Magister Palatini* reads the proofs and underlines passages, which are then erased in the Segretaria di Stato. Thus the paper authentically expresses the Papal ideas. But the Jesuits who act as editors are separated in a certain way from the order and are under the Pope's direct guidance. In this way the Society and the General are not responsible for the doctrines of the *Civiltà*, and in any country where the ultramontane principles inflexibly applied in that organ create offence or embarrassment, the order truthfully can say that it has nothing to do with the journal. But the editors belong to the order and are imbued with its true spirit, though they are responsible only to the Pope; and their independence of their order enables them to guide the Vatican far more effectually than if they received their directions from the General. Another paper, the *Correspondance di Roma* was founded and supported by Papal funds. The power of journal-

[1] Lord Acton and Bury both believed Pius IX. to have made this amazing outburst, but I am not certain that he did make it.

ism was now recognised at Rome, and was actively used for preparing the way for Infallibility.

In December 1864, two days before the issue of the *Syllabus* (which you remember was on the feast of the Immaculate Conception), the Pope communicated with great secrecy to the Congregation of Rites that the idea of holding a General Council had been long in his mind, as a thing desirable in order to meet the great needs of the Church. During the next two years various cardinals and bishops were consulted. Bishop Dupanloup, at first opposed,[1] came round to approve the project. Satisfied by the results of his tentative approaches, Pius mentioned the design openly in an Allocution on St. Peter's jubilee in June 1867, when bishops were assembled in large numbers in Rome. The precise object of the Council was not revealed. Those who were in the secrets of the Vatican knew that the intention was a definition of Infallibility, and in wider ultramontane circles the hope was cherished that this would be the result of the Council. The bishops who were present at the jubilee in 1867 wished to insert the word *infallible* in their address to the Pontiff, but this was prevented. Archbishop Manning and Senestrey, Bishop of Regensburg, who were at Rome on this occasion, took an oath together to do all in their power, and to offer special prayers every day, for the definition of Papal Infallibility.

Liberal and moderate Catholics like Dupanloup looked forward with great anxiety to the terms of the Papal Bull summoning the Council. It appeared

[1] Pelletier, *Dupanloup*, p. 96; *Collectio Lacensis*, vii. pp. 999 c, ff., 1285 c; Cecconi, Doc. cclxxxi.

a year later, dated June 29, 1868, and it was modelled on the Bull of Paul III. which convoked the Council of Trent. The purpose of the Council was stated to be "most carefully to examine and provide what in these hard times may promote the greater honour of God, the purity of the faith, the dignity of divine service, the salvation of souls, the discipline of secular and regular clergy, their training, the observation of ecclesiastical canons, the improvement of morals, the Christian education of youth, and the common peace and concord of the whole world. So, too, measures shall be most zealously taken to remove all evils from the Church and civil society, to revoke the erring to the right way, to extirpate vice and crime and revive religion."

This vague language might seem to contemplate a discussion of religion and morals in all their aspects. Never before in the annals of the Church had a Council been summoned for such indefinite reasons. Every Council that had ever met had been held to consider some specific question or questions; to settle some disputed point of theology, to condemn some particular heresy, or to deal with some particular abuse. On the face of the Bull, there was no reason for holding a Council then; at any other time the same reasons would have been equally valid. This anomaly, however, was only superficial; it was due to the determination of the Pope and his advisers to preserve official secrecy as to the real object of the Council, which was perfectly definite. The vague language of the Bull was a cloak, and the instructed could read between the lines that the means of compassing all the desirable ends which

were enumerated was the definition of Infallibility. Friedrich in his history of the Council has pointed out that the passage of the Bull which I quoted corresponds closely and even verbally to the programme sketched by the Pope in a Brief of 1860 which gave permission to Cardinal Geissel to hold a Provincial Council at Cöln.[1] Cardinal Geissel knew how to interpret it. He drew up a programme of resolutions for that Synod, which closely resembles the scheme adopted afterwards at the Vatican Council, and received (1862) the warm approbation of Pius IX. It included a recognition of the Pope as infallible and as universal bishop. The Bull of Convocation implies these claims elsewhere. Pius subscribes himself as "bishop of the Catholic Church", and he emphasises the absolute jurisdiction of Peter, who is the head, the foundation, and the centre of the Church. Thus to the initiated the Bull said everything; to ordinary clergy and laymen it seemed perfectly innocent. But the very date which was fixed for the opening of the Council was significant and ominous. The 8th of December 1869, the day of the Immaculate Conception, was the date of the issue of the *Syllabus*. These deliberately designed chronological coincidences are an outward symbol of the close inner connexion of the three great acts of the pontificate of Pius IX.

A summons to the Council was issued to the Eastern Church and to the Protestant communities. Rome can hardly have had any illusions that this was a form which could lead to nothing. In his invitation to the Eastern Patriarchs, the Pope avoided

[1] Friedrich, pp. 354 ff.

applying to them the word "schismatics", but the superscription of the letter with the title "the Apostolic Chair" was enough to give offence. It reached the Greek and the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople, the Coptic Patriarch in Alexandria, the Jacobite Patriarch of Syria and Persia, the Jacobite Bishop of Jerusalem, the Nestorian Patriarch at Kochanes in Kurdistan, and even the Abyssinian Church. Only the Russian Church received no formal invitation. All of them either declined or sent no answer. Among those who did not reply was the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, but he explained his reasons to the Abbot Testa, who presented the letter, which the Patriarch even refused to receive.[1] He said that he had seen the Bull, which had been printed in the newspapers, and that it contained views which directly contradicted the principles of the Orthodox Church, the spirit of the Gospels, and the doctrines of the Ecumenical Councils. He then went into some of the radical differences between the two Churches, especially the position of the Pope. Finally, he said, if the Western bishops are in doubt and uncertainty on matters of faith, let them hold a council; we have no doubts, we adhere to the unchangeable doctrines derived from the Fathers. And in any case if the Pope of Rome desires a council he should consult the Eastern Patriarchs as equals and brothers, and not signify his will to them as if he were teacher and master of all. The refusal of the Eastern Church to take part deprives the Vatican Council of any real right to the name of Ecumenical.

As to the Protestants. The reply of Prussia was

[1] Friedenberg, pp. 250 f.

to issue circulars for subscriptions and collections to the Gustavus Adolphus Society, which had been founded to support evangelical Churches in Catholic countries.[1] The High Church party in England were unmoved.[2] In 1867 Pusey had said to Bishop Dupanloup "there are 8000 of us in England who pray daily for the unity of the Church", and in the same year 180 clergymen had sought to know from the Pope what would be a possible basis of reunion.[3] The Puseyites had constantly appealed to a General Council, and Rome was at this time keen on recovering England. But to the astonishment of the Jesuits, the Puseyites did not stir when the Council was announced. It could not have been otherwise. Pusey in his "Eirenicon"[4] had designated as the two fundamental grounds of the continuance of the schism, the doctrines of Papal Infallibility and Immaculate Conception; and he now edited a treatise of Turrecremata for the purpose of showing that the proclamation of 1854 was an error which should be corrected at the approaching Council. The attitude of the Puseyites in holding aloof illustrates the words of Dupanloup, who, though he was a believer in Infallibility, thought it a grave mistake to define it. "When the problem is stated", he wrote, "the enemies awaken, the faithful are troubled, the *Protestants draw back*, the governments are disquieted."

[1] Granderath, i. pp. 406-15; *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, pp. 164 ff.; *Collectio Lacensis*, vii. p. 1123 d; Cecconi, Doc. cxxiii.; Friedenberg, pp. 253 f.; Frommann, p. 10.

[2] Granderath, i. 397 ff.; Cecconi, i. pp. 262 ff., 293 ff.

[3] Cf. Liddon, *Life of E. B. Pusey*, iv. p. 153.

[4] It was entitled "Is healthful Reunion possible?"

Dr. Cumming, the Scotch Presbyterian, inquired of Archbishop Manning what Protestants must do in order to take part in the Council.[1] Manning inquired at Rome, and the answer was: Return like prodigal children. The Pope afterwards said: Protestantism cannot be discussed, sentence was long ago pronounced, it is a *chose jugée*.[2]

Catholic sovrans had always been invited to General Councils; on this occasion no invitation was sent. Émile Ollivier complained that the Pope by this innovation affirmed the principle of separation between Church and State.[3] The *Univers* said their exclusion proved that they were outside the Church. "In fact, all Catholics are outside the State, which is rotten."[4] At Rome the unsatisfactory explanation was given that the position of Victor Emmanuel, who was excommunicated, caused difficulties; and some princes had violated their Concordats and were consequently ruling over states which had no religion.[5]

The most important event after the publication of the Bull was the appearance on February 6, 1869, of an article in the *Civiltà Catholica*, on the future Council.[6] It was written in France, and expressed

[1] Friedrich, i. pp. 729 ff.; Granderath, i. pp. 399 ff.

[2] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 114 f.; Friedenberg, pp. 255 f.

[3] Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État au concile du Vatican*, i. p. 509. Cf. Cecconi, Doc. xxxv. pp. 135 ff.; *Collectio Lacensis*, 7, 1061 b, c.

[4] Veuillot was its editor. Cf. his *Illusion libérale*, pp. 36, 37, 148. On p. 38 we read: "Il n'est point de temps, point de société, point d'homme de qui les fidèles de Jésus-Christ ne doivent exiger, lorsqu'ils le peuvent, quelque forme d'obéissance aux décrets du pontife-roi".

[5] Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, iii. pp. 83 f.; Ollivier, ii. pp. 551 f.

[6] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1147 ff., 1153 ff.; Cecconi, ii. Doc. cxxxv.-cxxxix. Cf. Friedrich, ii. pp. 11-13; Granderath, i. pp. 184-6.

the wish that the Council would confirm the *Syllabus*, carry the definition of Infallibility by acclamation, and declare the dogma of the Virgin's bodily Assumption into heaven. Now the significance of this article as a feeler on the part of the Jesuits has been fully established by the revelation of the official historian of the Council, Cecconi. Towards the end of 1868 the editors of the *Civiltà* approached Antonelli and asked him to direct the Nuncios in the various countries to collect correspondence for their paper on the subject of the Council; and on December 9 Antonelli instructed the Nuncios to this effect, observing that the correspondence thus obtained would both be submitted to the commissions which were preparing the material for the Council and also serve the uses of a journal.[1] Among the points on which communications were invited were the wishes and needs of each country. "Here", wrote Antonelli, "might be indicated points of doctrine or discipline which prelates might like to be decided in the General Council."[2] One of the Nuncios interpreted this to mean whether any new dogmas were desired! Now the article in the *Civiltà* was compiled from correspondence forwarded by Chigi, the Nuncio in Paris.[3] In these circumstances, the quasi-official complexion of the article cannot be called in question. The complaints of the correspondents as to the use made of their letters were hushed up; and when some of the ambassadors spoke

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1048 b, ff., 1061 b, c; Cecconi, Doc. xxxv. pp. 135 ff.

[2] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1146 c, ff.; Cecconi, ii. Doc. cxxxv.

[3] Friedrich, ii. pp. 10 ff.

to the Pope or Antonelli on the subject, they denied all responsibility for the *Civiltà*.

The article which disclosed the true objects of the Council to the world called forth the famous articles of Döllinger[1] in the Augsburger *Allgemeine Zeitung*, entitled "The Council and the *Civiltà*", which were published in March 1869. The most learned ecclesiastical historian in Germany, he pointed out what the definition of Papal Infallibility would mean, what changes it would introduce in the Church, how it would raise the propositions of the *Syllabus* to authoritative dogma; and he tried to show that it would affect the whole modern world. He prophesied what the character and procedure of the Council would be, and it is remarkable how his predictions were verified. "In 449", he said, "a synod was held which got the name of the synod of robbers; the Council of 1869 will be the synod of flatterers."[2] "If the Council allows itself to be used to bind the

[1] On his attitude cf. his *Kleinere Schriften* (ed. Reusch), pp. 357 ff.; Michael, *Döllinger*, p. 55. His theory is specially plain in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 11, 1870. Cf. *Collectio Lacensis*, vii. p. 1502 a; Schulte, *Die Stellung der Konzilien*, p. 104; Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, iii. pp. 131 ff.; Friedrich, *Döllinger*, iii. p. 498.

[2] *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), 1869, No. 74, 1126. Döllinger's sixty-nine letters were published at Munich in 1870 just as they appeared in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. Friedrich edited them. There is an authorised English version entitled *Quirinus, Letters from Rome on the Council*. The date of the first letter is December 1869, and of the sixty-ninth July 19, 1870. Cf. Friedrich, *Döllinger*, iii. pp. 518 ff.; Michael, *Döllinger*, p. 107. The three friends of these letters are Friedrich, Döllinger, and Acton. Manning, with reason, regarded Acton almost as dangerous as Döllinger. According to Friedrich, Strossmayer was one of the main inspirers of these famous letters (Friedrich, *Döllinger*, iii. pp. 549, 703). Figgis and Laurence edited vol. i. of *Lord Acton's Correspondence*, and it is invaluable for the understanding of Ultramontanism. Its publishers tell me that there will not be a second volume.

wreath of Infallibility round the Pope's brow, none of those consequences will ensue which followed the fifth Lateran Council (which preceded the Reformation). There will be no great and sudden rebellion, no insurrection in the grand style; all will remain quiet, only too quiet. The Jesuits and their pupils will sing Hosanna, draw some inferences from the dogma and use it for their purposes; and the world will look on indifferent. But a deep antipathy against the Italian priesthood will gradually grow."[1]

The article in the *Civiltà* also led to action on the part of the Bavarian minister, Prince Hohenlohe, who was intimate with Döllinger. He sent a circular on April 9, 1869, to the Bavarian envoys, instructing them to call the attention of the governments to the Council and propose united action, so that the Pope might know in time what the attitude of the Powers would be.[2] But the proposal met with no sympathy.[3] The attitude of the governments was that if the Council should make any encroachments, it would be time enough to think of acting. Arnim—Prussian ambassador at Munich—ridiculed Hohenlohe, said he was inspired by Döllinger, and that the

[1] *Allegmeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), No. 74, 1126. Cf. Friedrich, ii. pp. 21 ff.

[2] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1199 ff.; Cecconi, ii. Doc. clxix.; Friedenberg, pp. 354 f. Prince Hohenlohe, in his *Memoirs*, reveals that Döllinger drafted the body of this circular. Had Prince Hohenlohe's advice been taken, the Vatican might not improbably have hesitated to challenge a conflict with Roman Catholic Europe. But it did not at that moment suit Bismarck to follow this advice; Beust was far too superficial to comprehend its drift; France was distracted by internal troubles; and the peculiar conditions of Italy rendered it impossible for her to interfere.

[3] Friedrich, *Döllinger*, iii. pp. 487 ff.; Cecconi, Doc. clxxiii.

question was merely theological.[1] The President of the Swiss Federal Council also asked Prussia what it intended to do.[2] Bismarck said he did not share in the hopes or anxieties of others; the Council would not touch the political interests of Prussia.[3]

The anonymous articles in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* were enlarged and recast in book form by Döllinger and Huber, and appeared in July under the pseudonym of *Janus*. The book was a systematic historical criticism of Papal Infallibility; it traced the gradual growth of ultramontane doctrines, and dealt with the fabrications on which they had been based. Archbishop Ketteler of Mainz, who was personally opposed to the definition of Infallibility, said that Janus had only one parallel for untruth—the *Provincial Letters* of Pascal.[4] Bishop Hergenrother of Wurzburg wrote a reply entitled *Anti-Janus* —an extremely weak performance.

In Germany, outside the theological school of Munich, there were not a great number who rejected the doctrine of Infallibility itself, but there were a great many who, like Archbishop Ketteler, were strongly convinced that its definition was inopportune. This opinion was expressed by the majority of an assembly of bishops who met at Fulda.[5] The same position was held by a considerable number of the French bishops, including Dupanloup,[6] who

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 1203 c; Cecconi, Doc. clxxix.; Ollivier, i. p. 513.

[2] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1215 b, ff.; Cecconi, Doc. clxxxvii.

[3] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1202 d, ff., 1209 c, ff.

[4] Friedrich, i. pp. 367, 626-8. Ketteler's letter is in *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 1485.

[5] Granderath, i. pp. 232-46; Friedrich, ii. pp. 200 ff.; *Collectio Lacensis*, 7, pp. 1196 a, ff.

[6] Falloux, ii. pp. 418 ff.

worked hard to avert the danger and drew down upon himself all the venom of the editor of the *Univers*.

No one worked harder or took a more prominent part in bringing about the accomplishment of the Pope's wishes than Archbishop Manning.[1] He had very slight theological or historical equipment, but he made up for these defects by boldness and enthusiasm. In October 1869 he published a pastoral letter which assumed the proportions of a book, entitled *The Oecumenical Council and the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff*. The well-known intimacy of the author with the Vatican lent the publication great importance; but it was only after the Council that Manning acknowledged that one chapter was not his own, but was furnished by the official committee which was preparing the material for the Council. This shows how deeply, though not a member of the committee, Manning was initiated into the secrets. The purpose of the work is to prove that the definition of Infallibility is opportune. He answers objections and advances positive arguments. One notes such curious sophisms as this. The Church is the body, and the Pope is the head; the Church is infallible, but an infallible body with a fallible head is absurd; therefore the head is infallible. Of course, the correct Catholic doctrine in regard to the Early Councils was that the body and head together, but

[1] The main source for his activities is Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning*, vol. ii., chapters xvi. and xvii. Purcell should be read in the more candid first edition. Cecconi, Friedrich, and Granderath naturally devote much space to the man termed by the Italian papers "Il Diavolo del Concilio". One of the best etched sketches of Manning is by Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État*, ii. pp. 8 ff. Lytton Strachey has subtly portrayed him in his *Eminent Victorians*.

neither separately, were infallible. Manning says that an urgent reason for not leaving the Infallibility question longer in *suspense* is that in the history of the Church many decisions were made by Popes, which were not decreed by Councils, and it ought to be determined whether there is any doubt about their validity. For instance, he says, the decision of Innocent I. as to original sin and the doctrine of Pope Gelasius as to the Canon of Holy Scriptures. Here Manning shows his imperfect acquaintance with the history of theology. Gelasius laid down no doctrine about the Canon; in the decree which goes by his name there is merely an enumeration of scriptural books. And when Manning wrote, it had already been recognised by critics, like Hefele, that this part of the decree was older; it was the work of Pope Damasus. And then when we go back to Pope Damasus things do not look very favourable to the cause of Infallibility, for the canon of Damasus ascribed to St. John the Evangelist only one letter, the other two being attributed to another person of the same name; whereas Pope Innocent ascribed all three letters to the Apostle. Here are two Infallibles in contradiction with one another. But the accuracy about facts really did not matter for Manning's position or purpose. It is high time, he says, that the pretensions of historical science should be confined to its own sphere. That will be done by the Council with the help of the Holy Ghost! During the Council, he put this briefly: "The dogma must conquer history".[1]

[1] Cf. his *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, pp. 28, 203, 226, especially p. 226. There he says that "the appeal to antiquity is

Now while the Church was agitated with excitement and anxieties and the Papal Court was occupied with preparations for the Council, Italy was waiting for the first opportunity to seize Rome. If the opportunity came and Victor Emmanuel moved before December 1869, the Council could not be held. It was the presence of French troops in the Roman State that stood in the way, and the great object of the diplomacy of Florence was to have them removed. The question became the subject of secret negotiations between France, Austria, and Italy in 1868. It was not the prospect of the Council that influenced these governments, but the result of their negotiations was to decide whether the Council could be held. Rouher's famous asseveration in the Chamber that "Italy would never go to Rome" had marked the collapse, at the end of 1867, of previous *pourparlers* between the same three powers, through the attitude of France.[1] But Napoleon, foreseeing a conflict with Prussia, was holding out his hand to Italy in 1868, and Austria, when she learned of the possibility of an alliance, determined to be a third.[2] The Austrian war party, of which the Archduke Albrecht was the leader, was thirsting for revenge on Prussia.[3] The negotiations were first of all en-

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both a treason and a heresy. It is a treason, because it rejects the Divine voice of the Church *at this hour*; and a heresy, because it denies that voice to be divine." Cf. Manning's letter to *The Daily Telegraph*, October 8, 1875.

[1] *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), December 9, 1867.

[2] Prince Jerome Napoleon, "Les alliances de l'empire en 1869 et 1870", *Revue des deux Mondes*, 1878, xxvi. pp. 489-500; *Journal des Débats*, May 14, 1878; Mérimée, *Lettres*, ii. pp. 354-5.

[3] Friedrich, III. ii. p. 676.

tirely conducted by the sovrans themselves. When they had reached a general agreement on the conditions of a triple alliance, then ministers had to be taken into their confidence and the matter passed into their hands. But as soon as this had happened, the Roman question, on which the sovrans had only touched very delicately, became crucial. Italy demanded, in return for her effective help, that the Roman question should be settled, through the withdrawal of the French troops. In this demand Count Beust, the Austrian Chancellor, strongly supported Italy; he showed himself a determined enemy of the temporal power.[1] It was a novel position for Austria to assume. But when the Italian government required France to return to the September Convention, the French minister, De Lavalette, informed it that Napoleon did not feel able to execute that convention, that the negotiation must be suspended, but might be resumed at a more favourable opportunity. This was in June 1869. The sovrans indeed continued to interchange letters.

These diplomatic transactions were virtually a secret from the world, and it is impossible to say how much the Vatican knew about them; but there was certainly considerable apprehension at Rome as to the eventuality of the French troops being withdrawn. The action of Napoleon in breaking off the negotiation was decisive; to him belongs the credit of having made the Vatican Council possible. Personally, of course, he did not want the Council. His action was only another proof of his weakness, and

[1] Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État*, ii. pp. 473-4; D'Ideville, *Les Piemontais à Rome*, chap. viii.

the weakness of his political position; he was depending more and more on the clerical party. In October the Italian minister, Menabrea, sent round a circular in which he observed: The Italian government cannot avoid considering it a fact of great importance that France is assuring her protection to an assembly directed against Italy by permitting French troops to form the garrison of the Church State during the session of the Council. In January 1870 Bismarck observed: "France has the Council entirely in her hands, and she can endanger it by withdrawing her troops".[1] Frenchmen have not been unconscious of the responsibility incurred by their country in facilitating the enactment of decrees which caused much unrest in European states; but the attempts of Émile Ollivier, the apologist of the Second Empire, to justify French policy are curiously unconvincing.[2]

The French government indeed went somewhat further. In the instruction sent to De la Tour d'Auvergne, the envoy at Rome, it went so far as to countenance a definition of Infallibility.[3] The document runs: "For some years past there is a movement in the Catholic Church, aiming at augmenting unduly the prerogatives of the Pope and even proclaiming as dogma his personal Infallibility". This sounds promising; but how does it go

[1] Despatch of January 5, 1870, in Friedenberg, p. 524; Ollivier, i. 388 ff., 398, 519-28, 530, ii. pp. 29 ff.; Rothan, *L'Allemagne et l'Italie*, ii. p. 84; Cadorna, *La Liberazione di Roma*, p. 361.

[2] Cf. *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1216 b, 1218 a, 1220 c, 1229 a; Cecconi, Doc. clxxxviii.

[3] Ollivier, i. p. 519; *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1233 d, 1234 c; Maynard, pp. 192 f.; Ollivier, i. pp. 519 f., ii. p. 29.

on? "There is no doubt that the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope speaking *ex cathedra* admits many subtle distinctions, and we have reason to hope that if an explanation on this matter must be given, the expression will be chosen with extreme discretion."[1] Thus the government of Napoleon did what no other government did; it countenanced a discreet definition of Infallibility. Ollivier calls the French policy a policy of abstention;[2] it was really a policy of surrender to the ultramontane party.[3]

While Rome preserved official silence as to the precise object of the Council and what it was to do, many bishops and theologians published pamphlets, offering their opinions on what subjects should be discussed and proposing programmes. I may mention the work of Professor Walter of Bonn on *The General Council and the Ecumenical Situation*,[4] which deprecated the consideration of Papal prerogatives or of anti-Christian errors as futile, and called attention to questions of jurisdiction and discipline, and especially the establishment of a *modus vivendi* with the modern state. Ratzinger's book on *The next General Council and the true needs of the Church*, published anonymously, sketched a more ambitious programme, but one which was even more offensive to the ultramontanes and the *Civiltà Catholica*.[5] One of the great objects, he said, ought to be to reinstate all the Christian Confessions; the invitation of the non-Catholics was good, but they

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, 1234 c.
[2] I. p. 391. This page is decisive.
[3] I. pp. 530, 531. Cf. Granderath's comments, II. ii. pp. 369 ff.
[4] *Das allgemeine Concilium u. die Weltlage* (Regensburg, 1869).
[5] Friedrich, ii. pp. 20, 285-93.

should not only be invited but listened to; and the basis of reunion should be the Apostles' Creed and the doctrines on which all Christians are unanimous. Another object should be to make provision that the clergy should receive an education which would place them abreast of the most advanced culture and science of the age. Their training should not be confined to scholasticism, liturgy, and ritual; they must study history impartially, and the *Index Librorum* prohibitions must be abolished. Another question of pressing importance was the reformation of Church government in both head and members. This section of the book is extremely drastic. All nations of the Christian world should exercise equal influence on the election of the Pope; there is no good reason or right why the Pontificate should be confined to Italians. The Congregations must also be reformed; the Congregation of the Inquisition must be done away with as well as that of the Index. Further, the Pope must banish from his Court the avariciousness which has become proverbial. This book was at first ascribed to Döllinger. It was generally thought even by the most liberal Catholics that while there was much truth in it, it was too rough and unsparing.

Of other works I need only refer to that of Professor Ginzel of Leitmeritz, entitled *Reform of the Roman Church in its Head and in its Members*, a very ominous title, which called down the wrath of Vatican circles.[1] It is enough to say that it was a free and radical criticism, and that it strongly denounced the dominant theory of the relations of

[1] Friedrich, ii. pp. 207-8, 296-303. Ginzel enjoyed the confidence of Cardinal Schwarzenberg.

Church to State, which maintained still the principle of the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII.[1]

It is observed that the ultramontanes of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland did not publish any proposals or programmes for the Council. It was part of their position that the initiative should lie with the Pope.

Hardly anything in the nature of proposals appeared in France, where theological learning was at low ebb; Italy was almost equally unproductive. An Englishman, Urquhart, who was an Anglican and editor of the *Diplomatic Review*, published some articles in the spring of 1868, which attracted considerable attention.[2] They were entitled "How the Ecumenical Council may act on the human race"; "The Ecumenical Council: Restoration of the Law of Nations"; "Appeal of a Protestant to the Pope to restore the Law of Nations". His idea was that the cause of the chief evils of the age was due to the decline of law, and the remedy was to restore respect for the Law of Nations. This, he held, could only be done by the Pope or the Council. Law, he said, is based on the Ten Commandments, and it is everyone's duty to maintain it, but especially the Pope's. It is his duty as king to protest against all acts of violence. If his government undertakes the protection of justice, it will become the most powerful on earth.[3]

This will suffice to show what his idea was. As it tended to exalt the power and importance of Popes,

[1] Published in 1302.

[2] Granderath, i. p. 400; *Collectio Lacensis*, vii. pp. 1309 c, ff.

[3] Friedrich, ii. pp. 329-33.

and emanated from a non-Catholic, it was received with respect and attention by the Vatican, and by the Catholic press of all countries. It was indeed a return to the mediaeval idea of the Pope. The Jesuit organs praised it, but, of course, their idea was to restore his mediaeval position through the halo of Infallibility.[1]

The literature on the Vatican Council is very extensive. To some of the most remarkable examples of the pamphlet literature which circulated before its assembly, I have referred. On the histories of the Council itself some like that of Pressensé may be neglected. That of Cardinal Manning threw light on some points, but it must be used with great precaution. The three most important histories are the quasi-official *Storia del Concilio* by Archbishop Cecconi; the history of Plantier, which was approved of by the Pope; and the *History of the Vatican Council* by Friedrich, which is far the best. It is bitterly anti-Papal, but it gives the facts accurately, and the author had an unrivalled survey of all the literature bearing on his subject. He was a trained ecclesiastical historian, a pupil of Döllinger, and made a special study of Conciliar history, especially of the Council of Trent. He was invited to act as theological adviser of Cardinal Hohenlohe, the brother of the Bavarian minister, at the Council, and he was at Rome in that capacity all the time.[2] He kept a careful diary of his experiences, which lets us see the various phases of opinion, the fears

[1] *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, i. 4, pp. 130 f., 135; Cecconi, ii. pp. 333 ff.

[2] Friedrich, *Tagebuch während des vatikan. Konzils*, p. 1.

and the anxieties of the minority, their vacillations and compromises. The ultramontanes would have been glad to find an excuse for driving him from Rome. He was looked on askance for his learning and for his connexion with Döllinger and the Munich school of theology; and his employment by Cardinal Hohenlohe, whose brother was so strongly opposed to the Council, did not recommend him. Besides Friedrich, Bishop Hefele was almost the only man at Rome who had a profound knowledge of ecclesiastical history. The majority of the Fathers were grossly ignorant, or possessed a superficial knowledge derived from handbooks. It was the aim of the Vatican to discourage them from studying history during the Council. We shall see that the Vatican librarian Thenier had special orders not to permit anyone to examine the *Acta Concilii Tridentini*.[1]

[1] Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 1039, 1096.

IV

THE VATICAN COUNCIL

THE work of the Council was being carefully prepared at Rome for over two years.[1] It was important to obtain the co-operation of theologians who had fame for learning. The name of Newman naturally occurred; but Manning and the Jesuits succeeded in excluding him.[2] The work was organised in the form of a *Directing Congregation* and six committees. Cardinal Patrizi was president of the Congregation, which included Sanguinetti the Jesuit, Monsignor Talbot, and the learned Hefele, Bishop of Rottenburg. Of the committees the most important was the Dogmatic. Its president was Luigi Bilio (who,

[1] The two principal official collections of documents are Eugenio Cecconi, *Storia del concilio ecumenico vaticano scritta sui documenti originali*, Rome, 1873–9, 4 vols., and Gerhard Schneeman and Théodore Granderath, *Acta et decreta Sacrosancti Oecumenici Concili Vaticani. Accedunt permulta alia documenta ad Concilium ejusque historiam spectantia*, Freiburg, 1892, vol. 7. The latter I generally cite as *Collectio Lacensis* and a few times as *Acta*. In 1872, E. Friedenberg published his useful *Sammlung der Aktenstücke zum ersten vatikanischen Konzil mit einem Grundrisse der Geschichte desselben*. Bishop Martin published his *Collectio omnium documentorum concilii Vaticani* in 1873. J. Friedrich's *Documenta ad illustrandum Concilium Vaticanum anni 1870* is also useful. Cf. Mirbt's admirable article in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. v., series iii. (1908), on the "Geschichtsschreibung des vatikan. Konzil".

[2] *Sull' opportunità della definizione dommatica dell' Infall.* (Napoli, 1869), p. 9; Icard, *Journal*, pp. 278-9.

you remember, had been concerned in the compilation of the *Syllabus* and who had been made a Cardinal); it included the Jesuits Perrone and Schrader, whose names are also associated with the *Syllabus*. The members were sworn to secrecy. Each member of this committee had to draw up a report on a given subject—some point of doctrine which had led to heresy. Heresies were to be traced, formulated, and reasons given for their condemnation. From all these reports the committee compiled a *Schema de fide* which was to be laid before the Council.

The Council was to be opened on December 8. But it had been decided that a preliminary Assembly should be held on December 2 as a sort of a preface, and on that day the Bishops and members of the Council who had already arrived in Rome gathered in the Sistine Chapel; they numbered 503, including 43 Cardinals. The Pope delivered an address in which he virtually identified his own voice with that of Christ; but it was disappointing to the audience, who hoped to hear definitely what the programme of the Council would be. It consisted entirely of phrases. After the address, a Papal Brief was read fixing the order of proceedings and the mode in which the Council was to be conducted.[1]

(I must note here that on the same day, December 2, official notices were posted on the doors of St. Peter, Ste. Maria Sopra Minerva, the Inquisition Palace, and the Curia Innocentiana, that the book entitled *Janus* had been condemned by the Index Congregation, and that their decision was confirmed by the Pope.)

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, 17 ff.; Friedenberg, pp. 358 ff.

To return to the order of proceedings. It was a complete and high-handed innovation that this should be prescribed by the Pope, and not fixed by the Council itself.[1] It was ordained that there were to be three kinds of meetings: (1) committees which were to prepare the decrees, (2) general congregations which were to pass the decrees, and (3) public sessions which were to publish them.

In his Brief the Pope claimed the exclusive right of initiating proposals, a right which had not been claimed at Trent or any former Council.[2] He announced, however, that he would allow the Fathers to share in this privilege. But the concession was rendered futile by the provision that if a member wished to make a proposal he must submit it first to a committee appointed by the Pope, and the Pope would decide whether the proposal should be discussed. Under such novel limitations it could not be said that the Council was a free body in the sense in which this could be said of other Councils. The restriction on the right of proposing was a violation of what may be called Conciliar law, as shown by the practice at the Ecumenical Councils and at the Council of Trent. At the latter Council an attempt had been made to appropriate to the Pope or his

[1] Friedrich, *Tagebuch*, pp. 11 ff., yet cf. Fessler, p. 34. Cf. also *Aktenst.* ii. pp. 29 ff.; Acton, pp. 50 ff.; Friedenberg, p. 97; Fessler, *Das vatic. Concil*, pp. 31 ff.

[2] Friedrich, iii. p. 86; Fessler, p. 51; *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1551 b, 917 ff. Cf. the last, pp. 489, 778, 1077, 1087; Ollivier, i. p. 500; Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, iii. p. 55. Cf. Figgis and Laurence, *Lord Acton's Correspondence*, i. pp. 89-90: "The sole legislative authority has been abandoned to the Pope. It includes the right of issuing dogmatic decrees, and involves the possession of all the infallibility which the Church claims."

legates the right of proposing, but it had been successfully resisted.

Another innovation of great importance which was introduced was the requirement of strict secrecy as to the proceedings of the Council. The words of the Brief are as follows: "Considerations of policy cause us to ordain that throughout the whole duration of the Council official secrecy shall be observed; in view of the seriousness of present circumstances this must be prescribed more than in the case of former Councils. This foresight is highly necessary at the present time when godlessness, equipped with a thousand weapons of destruction, is on the watch to lose no opportunity of stirring up odium against the Catholic Church and its doctrines. Therefore, we command all the fathers, the officials of the Council, the theologians, the canonists, and all who perform any official services at the Council not to reveal to any outside person decrees or any business discussed, or the opinions of individual members. Officials, who are not members, must take an oath of secrecy."[1]

This instruction came as a great surprise.[2] It placed the members in a very awkward position. They came to Rome without any information as to the subjects which were to be discussed, so that they had not been able to study the questions beforehand.

[1] Par. 3 of "Multiplices inter", laying down the ordering of business at the Vatican Council. Cf. Quirinus, *Letters . . . on the Council*, p. 13.

[2] Fessler, p. 35. Cf. Bishop Strossmayer's striking testimony to the absence of freedom at the Council in his letter of November 27, 1870. It was first printed in the *Deutsche Merkur*, and was reprinted in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, July 13, 1881.

Every member was now debarred from consulting anyone except the theologian whom he had brought with him. If there was a man of learning in his own diocese whose opinion he would have valued on a theological point, he could not communicate with him. And special precautions were taken to prevent this. The Papal post office was empowered to stop letters, and send them to the censor. It was also explained by the Secretary of the Council, Bishop Fessler, that the theologians were precluded from attending private meetings of bishops, and afterwards even meetings of bishops were subjected to restrictions. The members of the Council were forbidden to print anything on the subject of the Council either at Rome or elsewhere. Thus the Pope and his advisers were determined to shroud the proceedings of the Council in deep obscurity, until its final result should be published to the world. The intention was that the *acta* should never be known except in an official history.

There was yet another significant innovation announced in the Brief. All the decrees were to be introduced by the words: "Pius, bishop, servant of God, with the approbation of the Sacred Council, ordains".[1] The decrees were thus to be in the name of the Pope. At Trent the formula was: "The sacred Synod, lawfully assembled in the Holy Ghost, under the presidency of the legates of the Apostolic See, ordains".[2] By accepting this form the Council

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 56; "Multiplices inter", § 8. Cf. Schulte, *Stellung*, pp. 81 ff.

[2] *Acta Congregationum*, i. p. 39. Cf. Friedrich, iii. pp. 70 ff., and contrast Fessler, *Das vatikanische Konzilium*, p. 39; Hinschius, *Kirchenrecht*, iii. p. 362; Cecconi, i. pp. 244, 246.

implicitly admitted that the Pope was independent of the Council, that the Council was superfluous and was not a Council in any real sense.

The meeting place arranged for the Council was in the right transept of St. Peter's Church. The Pope was insistent that the sessions should be held close to the Apostle's tomb. It was fitted up like an aula. But for practical purposes a worse place for a large assembly to deliberate could not have been selected. The acoustic properties were extremely bad, and a discussion which should be audible to all was impossible. Many complaints were made, and there was talk of providing better accommodation in the Quirinal, but nothing was done. Before the Council opened, there had been a trial of the acoustic properties of the aula, at which the Pope was present. The Bishop of Aire ascended the pulpit and sonorously declaimed a definition of Infallibility which amused the Pope.[1] He was no doubt satisfied that the aula was adequate for promulgating the definition, and nothing more was necessary.

The Cardinal von Reisach was appointed President of the Council, but he died soon after it opened, and the Cardinal de Angelis succeeded him.[2] It is unnecessary to describe the long and ceremonious opening session on December 8, at which the Pope was present, delivered an address, and recommended the Council to the mother of God. 719 members had assembled, and in January this number swelled by late arrivals to 744. Of the European members, who

[1] *The Vatican*, p. 23.

[2] Acton, *Zur Geschichte des vatikanischen Konzils*, p. 67; Schulte, *Stellung der Konzilien*, p. 254.

counted 541, more than half were Italians. There were 113 Americans, 13 Australians, 14 Africans, and 83 Asiatics.

In the days following the preliminary meeting, the general surprise and dismay occasioned by the ordinances which the Papal Brief laid down for the Council threw everything else into the background. The chagrin was felt not only by the men who were opposed to the extreme Roman claims, but by the general rank and file of French and German bishops who were ready to vote for anything the Pope wished. But they were conscious of the indignity of sharing in a Council from which even the semblance of freedom was taken away. The nomination of the secretary and all the officers of the Council by the Pope, as well as his exclusive privilege of initiation, produced a painful impression.

But the question of Infallibility, though as yet there was no official knowledge that it would be brought forward, operated during these first days in grouping the members. Before the opening meeting of December 8, the fathers were instinctively differentiating themselves into two large sections —a majority which was in favour of the definition of Infallibility, and a minority opposed to it. And within the majority national groups were formed. For instance, the Spanish bishops met almost immediately under the chairmanship of Cardinal Moreno, and resolved to vote for everything that was submitted to the Council, especially Infallibility, and, if Infallibility were not brought forward by others, to endeavour to secure its definition.

It is not necessary to describe the great opening

meeting on December 8, at which the Pope was present and delivered an address, but it was not entirely satisfactory to the Pope. He had appointed the Archbishop of Iconium, Pücher-Passavalli, to preach the sermon on this occasion, and sent him a private hint that he should emphasise the desirability of sanctioning Infallibility as an article of faith at the Council. But although the Cardinal's hat had been promised him, Passavalli ignored the intimation, and did not say a word on the subject in his sermon.[1]

The first Congregation met on December 10, and an announcement was made of the names of the Commission who were appointed to examine any motions which members of the Council wished to bring forward.[2] The names were almost entirely those of known Infallibilists: they included Moreno, leader of the Spanish party, Riario Sforza of the Italian, Bonnechose of the French, Cullen of the Irish; also Manning and Dechamps (of Malines), the most eminent literary advocates of the doctrine; and Bishop Martin of Paderborn, a red-hot Infallibilist.[3] Of the twenty-six there were only three opponents, one of whom was Cardinal Rauscher, Archbishop of Vienna, but their views were unknown at the time. A Bull was then read to the Assembly, which provided that, if the Pope died during the Council, the Council should be suspended and have no voice in the election, which should rest as usual with the

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, 764 d, ff.; Friedrich, ii. p. 425; III. i. p. 129. The sermon is in Friedenberg, pp. 366 ff.

[2] Cf. Friedrich, iii. pp. 166-9, 175 ff., 177.

[3] Granderath gives the different lists, ii. pp. 96-9. Cf. Friedrich, III. i. pp. 236 ff.

Cardinals, and the Council should not meet again till summoned by the new Pope. This created considerable dissatisfaction. The fathers were annoyed at the acoustic deficiencies of the hall. Some said in voting *non placet quia nihil intelleximus*, but most, out of respect to Pius, pretended to hear.[1]

The Bull for the next papal election had perhaps the effect of consolidating the minority, and some incidents which happened outside the Council contributed to this. For instance, Cardinal Schwarzenberg, one of the most prominent anti-Infallibilists, had an audience of the Pope and brought forward some of his objections to Infallibility. The Pope replied: "I, Giovanni Maria Mastai, believe in Infallibility. As Pope I have nothing to ask from the Council; the Holy Ghost will enlighten it."[2] It soon became clear that the minority was about 120 strong, and, including the Oriental bishops, amounted to 150. The size of the minority would at least render it impossible to carry decrees by acclamation.

According to the instructions of the Papal Brief, four commissions were to be chosen by the Council for preparing the business in four different departments. The first was to deal with dogma, the second with ecclesiastical discipline, the third with the affairs of religious orders, the fourth with the Oriental Churches. The first, under which Infallibility came, was the most important. It was of the greatest

[1] Granderath, ii. p. 68; Darboy, *La Liberté*, p. 139; Pomponio Leto, p. 64.

[2] Cf. Ollivier, ii. p. 336. This utterance is in Friedrich, III. i. pp. 108 f. Take another utterance: "As to Infallibility, I believed it as plain Abbé Mastai, and now, as Pope Mastai, I FEEL it" (Quirinus, p. 132). Cf. Friedenberg, *Aktenstücke*, p. 108; Friedrich, III. i. p. 649.

consequence for the future of the Council how these commissions should be composed, especially the first; and the crucial point was whether members of the minority should be admitted.

On this question the editor of the *Univers* wrote on December 14: "The Majority and Minority at a Council are not analogous to political coalitions, in which the exclusion of members of our party is justifiable. If this were done it would seem like an attempt to make the Holy Ghost lie, and would be branded as a repulsive intrigue." But this was not the view of the Pope and the Curia. We are enlightened on this by Plantier, the historian approved by the Pope. His words are quite candid: "Among the bishops of the minority", he says, "there were men of prominence who had deserved well of the Holy See and the Church, men distinguished for learning and eloquence. They had a right to be included in the Commissions, and would have enriched them with stores of learning. But their writings and speeches, in fact everything, show that in the great question of Infallibility they held stubbornly to views which were obsolete and had been a hundred times condemned. They had announced that they would oppose any decree which contradicted those views. That was enough. They were inexorably excluded from committees which were open to men of less reputation, but who represented a purer faith and sounder theology. Certain elements, in short, were mercilessly excluded."[1] He then goes on to designate the majority and the committees they elected as a great army well ordered

[1] C. H. Plantier in Roskovány, *Monumenta Catholica*, vii. pp. 649 f. Cf. his *Les Conciles généraux et le concile du Vatican.*

for battle. There is no doubt that the elections were made by means of lists prepared beforehand, though the episcopate of any country in which Infallibilists were more numerous had a free hand to select the names they wished. It is to be noted that Manning used all his influence to exclude the non-Infallibilists; they are heretics, he said, in the position of a cursed person, and must only be permitted to discuss and defend themselves. The voting for the dogmatic Committee was held on the 14th and the result published on the 17th. The list contained hardly any well-known names; the various nations were impartially represented; but as Manning's paper, *The Vatican*, observed: "Not one member was compromised by Gallican or liberal principles. Of the twenty-four every one is distinguished by devotion to the Chair of St. Peter, or, to speak in the modern phrase, by ultramontane doctrines and sympathies."[1] The less important Committee for ecclesiastical discipline, of which the names were published on the 23rd, contained only two, and those not prominent, members of the minority. The results in the case of the other committees, which were elected later, were similar.

There is no doubt that the majority were surprised at the number of the minority. Manning and others found it genuinely difficult to understand their attitude, or to conceive how so many Catholic bishops could combine to oppose the wishes of the Pope and cause him anxiety and annoyance. But if Pius was vexed at the resistance and the obstacles which were presented to his hopes of a speedy and triumphant promulgation of the dogma, at the same

[1] Cf. Friedrich, III. i. pp. 165-7.

time the fact that a minority was formed, comprising very influential prelates, corroborated his belief in the prophecies of Anna Maria Taigi. For that inspired sibyl, in foretelling that Papal Infallibility would be defined at a Council under the auspices of Pius IX., had also declared that it would be opposed by some of the most eminent ecclesiastics in the Church.[1] Meanwhile he was amiable to members of the opposition. He gave (December 22) a long audience to Ketteler of Mainz,[2] one of the most prominent of the Inopportunists. He opened the interview with the words *Amas me?* Ketteler, like St. Peter, was confused, but answered with expressions of devotion. But he explained his views on the question of opportunism, and left the sacred presence unconverted.[3]

The minority meanwhile were taking counsel together, though not in a very business-like or effective way. It was determined to present an address to the Pope demanding free initiation in making proposals:[4] Strossmayer drew it up,[5] but some of the most important bishops, who had approved of the design at first, refused to sign it for various reasons. It never led to anything.[6]

From December 17 letters began to appear in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* (a journal which stank in the nostrils of the Vatican) on the "First Days of the Council". They excited the indignation not only of the majority but also of the minority, but they

[1] Callisto, *Vita della V.S. di Dio A. M. Taigi*, pp. 206 ff.
[2] His *Freiheit, Autoritat u. Kirche* is well worth reading.
[3] Quirinus, *Letters . . . on the Council*, p. 139.
[4] Friedrich, III. i. p. 231.
[5] Friedrich, *Documenta*, ii. pp. 380 f. [6] *Ibid.* i. p. 136.

were greedily read at Rome, and Antonelli had to get them translated into Italian. It had been hoped that no news about the proceedings had escaped beyond the members and the initiated at Rome, but these articles withdrew the veil of secrecy. All the actors were displayed on the stage, and the secrets of the Vatican and the mandates of the two parties were disclosed. The articles showed a knowledge far wider and more intimate of what was going on than most of the members of the Council possessed. The tone was critical and often sarcastic; individuals were not spared; the weak points of the authorities were exposed. From December 27 they appeared under the name *Roman Letters on the Council*, and everyone at Rome who wished to know the secret threads which were being twined, and the intrigues which were being woven, around him, had to read them. The question was: Who wrote them? Suspicion alighted for a moment on the attaché of the Bavarian Embassy, Count Louis von Arco, and also on Lord Acton.[1] But they finally concentrated themselves on the Palazzo Valentini, the residence of Cardinal Hohenlohe, and ascribed the authorship to Professor Friedrich. Hohenlohe's residence was regarded as the focus of opposition, and the belief in Friedrich's responsibility for the letters intensified the distrust of the Bavarian Cardinal's house. Friedrich absolutely denied the charge; he says that the letters could not have been the work of one person alone.

The appearance of these letters demanded, on the part of the Vatican, counter operations in the press,

[1] Friedrich, III. i. p. 244. Cf. *Revue internationale de Théologie*, 1903.

notwithstanding the ordinance of secrecy. But even before they appeared measures had been taken by the authorities, who fully realised the importance of the press. It was not known till after the Council was over that four of the fathers—fervent Infallibilists—Dechamps, Senestrey, Mermillod, and Manning—had been absolved from the oath of secrecy in order that they might make communications to a number of laymen with a view to contradicting false and calumnious reports on the part of the opposition press. Manning's confidant was a Protestant, the diplomatist Mr. Odo Russell, who was the English agent in Rome. Russell passed on Manning's information to Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, and he helped Manning by reporting to him all he could discover about the proceedings of the opposition. Russell was of considerable help in averting the danger of diplomatic intervention, and Purcell, the biographer of Manning, goes so far as to describe him as a human agent for aiding in carrying through the new dogma.[1]

On New Year's Day the Pope held his usual reception of the diplomatists, and he sought to assure them that nothing the Council would do would affect the Church's relations with the governments of Europe. "A great noise", he said, "was made about the *Syllabus*, but the ecclesiastical world has now acquiesced in its principles. It will be just the same with the decrees of the Council." In this prophecy he was perfectly right. The words show that Pius was quite confident as to the result. And Odo Russell observes that in Rome people generally mocked the

[1] Purcell, *Manning*, ii. pp. 435, 436.

naïveté of Cardinal Schwarzenberg and Bishop Dupanloup, who imagined for a moment they could oppose the Holy See; and records that Antonelli remarked, speaking of Dupanloup's futile excitations, that the *furia francese* was often forced to abate itself in Rome.[1] "The Jesuits", observes Russell, "are men of the world, and they do not usually undertake things they cannot carry through; for years they have been sounding the spirit of the Catholic populations and of the clergy, and they know perfectly well how far they can count on the superstition of the former and the servility and stupidity of the latter."[2] But the minority did not look on the situation with such a discerning eye; they thought they had to do, not with the world, but with the Church, and were not prepared for intrigues. The remark of Antonelli is one of the indications that the fate of the minority had been decided, and it was only for reasons of policy that the struggle of the parties was allowed to protract itself unmeaningly for six months.

Meanwhile the *Schema de fide*, on which the preparatory committee had been laboriously engaged for two years before, was submitted to the Council at the Congregation of December 28. It was hoped it would pass without any discussion, for the Pope was very anxious that it should be ready for formal promulgation on January 6, the date fixed for the Second Public Session.

It is said, and this has not been contradicted, that the schema was the work of the Jesuits Schrader and Franzelin. It was an enormously long document,

[1] Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 601-2; III. i. p. 268.
[2] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 268-9.

dealing with a number of heresies, and with the general question of the sources of divine revelation, and the meaning of tradition. It is quite unnecessary to touch upon its details. But though no time had been allowed to the fathers to study its details seriously, it was not to pass without criticism. Cardinal Rauscher opened the discussion, and proposed the rejection of the scheme.[1] Bishop Kenrick of St. Louis followed to the same effect. Then came Tizzani, a blind man, Archbishop of Nisibio, who condemned the document as mere words, *verba verba nil nisi verba*, and contrasted the brevity of the decrees of former Councils.[2] But the speech of the day was made by Connolly, the Archbishop of Halifax, who concluded with words that ran through Rome like wildfire: *Hoc schema non esse reformandum censeo cum honore sepeliendum.*[3] Cardinal Bilio, president of the Committee that was responsible for this precious document, hung his head and looked deeply dejected.[4] The majority were much disconcerted, but when the members of the minority left the hall in high satisfaction and naïvely began to praise the freedom of the Council, the majority took full advantage of this, and made the proceedings which had vexed them the text for proving to the world how free the Council was. It must be remembered that two-thirds of the Assembly could not hear what the outspoken critics said.

The debate was resumed on December 30, and was marked by the speech of Bishop Strossmayer

[1] Wolfsgruber, *Cardinal Rauscher*, p. 430.
[2] Friedrich, III. i. p. 323.
[3] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 324 ff. [4] Cf. Icard, *Journal*, p. 193.

(of Diakovar in Bosnia).[1] He began to criticise the superscription of the scheme, "Pius, bishop, servant of the servants of God, with the approval of the Council", as against tradition and unsuitable to the decree of an Ecumenical Council, but he was interrupted by Cardinal Capalti, who pointed out that the superscription formula was fixed by the order of business as laid down in the Papal Brief and could not be discussed. Strossmayer replied that he would say with Bossuet, rather let my tongue be dried up than that I should attack the true rights of the Holy See—and descended from the tribune.

In support of Capalti and the presidents, it may be said that the order of business dictated by the Pope had been accepted by the Council and Congregations, and on that basis had already been held. But, on the other hand, there had been no opportunity before of discussing or protesting against the order of business. In any case the Capalti incident displayed the weakness of the minority. A strong and determined party would have seized the opportunity for a vigorous and combined protest. Many of them, no doubt, did not know what was going on. But afterwards, if they had had any discernment, they would have seen that their further presence at Rome was futile and undignified and would have left the Council. For the Capalti incident made it clear that the Council was based on a *petitio principii*. For the acceptance of the superscription was an acceptance of the principle that the Pope can alone define and is a legislator in dogma. What was the object, then, of continuing the fight for months

[1] *Acta Congr. gener.* ii. pp. 43 ff.; Icard, *Journal*, p. 193.

against Infallibility? A French journalist observed: "It was a true master stroke to set the Papal Infallibility in operation before it is proclaimed as a dogma". But the minority were blind, and praised Strossmayer as a second St. Bernard.

These proceedings—for more speakers were announced and the debate was continued on subsequent days—showed that the *Schema de fide* could not be proclaimed on January 6. The Pope saw it would be impolitic to intervene to cut short the discussion; it was expedient to let the bishops speak as much as they chose, and maintain the semblance of complete freedom. It was therefore necessary to invent something else for the Public Session of January 6. The directors of the Council resorted to an extraordinary expedient for occupying this Assembly. Each of the members present pledged himself to the Confession of Faith of the Council of Trent—the same pledge which he had taken when he was ordained; it was not taken to the Pope. Such a proceeding was entirely alien to the business and purpose of a Council, and caused no little disgust among the opposition.

In the meantime the promoters of Infallibility were devising how to bring this supreme question forward. Bishop Martin besought the Pope to have it proposed. Pius required in support of such a petition the names of at least 400 bishops, and Martin immediately set to work. The petition was prepared chiefly by him, Manning, and Dechamps. By January 2 it was printed, revised, and had fifteen signatures, and was ready to be sent to the members of the majority. The minority knew nothing about

this movement till after the address was printed in *The Vatican* (Manning's paper) on the 15th and in more complete form on the 22nd January. The address obtained 410 names. At the same time, from the 6th to 16th, a sermon was preached every day in St. Andrea della Valle in favour of Infallibility. Bishop Mermillod outdid all the other preachers; his expressions were so strong that even the ultramontane press forbore to print his sermon. His subject was the three Bethlehems; and the three Bethlehems were the manger, the tabernacle, and the Vatican. "If you knock at the Vatican, who comes out? Christ and the gospel." Bishop Haynald asked him afterwards: "In which storey of the Vatican does Christ reside?" Mermillod answered quite good-humouredly: "I did not take a note of the number".[1]

On the same day on which this sermon was preached (January 9) Pius IX. received an audience of 1500 persons, and delivered a discourse in which he referred to the minority as *duces caecorum*.[2]

Pius also did something publicly for Infallibility. On January 5 he issued a brief to J. Jacques, a Redemptorist, who had written a book explaining Liguori's doctrine of Pope and Council. Pius said the book was not only good but opportune, on account of the Council now sitting, and would help to dissipate sophisms which were propagated under the semblance of a new philosophy. Thus the Pope, by this means, recommended Liguori to the Council.

Some prominent members of the minority held an international meeting, as it was called, on January 8,

[1] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 387-9.
[2] Friedrich, III. i. p. 390; his *Documenta*, i. p. 185.

and decided to draw up manifestoes, in the form of addresses to the Pope, against Infallibility. Several petitions resulted: one from the German and Austrian members; another from thirty French members, to which were added all the Portuguese names, some Armenians, and others; a third from the American, English, and Irish bishops, twenty-seven signatures; a fourth from sixteen Orientals; and a fifth from seven Italians. These extra-conciliar movements occupied the chief attention of the fathers now, and weakened the interest in the Congregations. The minority went on making tiresome speeches, for so long as the fate of the *Schema de fide* was not decided they persisted in talking, although they knew now that it was a subordinate matter. At the end of the Congregation on January 10 the President declared the debate closed, and the Scheme was referred to the dogmatic committee for correction. Meanwhile schemes on the subject of Church discipline would be brought forward at next Congregation.

The French bishops had already in preparation a memorial on ecclesiastical discipline and organisation, written by the Archbishop of Paris, and on January 13 they determined to hand it in to the Committee for Proposals. Among the *vota* of the French were that Ecumenical Councils should be more frequently held, also plenary and provincial Councils to which the Roman Congregation should not have the right of making additions unless submitted to and approved by the members; that the bishops should have a larger right to grant dispensations; that the Rules of the *Index Librorum Pro-*

hibitorum should be reformed, as they were useless and impracticable nowadays; that the Breviary with its apocryphal stories and obscure hymns should be corrected; and that the diffusion of pious pictures, miraculous legends, and introduction to new cults should be checked.[1] There was consternation in the Vatican when the tenor of this document was known, and two Dominican monks of the Inquisition paid a visit to Cardinal Hohenlohe to request him to use his influence with the German bishops not to send in such unsuitable propositions. "It is frightful," they said. "What will become of Rome? These bishops are working for a decentralisation of the Church."[2] They did not go to the right person, but in any case the Germans had already prepared a document of the same kind, which had been in preparation since the meeting of bishops at Fulda. The German propositions also tended to decentralisation, to securing and increasing the powers of the bishops, and included the revision of the rules of the Index, and of the Breviary, and a revised Corpus of the canon law.

The Roman Cardinals and members of the Roman Congregations were terribly alarmed at such demands. If dispensations and everything are taken out of the hands of Rome, they said, on what are we going to live?

The schemes which were proposed to the Congregation on January 14 tended in exactly the opposite direction. They were two—one on the bishops and synods, and one on the procedure in case of vacant sees. They aimed at securing greater centralisation

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 832. [2] Nielsen, ii. p. 331.

and stricter dependence of the bishops on Rome. In the debate on this and the following day, speakers insisted on the complete omission in the schemes of any reference to the rights of the bishops. The Pope was greatly put out by these discussions, and his anger vented itself on the presidents. But the debate continued through many meetings till January 25, when both schemes were withdrawn and referred for revision in Committee.

During these weeks lively war was carried on outside Rome; pamphlets and brochures were flying. The first bolt that caused great excitement at Rome was a letter of the Oratorian, Père Gratry, to Bishop Dechamps.[1] It was a drastic historical criticism on the doctrine of Infallibility, and professed to be an attack upon a "school of errors and lies". "Does God need your lies?" the writer asked.[2] He laid most stress on the notorious case of Pope Honorius, the main stumbling-block to adherents of Infallibility who take any account of historical facts.[3] This case alone, according to Gratry, decides the question.[4] On January 22 the Pope issued a Brief to the Abbé Ségur, which, if not caused by Gratry's letter, was a reply to it. "Is it so surprising", asked the Holy Father, "if the forces of hell, which have been once

[1] *L'évêque d'Orléans et Mgr. de Malines, Première lettre à Mgr. Dechamps*, 1870. There were four. Cf. Friedrich, *Döllinger*, iii. p. 521. Döllinger helped Gratry in his letters.

[2] *Première lettre*, p. 2. Cf. Frommann, pp. 66-71.

[3] *Première lettre*, pp. 15 ff. Cf. pp. 36, 37. Cf. Friedrich, III. i. pp. 480-82.

[4] Honorius I. (625–38) supported the monothelite heresy. It is important to note that the Council of Constantinople condemned him in 680, and in the oath taken by every new Pope from the eighth to the eleventh century, he was duly anathematised.

more vanquished by the assembling of the whole Church, should pull all their strength together to fight against the Council? Godless men are laying snares to postpone as long as possible the deadly stroke which in the end they will not escape."[1]

The petition in favour of Infallibility was published in the paper of the party, before the text appeared, in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* on January 16. Five days later an article on the subject appeared in the same journal by Döllinger, entitled "Einige Worte".[2] In breaking silence at this juncture, Döllinger seems to have been prompted by a letter which he had just received from Arnim, the ambassador of the North German Federation at Rome. "The longer the bishops remain away from home", wrote Arnim, "and are exposed to the influence of the Roman spirit, the more pliable will they become. They are all excellent men, but they have lost the great ideas of the Church. Two months more at Rome, and there will be complete concord. The fault is largely due to the lifelessness of the Catholic world in Germany. It seems to me of the greatest importance to call public attention to the state of things, in order to organise a manifestation of opinion which will reach as far as Rome, and which should particularly be based on the principle that the Catholic world in Germany cannot possibly be induced to receive laws from 500 Italians, of whom 300 are parasites of the Pope."[3]

The publication of the Infallibility petition gave

[1] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 483-4; Friedenberg, *Aktenstücke*, pp. 489 ff.
[2] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 493-500.
[3] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1471 c, ff.; Quirinus, p. 128.

Döllinger an opportunity to attempt to influence public opinion in Arnim's sense. His criticism was unsparing. He examined particularly certain assertions of the petition about the Council of Lyons (1274) and the Council of Florence (1439).[1] I will quote only the conclusion, in order to show the tone of a pronouncement which caused unspeakable fury in Rome. "The petition", he says, "is at pains to show that the promulgation of the new article of faith is just now opportune, or rather urgently necessary, because some persons who profess to be Catholics have recently disputed this opinion of Papal Infallibility. What the petition says, or assumes as known in Rome, on this head amounts to this: Abstractly, it would not have been necessary to augment the number of dogmas by a new one, but the situation has so developed that this can no longer be evaded. Years ago, the Jesuit Order, supported by followers of the same views, began an agitation in favour of the proposed dogma simultaneously in Italy, France, Germany and England. The chief organ of the Jesuits, the *Civiltà*, has designated it as the principal task of the Council to bestow upon the expectant world the article of faith which is still lacking; their publications at Maria Laach and in Vienna have ventilated the same theme untiringly. Those who disagree ought, they think, to have maintained a respectful silence in the presence of this agitation and to allow the arguments of their numerous writings to pass without criticism. Unfortunately this has not been the case. Some men have had the unheard of auda-

[1] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 495-6.

city to break that sacred silence and to express a different opinion. This offence can only be atoned for by an addition to the creed, a change in the catechism and all religious books."[1]

The article was an event; it created an uproar in the precincts of the Council. Döllinger, who bore the reputation in all lands of being the first theologian of the day—Döllinger *locutus est!* He had spoken, and the strength of his language surpassed expectation. It was a drastic exposure of the theological knowledge of the 369 bishops who had already signed. No one at Rome was more furious than Manning.[2] The order which forbade anyone to discuss Infallibility during the Council, within the Roman State, in a public print was now felt to be embarrassing by the promoters of the dogma, and on February 1 the Pope gave the Jesuit editors of the *Civiltà* a dispensation from this prohibition, so that they could print an article against Döllinger. Döllinger's criticism, however, was far from pleasing all the minority. There was naturally in parts of it a strong resemblance to *Janus*, and the bishops of the minority were strongly averse to identifying themselves with the attitude of Janus, though they agreed with it partly. They all entertained a violent dislike to the *Augsburger allgemeine Zeitung*, and were vexed that Döllinger should have contributed his paper to it. Ketteler was especially indignant, and was very anxious to get up a manifesto against Döllinger.[3]

[1] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 21; Friedrich, III. i. pp. 499-500; Friedenberg, pp. 495 ff.

[2] Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning*, ii. p. 433.

[3] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 504-6, 522-6; III. ii. pp. 588-90.

There were several points on which they could have disavowed agreement—for instance, the ecumenical character of the Council of Florence, which Döllinger denied, but Hefele and Strossmayer upheld.[1] But the proposal was not accepted.

It was while indignation with Döllinger's step was still fresh that the address of the minority against Infallibility was presented to the Pope, and a worse moment could not have been chosen for handing in an unwelcome petition. The Pope said it must be sent to the Committee of Proposals, for he did not interfere with the Council. It was not pleasing to him to learn that on January 27 Munich honoured Döllinger by making him an Ehrenburger, or honorary citizen.[2]

I may close this lecture with the incident of Audu, the Patriarch of Babylon.[3] On January 25, the last day of the debates on the schemes concerning Church discipline, the Patriarch had complained of the efforts of Rome to interfere with the ancient customs of the Church. The Pope, in fact, had in the previous September sent a Constitution *cum ecclesiastica disciplina* to the Chaldeans, which divested their Patriarch of important rights. Audu's speech was an appeal from the Pope to the Council. Pius IX. was indignant beyond measure. The same evening a Roman prelate summoned the Patriarch to appear before the Pope next morning, and he came without an interpreter, since a certain Valerga,

[1] Friedrich, III. i. pp. 503, 506-7, 543.

[2] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 28 (Supplement); Friedenberg, *Sammlung der Aktenstücke*, pp. 121 ff. Döllinger refused this honour.

[3] Friedrich, iii. p. 508; Quirinus, pp. 174-5.

whom the Propaganda had appointed to Latinise the East, would act as such. The Patriarch Audu went and found the Pope trembling with anger. Pius exclaimed: "So you are the stiff-necked troublesome man who has been vexing me so long. Your disobedience will have to bend before me." After many reproaches about the speech he had delivered the day before, the Pope placed two papers before him, one being a resignation of the Patriarchate, the other a nomination of two bishops whom the Pope had chosen for the Chaldeans, and whom the Patriarch and his Church had refused to accept. Audu, who was nearly eighty years old, prayed for a postponement of three or at least two days for consideration. The Pope refused—you must sign at once. The Patriarch took the pen and began, then stopped, saying the pen would not write. The Pope supplied a penknife, Valerga pared the pen, and the Patriarch wrote—the effect of the signatures being that he would consecrate the two priests as bishops within two hours or resign.[1] He did consecrate them, but he confided the whole transaction to one of his Oriental colleagues; it was known throughout Rome and created a great impression.[2] Darboy said: "It is simply a robber synod. What is to be thought of its freedom, men asked, if a bishop is liable to be called to account for his speech by the Pope and perhaps even punished?"[3]

[1] *Giornale di Roma*, February 1, 1870.

[2] Friedrich, *Tagebuch*, pp. 140 ff.; *Stimmen aus der kath. Kirche*, ii. pp. 180 ff.; Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État*, ii. p. 185; Quirinus, p. 138; Friedrich, *Geschichte*, iii. p. 508.

[3] Cf. Friedrich, i. pp. 435-7; Friedenberg, *Aktenstücke*, pp. 257 ff.; *Ce qui se passe au Concile*, p. 17; *La vérité sur Mgr. Darboy*, p. 37.

V

THE VATICAN COUNCIL

The bishops who formed the minority of the Council, although to some extent conscious already of the undignified, helpless, and illogical position which they occupied, had not the courage or unanimity to take a decisive step, and still struggled on, hoping to gain succour partly from public opinion outside, influenced by the authority of men like Döllinger, and partly from diplomatic intervention. From Prussia nothing was to be hoped; Bismarck declined to take any interest in the Council;[1] in his despatch of January 5 to the Prussian envoy at Rome he explained at length that the decrees of the Council could not affect Prussia. "We do not in the least require an assurance on the Pope's part that the relations of the Curia to the governments shall not be altered by the Conciliar decrees."[2] And later, on March 13, he wrote in the same sense; the government would give its moral support to a firm attitude on the part of the North German bishops; but it was for them to act, not for the government.[3] It was on the attitude of France that the hopes of the minority chiefly de-

[1] Meglia to Antonelli, July 8, 1869.
[2] *Collectio Lacensis*, 1202 d, ff., 1206 a, ff.; Cecconi, Doc. clxxx.
[3] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 1608 a.

pended; and French diplomacy at this moment gave some false grounds for hope.[1] On January 2 Napoleon had resorted to a ministry under the presidency of Émile Ollivier, a ministry whose members were far from holding the same views on ecclesiastical affairs.[2] Daru was the Foreign Minister; he was a friend of Dupanloup, and strongly adverse to Infallibility. Whatever instructions Daru wrote to Banneville,[3] the envoy at Rome, and whatever words he uttered on the question of the Council, Ollivier, a man full of confidence in his own omniscience, disavowed, and thus lowered the respect for the French government at the Vatican.[4] When the preparation of the petition for Infallibility was known at Paris, Daru sent an instruction to Banneville, expressing views which he desired to be laid before Antonelli. He pointed out the policy of the Holy See was making the situation difficult for the French government, which would have to explain in the Chamber the retention of the French troops; and he complained of the methods by which the freedom of the bishops had been curtailed in a manner without precedent. The next day, Daru

[1] The serious matter for the minority was that Ollivier was opposed to all interference. He defended his action by maintaining that it is true and sound policy in our time to respect religious liberty fully, and, moreover, that it would have been undignified on the part of France to offer ineffectual remonstrance. But he forgets that French troops were then supporting Pius IX. in interfering with liberty. Napoleon III. said to Odo Russell: "Je crois, et j'ai toujours cru, que l'occupation de Rome sera la faute de ma règne". No truer words were ever spoken. They will be the final verdict of history.

[2] Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État*, ii. p. 33; *Revue des Deux Mondes*, March 1, 1924.

[3] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1553 ff.; Friedrich, III. ii. p. 737; Paul, *Letters of Lord Acton*, xli.

[4] Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, ii. pp. 210-39; Friedenberg, pp. 521 ff.; Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État*, ii. p. 126.

wrote in much stronger terms to his friend Du Boys, the vicar-general of Dupanloup. "They can hardly be blind enough", he said, "to suppose that we will leave our troops there a single day, once they proclaim the dogma of Infallibility. . . . Public opinion in France will be too strong."[1] But Banneville did not move in the sense of Daru's instructions; and this was due to the fact that the premier Ollivier was working behind Daru's back, and indirectly assuring the Vatican that in the opinion of the government intervention was unreasonable and the Council was perfectly free.[2] The Pope and his advisers knew that there was nothing to fear for the present, and some ambiguous menaces on the part of Austria were equally without result.[3] The Pope used to say: "I cannot help laughing at these governments".

Speaking in the senate on the subject, Count Daru had appealed to the great principles of 1789. Now in the preceding October the editor of the *Univers* had asserted that men like Döllinger, Maret, Montalembert[4] wanted an '89 for the Church; and the *Civiltà*, in its recent article against Döllinger, imputed to him the design of substituting, instead of the monarchy instituted by God, a modern constitutional régime. These observations made a great impression on Pius IX., and he became convinced that the liberal Catholics and all the opponents of Infallibility

[1] Friedenberg, p. 136. The second sentence is a paraphrase. Cf. Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 818-19.

[2] Ollivier, ii. pp. 133-7; *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1559-60; Friedenberg, III. ii. pp. 736-9.

[3] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1577 a, 1578 c, d, 1579 a, 1581 b, 1593 a, ff., 1602 c, ff. On Bismarck's attitude cf. the *Collectio*, pp. 1608-10.

[4] Contrast Pelletier, *Dupanloup*, pp. 94 ff.

were ecclesiastical revolutionaries and desired a 1789 for the Church. And so he seized an early opportunity of branding the year 1789. On the 17th of February he opened an exhibition of art, and observed in the course of his address: "It is not true that, as some say, our religion requires a year '89; that is a blasphemy, borrowed from a great Italian demagogue".[1] Nobody doubted that in these words the Pope was attacking the minority. Just after this utterance the *Moniteur Universel*[2] arrived from Paris, containing an article on the Council of which Darboy afterwards acknowledged himself the author.[3] It showed unsparingly how the members had found at Rome a Council already constituted by theologians and canonists who had been selected on exclusive principles and had framed resolutions which the bishops were expected to sanction.[4] The order of procedure had been imposed on them, they had not elected a single officer; and the arrangements were made in order, as Veuillot said, to deprive the bishops of the freedom to do wrong. "The Italian bishops and apostolic vicars are masters of the Council and of the votes, and the Roman Curia can crush the minority by numbers, although the minority represent a population of 90 millions, *i.e.* about half the Catholic world."[5]

In the meantime a scheme had been proposed to the Council for introducing a short catechism that should be used universally in all countries, superseded

[1] Cf. Nielsen, ii. p. 340.

[2] Article of February 14, 1870; Quirinus, p. 227; Friedrich, *Tagebuch*, p. 191; Veuillot, *Rome pendant le Concile*, i. p. 275.

[3] Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État au Concile*, ii. p. 91; his *Empire libéral*, xiii. p. 148. Cf. Cornu, *Mgr. Freppel*, p. 168.

[4] Ollivier, *L'Église*, ii. p. 272; Friedrich, *Geschichte*, iii. p. 899, and his *Tagebuch*, p. 380.

[5] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 1567.

ing all local or national catechisms.[1] The intention of Rome was that it should be a vehicle for introducing Infallibility. Like other schemes, this, too, was returned to the Committee for revision on February 22, and at the same time the Council was informed that the Pope had decided on a new order of procedure, in order to accelerate the work of the Council, and this was read out. Members were required henceforward to send in writing their objections to the proposals laid before Council, and they must propose amendments for all classes or paragraphs they objected to. The committee was to revise the scheme with all these criticisms before them, and then bring it forward again, on which the real discussion was to be held. In case *ten* members proposed to close the debate and the majority agreed, the closure was to be enforced. At the voting a qualified affirmative *placet iuxta modum* might be given, but the condition was to be handed in in writing.

The minority were dismayed by the new ordinance, for it placed the liberty of discussion entirely in the hands of the majority, and deprived the Council of the small appearance of freedom it possessed. It was felt by a great many bishops that the only dignified and reasonable thing to do was to leave Rome, but they had not the resolution, and they still secretly hoped something would be done by the French government.[2] A strong protest was drawn up and

[1] Granderath, ii. pp. 257-77.

[2] Cf. Bourgeois and Clermont, *Rome et Napoléon III*, 1849–70. Bourgeois describes the negotiations which took place between 1868 and August 1870, with a view to the formation of a Triple Alliance between Austria, France, and Italy against the growing power of Prussia. He proves with the utmost clearness that the main obstacle

signed by more than a hundred bishops, pointing out the anomalies and injustice of the new arrangements, but they did not say that unless it were withdrawn they would retire from the Council, and it had no effect. But this protest forms in itself a striking criticism on the character of the Assembly. It illustrates the fact that the Vatican Council was indeed a very large gathering, but a gathering whose powers and competence were so indeterminate that it is difficult to see in what sense it can be called a Council. The protest and the circumstances which evoked it show that it was quite unsettled what were the relations of the Council to the Pope; whether the Assembly was merely advisory or had a decisive voice. It was not settled whether a simple majority was sufficient to decide whether a dogmatic decree would be invalid against which a minority voted, or how large a majority must be in order to make it invalid. Some held one opinion, some another; but nothing had been definitely and bindingly laid down, and the whole proceedings were chaotic, the only principal order being the Pope's despotic will.

Meanwhile the *Schema de Ecclesia* had become known at Paris.[1] Even Ollivier admitted that its canons were dangerous, since they involved the indirect power of the State over the Church. Daru drew up a strongly worded despatch to Antonelli, in which he referred to political complications which

to the conclusion of that Triple Alliance was the French occupation of Rome. Cf. Mazziotti's *Napoleone III e l' Italia*. Mazziotti and Bourgeois are in substantial agreement that French bayonets in Rome formed the main reason why Napoleon III. had to face Prussia alone.

[1] Granderath, ii. pp. 316 ff.

might involve military operations on the Rhine and necessitate the withdrawal of the French division from Roman territory.[1] It was despatched on February 20: next day there was a council of ministers, and Daru mentioned that he had sent it. His colleagues demanded to hear it, and decided that it must be revised. A telegram was sent to Banneville to keep it back, and Ollivier and Daru together watered it down, omitting everything in the nature of a menace; another cabinet council expurgated it still more; so that it had no effect except doubtless to cause Antonelli to smile.[2] The political situation in Europe was for the moment favourable to Rome. The war was already on the horizon. The Archduke Albrecht was in Paris at this time; he was the head and heart of the war party in Austria, who were thirsting for revenge on Prussia. The overthrow of the ministry of Prince Hohenlohe in Bavaria, and also of the ministry in Würtemberg, were both victories for the anti-Prussian party in South Germany and also for the ultramontanes. France saw in these events a favourable situation for intervention, to prevent in time the realisation of Prussian schemes for the unification of Germany. It was, therefore, in the eyes of the French ministry, of great importance to keep on good terms with Rome, with a view to ultramontane support both at home and in South Germany.

One of the curious things about this Council was

[1] Ollivier, ii. p. 87.

[2] Ollivier, ii. pp. 126 ff.; *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1553 ff. Cf. Ollivier, ii. pp. 130 ff.; *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 1578 ff. Antonelli's letter to the nuncio is in the *Collectio*, pp. 1555 ff.

that while all the members knew that the definition of Infallibility was its principal object, a large number of the minority never seemed able to realise that it would come to pass, and their surprise was great when on the 7th and 8th March the apostolic messengers distributed at their houses the text of an additional chapter to the *Schema de Ecclesia*, containing a definition of Infallibility—in answer, as a covering letter said, to the petition of a large number of fathers. Criticisms were to be sent in within ten days. It was hoped that the dogma would be proclaimed on the 19th of March, the feast of St. Joseph. The energy of the minority was able, however, to hinder this precipitation. Four American bishops wrote, protesting that if it were hurried they would leave Rome, and explain the whole circumstances to the Catholics of the United States.[1] Dupanloup wrote to Cardinal de Angelis, threatening to proclaim to the world how dogmas were manufactured in Rome.[2] The Pope and the Presidents of the Assembly saw that it would not do to push the matter as hastily as the extreme enthusiasts desired, and the plan was abandoned.[3] A pasquinade was placarded in Rome at the Pope's expense:

> Eve ate the apple and made Adam eat,
> Christ made himself a man, thus man to save;
> Christ's vicar, Pius, wrought another feat,
> Made himself God, to render man a slave.

Two weighty utterances about the proceedings of the Council appeared at this time. One was a

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 975 c, ff.
[2] *Diarium, Quae de definitione Infallibilitatis acta sunt*, n. 25.
[3] *Diarium*, n. 29.

letter of Newman to Ullathorne, Bishop of Birmingham, of which numerous copies were circulated, expressing grief and dismay at the policy of the ultramontane party and the majority. He urges the absence of all need for defining the dogma, which might cause no difficulty to him and others personally, but will cause pains of conscience to multitudes. "What have we done to be treated as the faithful have never been treated before? When has a definition of doctrine *de fide* been a luxury of devotion and not a stern painful necessity?"[1] But a far greater sensation was made by the last pronouncement of Montalembert. He had been long urged to raise his voice. He wrote a letter to Döllinger on February 28; it appeared in the *Gazette de France* on March 7;[2] he died on the 13th. He had been accused of inconsistency. "I venture to assert", he replied, "that not a word will be found in my speech of 1847, or in any of my speeches or writings, to support the doctrines or pretensions of the ultramontanism of to-day. I once said 'Gallicanism is dead, because it made itself the servant of the state, and you have only to bury it'. That, I think, was true then. It was dead, but it has risen again. What is the cause of its resurrection? I will tell you. It is due to the prodigal encouragement of extreme doctrines in the Pontificate of Pius IX., doctrines which insult both sane common-sense and the honour of the human race, doctrines of which there was not a shadow in the reign of Louis Philippe. How could we then foresee

[1] Ward, *Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, ii. p. 288; *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1513 ff.; Icard, *Journal*, pp. 278-9.

[2] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1385 a, ff.; Friedrich, iii. pp. 701, 704.

the triumph of those lay theologians of absolutism, who have offered up justice and truth, reason and history, in one great burnt offering to the *idol* which they set up in the *Vatican*? If the word idol seems too strong, you must censure the words which Archbishop Sibour wrote to me in 1853: 'The new ultramontane school leads us to a double idolatry—the idolatry of secular and the idolatry of spiritual power'."[1]

The idol in the Vatican was deeply outraged by the attack of the great Liberal Catholic. Immediately after he had heard the news of Montalembert's death he gave an audience to 300 persons, and pronounced this epitaph: "A Catholic has just died who performed services for the Church. He has written a letter which I have read. I know not what he said in the hour of his death; but I do know this man had one great enemy—pride. He was a liberal Catholic, that is, he was a half-Catholic. Yes, the liberal Catholics are only half-Catholics."[2] Thus Pius expressed his resentment. A funeral service had been prepared at Rome in the Frenchman's honour, for he had been created a Roma Patricius, in recognition of his services, long ago by the Pope, and it was customary to hold a service for deceased Patricii in the Church of Ara Coeli; but at the last moment the ceremony was forbidden.[3]

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 1385 a. Cf. Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État*, ii. p. 171, and his *L'Empire libéral*, xiii. pp. 142 ff.

[2] *Univers*, March 14, 1870. Printed in Ollivier, *L'Église et l'État*, ii. p. 175. Cf. Baunard, *Cardinal Pie*, ii. p. 392; Maynard, *Dupanloup*, p. 259; *Wie es auf dem Concil zugeht*, p. 195.

[3] *Univers*, March 21, 1870. Printed in Friedenberg, *Sammlung*, p. 109.

Simultaneously with the news of the French leader's death, there arrived at Rome a number of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* containing an article by Döllinger mercilessly criticising the new regulation of procedure, in the light of the *sententia communis* of the Church, and insisting that unanimity at Councils had always been recognised as a *sine qua non* for Catholic doctrine.[1] It made a great impression even on members of the minority like Ketteler who disapproved of *Janus* and Döllinger's school. It was suspected, however, that Ketteler was not altogether sincere, that he was pretending to act with the minority, but was playing a double game. I may read an extract from a recently published letter of Cardinal Hohenlohe to his brother:

We are having a bad time now, especially here. Friedrich is a great stand-by for me, and in spite of all enmities I have been able to keep him by me. What indeed will be decided in the great question is by no means clear. Stupidity and fanaticism are dancing a tarantella together, accompanied by such discordant music that one can hardly see or hear. The Bishop of Mainz, I fear, is leading the German minority into a pitfall. He deceives these gentlemen by his abuse of Rome and so forth, and works against them behind their backs, and the excellent gentlemen take him at his word![2]

Again in a later letter (May 7, 1870):

I go as little as possible to the meetings of the [Vatican] Council. . . . Ketteler persecutes Professor

[1] *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), July 19, 1870; Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 720-29; Acton, *Sendschreiben*, p. 15.

[2] *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, vol. ii. p. 1.

Friedrich behind his back in the vilest fashion, as will be seen from the last pamphlet, in which he openly slanders him. But this prince of the Church is again foremost among the good German bishops, thanks to his manœuvring: the "noble Ketteler" one hears everywhere and so forth.[1]

The truth is that Ketteler hated the Döllinger school and took especial pains to separate himself from it in his opposition to the definition of Infallibility and to the procedure of the Council, which was perfectly genuine. He did not like to find himself in such company, fighting in the same cause.

The theologians of the majority set aside Döllinger's arguments by saying: "Döllinger is already a formal heretic, for he has appealed to public opinion". Senestrey, the Infallibilist Bishop of Regensburg, replied by forbidding all theological students of his diocese to attend Döllinger's lectures and imbibe erroneous and corrupting doctrines; and by writing a long article in a Regensburg paper, in which he showed to his own satisfaction that "Döllinger ist wissenschaftlich vernichtet" (annihilated by the arguments of his adversaries).

As I have already said, the hopes of the minority were depending on the possibility of inducing the powers to intervene, and the bishops of the French opposition directly addressed the Premier in a document which reached him about March 9, drawn up by the Archbishop of Paris. The argument of the paper was that Infallibility was a political question.

[1] *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, vol. ii. p. 10. Cf. *Historische Zeitschrift*, v. p. 571 (1908). Mirbt's article in the *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie u. Kirche*, xx. pp. 468 ff. (1908), deserves consultation.

"It is a true revolution to place the absolute government of consciences in Italian hands, under the name of personal, absolute, and separate Infallibility. France did not conclude the Concordat with the Church which will now be created. It is thus clear that Infallibility is not a dogmatic or speculative controversy, but touches the independence and tranquillity of the nations. And the new dogma has been demanded from a Council which is not free, and which is deeply divided. Can the government of France, without whose consent the bishops could not have come together and deliberated, take upon itself, in the eyes of the world and of history, the responsibility for a Council, which by its organisation, composition, and direction, by the principles which inspire it and by the passions which animate it, will, so far from producing the slightest good, let loose religious storms for long years to come? All legitimate means should be used to prorogue the Council. Send an extraordinary ambassador to explain reasons, and induce the other governments to do the same."[1]

Such were the representations of the minority. At the same time the French members of the majority sent the Bishop of Pondicherry to Paris to keep the ministry in the right way; while a middle party, of which the leader was Cardinal Bonnechose, and who considered the majority injudicious, sent a messenger in the person of Mgr. Forcade, Bishop of Nevers. At the same time Banneville was summoned to Paris (March 17) to give full explanations of the situation at Rome.

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 1551. Bury condenses considerably. Cf. p. 1567.

Ollivier was determined to do nothing decisive, but the government drafted a memorandum, repeating the mild warnings of Daru's previous despatch and not touching the question of Infallibility, which they had resolved to treat as outside the sphere of politics. Other governments to whom the memorandum was communicated supported it. Beust instructed the Austrian ambassador (Trautmannsdorff) to urge the same views on the Vatican vigorously.[1] Bavaria, England, Spain, and Portugal supported it too.[2] And Arnim, the ambassador of the North German League, recommended it strongly to the Vatican, observing that the German bishops coincided in the opinion of the French government as to the danger of the dogmatic decrees.[3] The despatch was delivered by Banneville when he returned to Rome on April 22. But in the meantime, on April 11, the Foreign Minister Daru resigned, Ollivier taking over his duties. The telegram which carried the news to Rome added the comment: "The Council is now free"; for Daru represented the adverse element in the ministry.[4] The ultramontanes counted on Ollivier, and at this moment they could put on the screw, for the elections were approaching, and the extreme Catholic party even hoped to obtain a guarantee from the government in regard to the Roman question, in return for a promise to support their policy in other matters. This, indeed, the govern-

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1570 ff., 1585 ff.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 1572 ff.; Purcell, ii. p. 445.

[3] Baunard, *Cardinal Pie*, ii. p. 398; Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, iii. pp. 155 ff.; Veuillot, *Rome pendant le concile*, i. p. 462.

[4] Ollivier, ii. p. 225.

ment refused; but Ollivier's goodwill seemed assured. In these circumstances the Pope and Antonelli could afford to treat with neglect the French memorandum, which was a weak remonstrance,[1] backed by no menaces; and the ambassador was informed that such a document could not possibly be laid before the Council.

While this mild effort at diplomatic intervention was going on, the work of the Council was slowly proceeding. On March 18 the *Schema de fide* was brought forward in its revised form. The introduction now contained a characterisation of Protestantism as the root of all errors and evils in the world, first producing rationalism and indifference, and then leading on to the abyss of pantheism, materialism, and atheism, and annihilating the foundations of society. "As this godless pestilence (*pestis*) can range at large with impunity, many sons of the Church are necessarily infected by it." The inference was drawn as to the purpose of the Council. "We [the Pope] by our apostolic authority have summoned this ecumenical Council, in order, from our Cathedra, to prescribe and condemn these errors." If the minority accepted this they would acknowledge both the ecumenical character of the Council and the complete dependence of the Council on the Pope. As the text was circulated to all the members of the Council, about 700, it was impossible that the Protestants at Rome should not hear of the violent attack on Protestantism, and it was soon noised abroad.

The minority were in a dilemma at this juncture.

[1] So Ollivier owns, ii. p. 212.

They had denounced the new regulation of procedure. If they took part in the discussion on March 18, they would practically surrender their position, and acquiesce in what they condemned. They decided to participate, and their motion was, as the Archbishop of Paris explained, to avoid a scandal.[1] Strossmayer, who was the most courageous man at Rome, opposed this resolve as cowardly, and he determined to take the first opportunity to protest vigorously in the Congregation.[2] He spoke on the second day of the debate, March 22, and his action caused a stormy and scandalous scene.[3] He dealt with the attack on Protestantism, which he described as both untrue and uncharitable. It was not true to ascribe to Protestantism the growth of religious error. Many of the errors condemned in the decree were condemned and detested by Protestants as much as by Catholics; and where they err, they err in good faith. (He was interrupted by cries of "This is not the place to praise Protestants. Fie, down with the heretic!") Then he went on to attack the new procedure, and declared that the abrogation of the necessity of unanimity had destroyed the ecumenical character of the Council. The majority, apprehending the insinuation that on this principle Infallibility could not be proclaimed, jumped to their feet, raging furiously, and cried: "Down with him from the pulpit".[4] They thronged up and threatened him with violence. He descended protesting, and

[1] Acton, *Zur Geschichte des vatikan. Konzils*, p. 86.

[2] Friedrich, *Geschichte*, iii. p. 766.

[3] *Acta Congr. gener.* ii. pp. 43 ff.

[4] Acton, *Zur Geschichte des vatikan. Konzils*, p. 90; Friedrich, iii. pp. 773-9.

the meeting broke up in tumult.[1] Many of the minority thought that Strossmayer had gone much too far, but Dupanloup and some others supported him.[2] His words perhaps contributed to the result that the passage on Protestantism was revised, but this was chiefly due to the energetic action of Arnim, who, having assured himself that Protestantism was described as *pestis* in the decree, communicated with Berlin, and on March 25 was instructed to tell the Vatican that if the expression were retained it would probably influence the position of the representative of a Protestant king at Rome, for it was a grave insult to the Prussian king.[3] As a member of the German embassy said to some of the German bishops: "What would be thought if the Prussian king in a throne speech designated the Pope, in the words of Montalembert, as the idol in the Vatican?" Antonelli saw that it would be wise to yield. The objectionable preamble was re-written in the revised scheme, and the decree *de fide* was passed on April 24[4] in the third public session of the Council by a unanimous vote of 667 placets, the minority having determined, under the influence of Schwarzenberg, to yield, as the decree was really of minor importance. Strossmayer, and he alone, stayed away from the voting. This was the last act of the Council at which virtually all of the bishops assisted. But though the decree *de fide* was less thorny than the decree *de*

[1] *Acta Congr. gener.* ii. pp. 48 ff.; Acton, *History of Freedom*, pp. 541-2.

[2] Cf. *Diarium: Quae de definitione Infallibilitatis sunt*, n. 25.

[3] Hase, *Polemik*, pp. 40 ff.; his *Annalen meines Lebens*, pp. 216 ff.; Friedrich, iii. pp. 780-89.

[4] Cf. the two different forms in *Officielle Aktenstücke*, ii. pp. 129 ff.

ecclesia, it committed the minority to the positions against which they were contending.[1] At the end of the decree, the duty was laid down of obeying the constitutions and decrees in which not actually heretical opinions have been proscribed.[2] Many bishops were induced to swallow this by the assurance that it did not refer to questions of doctrine, and was a mere matter of discipline and obedience. But virtually, though not *totidem verbis*, the Council by passing this decree accepted Infallibility. As Lord Acton says: "In requiring submission to papal decrees or matters not articles of faith . . . they were investing with new authority the existing Bulls, and giving unqualified sanction to the Inquisition and the Index, to the murder of heretics and the deposing of kings".[3] "The Court of Rome became thenceforth reckless in its scorn of the opposition, and proceeded in the belief that there was no protest they would not forget, no principle they would not betray, rather than defy the Pope in his wrath."[4]

In the Congregation on April 29, at which the scheme of a catechism was again discussed, it was announced by Cardinal de St. Angelis that all schemes, both dogmatic and disciplinary, already prepared would be laid aside and the question of Infallibility would be taken up.[5] On the 6th of May a protest was sent in by the sixty-nine bishops of the opposition, objecting to the separation of the questions of the Primacy and the Infallibility from the

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 256.
[2] Quirinus, pp. 435 ff.; Acton, pp. 94 ff.
[3] Acton, *History of Freedom*, p. 534.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 544.
[5] Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 876-8.

rest of the whole body of doctrine *de ecclesia*. It contained complaints of what the Pope had done himself by allocutions and otherwise to put Infallibility in the foreground, and of the way in which the petitions of the minority had hitherto been treated. "This is not a petition, but a remonstrance against the mode of transacting business which is injurious both for the Church and the apostolic see."[1]

It was at this moment that there arrived at Rome a French pamphlet entitled *Ce qui se passe au Concile*, which described the history of the Council up to the middle of April, and showed that it was a mere caricature of an ecumenical Council.[2] The author used solely documents which had found their way into print, and the information supplied by ultramontane journals, especially the *Univers*. The book was promptly suppressed in Rome, but it was in everybody's hands. The antidote was presently supplied by a work by Cardoni proving Infallibility.

Cardoni was in a few days rewarded by being appointed Keeper of the Vatican Archives, instead of Thenier. The deposition of this learned scholar was a triumph for the Jesuits, whose enemy he was, and indirectly a slap in the face to the minority.[3] The Jesuits feared him because he had in his private possession documents which were compromising for their order, and they could not bear goodwill to the author of the biography of Clement XIV. During

[1] Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 877-8.

[2] Frommann, *Geschichte u. Kritik des vatikanischen Concils von 1869 u. 1870*, pp. 108, 128 ff., 206.

[3] Gisiger, *P. Theiner u. die Jesuiten* pp. 61 f.

the Council his private library had been the great stand-by to members of the opposition; for it was the only considerable theological library at Rome that contained the new literature; and it also contained the procedure of the Council of Trent, which Thenier, as Keeper of the Archives, had been forbidden to show to the bishops. Already in March an attack had been made on Thenier; the Jesuits told the Pope that he had betrayed his trust. The Pope summoned him and charged him with having admitted Lord Acton into the Archives and thus committed treachery of the worst kind. Thenier swore solemnly that the charge was untrue. The Pope was satisfied for the time, enjoined on Thenier to say nothing to Lord Acton, and then reproached the librarian for his friendship with such men as Döllinger and Friedrich.[1] But afterwards a printed copy of the procedure of the Council of Trent was procured by Friedrich, though not from Thenier, and was shown by him to several German bishops. Strossmayer seems then to have obtained a copy from Thenier. But it came from his private library, not from the Vatican Archives. When this was known, the storm burst and Thenier had to surrender the keys.

Meanwhile on May 9 the members of the Council received notice that the beginning of the general debate was fixed for the 13th (the Pope's birthday), and at the same time the revised text of the eleventh chapter of the *Schema de ecclesia*, which concerned the Primacy, along with the supplementary canon on Infallibility which had been brought before the

[1] Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 1039-40.

Council on March 6 and had since been revised. In its new form the eleventh chapter consisted of four parts: (1) On the institution of the Apostolical primacy in the person of Peter; (2) on the continuance of the Primatus Peter in the Roman pontiffs; (3) on the power and nature of the primacy; and (4) on the Infallibility of the Roman pontiff.[1] Some of the criticisms of the minority had been taken into account by the Jesuits who revised the scheme, but there were no serious alterations. Monsigneur Pie, Bishop of Poitiers, opened the general debate on May 13, having had conversations immediately before with the Pope and with the Jesuits, Schrader and Franzelin. The calibre of the Bishop of Poitiers may be estimated by one of his arguments. The Apostle Peter, he said, had been crucified with his head downwards, so that his head bore his body;[2] even so the Pope is the head who bears up the Church which is the body; but evidently it is he who bears that is Infallible, and not that which is borne.[2] Next day the discussion began, and Manning treated the Assembly to his sophistical arguments for two hours.[3] In the course of the debate, which lasted about three weeks, the speeches of Darboy, Strossmayer, and of Connolly, Bishop of Halifax, seem to have been the most striking of those delivered by the opponents of the decree. Connolly had come to Rome believing in Infallibility, having never studied the evidence. He plunged into a study of

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 269 ff.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 300 c; Quirinus, p. 412; Friedrich, iii. p. 982; Ollivier, ii. p. 279.

[3] *Acta*, iii. pp. 275 ff.

the question during the Council, and became convinced that the arguments were entirely against it.[1]

The general debate was closured on June 3, though many still desired to speak, and eighty French and German bishops signed a short protest against the closure, which, however, was ruled out of order, as the closuring was in accordance with the new regulation of business.[2]

The special debate, which was to consider the parts of the decree one by one, began on June 6. On the 18th they reached the section on Infallibility. As the president informed the Council that seventy-four members had announced their intention of speaking, it was hoped by the minority that the Council would have to be prorogued before the question came to a vote, as the heat was becoming intolerable; some members were falling ill, and all were exhausted. On the first day the Dominican Archbishop of Bologna, Cardinal Guidi, made a bold and dramatic speech, asserting that separate Personal Infallibility of the Pope was unknown till the fourteenth century, that even in Bellarmine's works there were passages inconsistent with it, and from him and Perrone it could be proved that the Pope had never condemned a heresy by his own authority.[3] This was too much for the Council, and the speaker was overwhelmed with words of abuse.[4] After a long interruption he resumed, and quoted St. Thomas Aquinas in his support. Few speeches

[1] *Acta*, iii. pp. 446 ff.

[2] Granderath, III. i. pp. 285-7; Friedrich, ii. pp. 392 ff., 399.

[3] Quirinus, pp. 671 f.; Pomponio Leto, pp. 279 f.; Friedrich, III. ii. p. 1109; *Acta*, iv. pp. 327 ff.

[4] Friedrich, III. ii. p. 1110.

at the Council produced a greater sensation than this.[1] The scene had an epilogue. When the Assembly broke up, Guidi was summoned to the presence of the Pope, who had been informed of the tenor of his discourse, and was received with the following words: "Well, Cardinal, you have just delivered an unworthy and heretical speech. You will return to Bologna, and doubtless make yourself useful to the Italian revolutionaries. Well, you will not return till you have signed a new confession of faith." The Cardinal replied the Pope must have been misinformed about his speech, and begged him to read it. He then briefly referred to his arguments and showed him that what he said was in accordance with scripture, the general teaching of the Church, and *tradition*. Here the Pope interrupted him with the words which became famous: "La Tradizione son' Io"—words which pregnantly express the ultramontane system.[2] Pius gave Guidi the choice of retracting or suspension. Guidi declined to retract.

[1] Friedrich, III. ii. p. 1112; Granderath, III. ii. p. 23.

[2] Nielsen, ii. p. 361; Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 1113-15; Acton, *Zur Gesch.* p. 112; Quirinus, p. 178; Frommann, p. 188. Cf. Mourret, *Le Concile du Vatican*, p. 299. Mourret gives Dupanloup's version of these famous words: "Des témoins de la tradition? Il n'y a qu'un. C'est moi." Cf. *Historische Zeitschrift*, v. p. 552 (1908); Granderath, III. ii. pp. 16-23; Martin, *Histoire de France*, vii. p. 146.

VI

THE DOCTRINE OF INFALLIBILITY

On the 2nd and 3rd of July the German and Austrian and the French members of the minority decided to abandon the policy of forcing a prorogation by protracting the debate, and declared their intention of speaking no more. If they had waited another day they might have come to a different resolve. The Curia and the leaders of the majority, who had better sources of information, were aware of the approach of the war, and were reckoning with it as a factor. The minority appear to have had no idea of its imminence. A French bishop on July 4 received a telegram from Paris: "Hold out yet a few days, Providence is sending an unexpected help".[1] This message meant the war which in official circles was now considered unavoidable. But it was too late to act: the speakers had resigned their right to speak, and the discussion was over.

The scheme then went through the form of being revised, but the alterations were not a compromise and gave no satisfaction to the minority. The voting took place on the 13th of July. The day before, Darboy had an interview with the Pope, and told

[1] Baunard, *Cardinal Pie*, ii. p. 411.

him the *non placet* votes would be numerous. I daresay, replied Pius, that many will vote *placet juxta modum*, but not more than ten will vote *non placet*.[1] He thought that deference to himself would influence many at the last moment. He was to be undeceived. Of the 692 members still at Rome, 601 appeared to vote. Most of the absent were kept away by sickness. Of the 601, 451 voted *placet*, 88 *non placet*, and 62 *placet juxta modum*. Far the greater number of the *non placets* were French, German, Hungarian, and American. The 13th of July was a memorable day; it was the day on which the famous incident at Ems occurred, the interview of King William and Benedetti which precipitated the war.

It had been hoped to proclaim Infallibility on June 29, the day of St. Peter and Paul. That had proved impossible, and July 18 was now fixed, the anniversary of the day on which the Pope had received the prophecy communicated to the maiden of La Salette. The voting at the public session was to be simply a ceremony, but all the members present would be required to sign an act of submission. The boldest of the opposition decided to attend, to repeat their *non placets*, and refuse to sign. But the most of them were not prepared to incur excommunication. It was decided to make a last appeal to the Pope, and, if this failed, to return home before the 18th. What they asked was that in the section on Infallibility words to the effect *innixus testimonio ecclesiarum* might be inserted. The Pope answered the deputation: There were 88 *non placets*; if you

[1] Nielsen, ii. p. 364; Foulon, *Darboy*, pp. 463 f.; Friedrich, III. ii. 1173-4.

produce 100 for your proposed emendation, I will see what can be done. The Bishop of Mainz threw himself at the Pope's feet, imploring him to save the Church.[1] If Pius was moved, other influences soon rescued him from a momentary hesitation, and on the next day (16th) he sent an intimation that he would as hitherto abstain from interfering with the conclusions of the Council, and confine himself to approving.[2]

Darboy had had no hopes of success, and after the voting of the 13th he circulated a pamphlet which he had written, *La dernière heure du Concile*. A quotation will illustrate its spirit: "All the secular powers have conscientiously respected the freedom of the Council, only one power [the Pope] has in every way restricted it, destroyed it. . . . Let us hope that the excess of the evil will lead to the return of the good. This Council will have only one happy result: that of calling another, assembled in freedom. The Vatican Council will remain barren, in all that has not blossomed under the breath of the Holy Spirit."[3] On the 17th, fifty-six members of the minority sent a joint letter to the Pope, saying that they could not alter their votes, but would stay away.[4]

Five hundred and thirty-five members attended the final session. All voted *placet* except two, Bishop Fitzgerald of Littlerock, in the United States, and

[1] Nielsen, ii. p. 364; Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 1105-7; Pfülf, *Ketteler*, i. p. 111; Foulon, *Darboy*, p. 483.

[2] Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 1182 f., and his *Tagebuch*, p. 390; Quirinus, pp. 803 f.; Ollivier, ii. pp. 341 f.

[3] *Darboy*, p. 6. Cf. Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 1178-80, 1187; Granderath, III. ii. pp. 129-31.

[4] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 994 f.

Bishop Riccio of Cajazzo. Cardinal Guidi was one of the minority who sacrificed the intellect and said *placet*. Cardinal Hohenlohe stayed at home.[1] But practically all the opposition, not only the Inopportunists, but those who had contended most strenuously that the doctrine was false, afterwards submitted one by one.[2]

No individual prelate had done more for the definition of the dogma than Archbishop Manning. The Jesuit editors of the *Civiltà Catholica* recognised his services by presenting him with a picture of the great theorist of the ultramontane system, Bellarmine.[3]

We may now examine the text and the bearings of the decree *Pastor Aeternus* which so deeply disturbed the Roman Church, and caused considerable alarm to the governments of Europe.

The first dogmatic constitution on the Church of Christ begins with a short introduction, a part of which I will quote:

In order that the episcopate should be one and undivided, and in order that the whole multitude of believers should be preserved in the unity of communion and faith, by priests united among themselves, the Eternal Shepherd, placing the blessed Peter above the other Apostles, has instituted in him the perpetual principle and the visible foundation of this double unity; that on its strength should be built the eternal temple, and on the firmness of his faith should rise the lofty edifice of the Church,

[1] Only a few of the Cardinal's letters to his brother, Prince Hohenlohe, from Rome during the Council appear to have been preserved, but they form vivid illumination.

[2] Granderath, III. ii. pp. 190-269. Cf. Frommann, pp. 201-11.

[3] Yet cf. Purcell, ii. p. 457.

to be raised as high as heaven. And since the gates of hell are rising on all sides, with a hatred increasing every day against the divine foundation of the Church, to overturn it if it were possible, we judge, with the approbation of the Sacred Council, that it is necessary for the guardianship, safety, and increase of the Catholic flock to promulgate the doctrine on the institution, perpetuity, and nature of the Holy Apostolic Primacy in which the force and solidity of the whole Church consist, and to proscribe and condemn contrary errors which are pernicious to the flock of the Lord.

The constitution consists of four chapters: (1) On the institution of the Apostolic Primacy in the person of the Blessed Peter; (2) on the perpetuity of the Primacy of Peter in the Roman Pontiffs; (3) on the force and character (*vi et ratione*) of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff; (4) on the infallible *magisterium* of the Roman Pontiff.

(1) The first chapter, in which the scriptural texts which are alleged to support the Primacy of Peter are quoted, ends with the anathema:

If then some one says that the blessed Apostle Peter has not been constituted by Christ our Lord Prince of all the Apostles and visible head of the whole Church militant; or that the same Peter has received only a primacy of honour, and not of true and proper jurisdiction, immediately and directly from our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.

(2) The second chapter, which lays down the perpetuity, may be condensed as follows:

It is necessary that what Christ instituted in the person of Peter for the perpetual safety and good of

the Church should also continually endure in the Church, which founded on a rock will stand firm for ever. All ages know that Peter received the keys of the kingdom from the Redeemer, and that up to the present time and always he lives and presides and judges in his successors, the bishops of the Roman See. Hence every one of the successors of Peter in this Chair possesses, by virtue of Christ's institution, the primacy of Peter and the Universal Church. Thus the "disposition of truth" (*dispositio veritatis* might be translated "economy of truth") abides and Peter has not abandoned the helm. Therefore it was always necessary that all the Church—that is, the faithful in all parts—should look to the Roman Church on account of its primacy, and in it should be members of one body. If then anyone shall say that it is not by Christ's institution or by divine law that Peter has perpetual successors in the primacy over the Universal Church, or that the Pope is not the successor of Peter in the primacy, let him be anathema.

(3) The third chapter begins by renewing the definition of the Council of Florence which attributed to the Pope the primacy over the whole world (*in universum orbem*), and then proceeds:

Accordingly we teach and declare that the Roman Church, God so disposing, holds the principality of ordinary power over all other Churches, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Pope, which is truly episcopal, is immediate; that the pastors and faithful, of every rite and every rank, both individually and collectively are subject to that power by the duty of hierarchical subordination and

of true obedience, not only in things which concern faith and morals, but also in those pertaining to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the world; so that the Church may be united. This is the doctrine of Catholic truth.

But so far is this power of the Pope from injuring the ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction by which the bishops rule their flocks as true shepherds, their power is asserted, strengthened and indicated by the supreme and universal shepherd.

From this supreme power of the Pope there results for him the right of communicating freely, in the exercise of his duty, with the shepherds and flocks of the whole Church. Therefore we condemn and censure the opinions of those who say such communication can be legitimately hindered or who make it depend on the secular power, pretending that the constitutions of the Apostolic See are not valid, unless confirmed by a placet of the secular power.

As the Pope presides over the Universal Church we teach and declare that he is supreme judge of the faithful and that recourse can be had to his judgment in all causes that come under ecclesiastical competence; that his judgment, than which no authority is greater, can be revised by no one and judged by no one. Therefore those depart from the way of truth who affirm that it is lawful to appeal from his judgments to an Ecumenical Council as to an authority superior to his.

Then follows the anathema of those who deny any parts of this doctrine.

(4) The *fourth chapter* is the most important, for it defines Infallibility, which is called in the title the

infallibile magisterium of the Pope. I must take leave to translate it almost in full:

This Holy See has always held, the perpetual practice of the Church proves, and the Ecumenical Councils themselves, especially those in which the East and the West met in union of faith and charity, have declared that the supreme power of the magisterium is included in the Apostolic Primacy which the Roman Pontiff as successor of Peter holds over the whole Church. Thus the fathers of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, walking in the steps of their predecessors, uttered this solemn profession: "Salvation is first of all to guard the rule of Faith. The words of Christ, 'You are Peter and on this stone I will build my Church', cannot be overlooked; and have been confirmed by facts, because religion has always been preserved immaculate and the holy doctrine always taught in the Apostolic See. So not desiring to separate ourselves in anything from its faith and doctrine, we trust that we may deserve to be in the one communion which the Apostolic preaches, wherein is the entire and true solidity of Christian religion."

Then come quotations from the second Council of Lyons and from the Council of Florence, which I will omit. The text then goes on:

To fulfil this pastoral office our predecessors have always worked untiringly that the salutary doctrine of Christ should be promulgated among all peoples of the earth, and have watched with equal diligence that it should be preserved pure and untainted wherever it was received. Therefore the bishops of all the world, now individually, now in synods, following the long custom of the Churches and the form of the ancient rule, have always re-

ferred to this See such dangers as emerged in matters of faith, in order that the harm done to faith might be remedied in that place where faith can suffer no loss or failure. And the Roman pontiffs, according as the condition of time or circumstance dictated, sometimes convoking Ecumenical Councils, sometimes by asking opinions throughout the Church scattered through the world, sometimes by special synods, sometimes by other means furnished by divine providence, have defined that those beliefs should be held which they knew to be in agreement with Holy Scripture and Apostolic traditions. For the Holy Spirit has not been promised to the successors of Peter in order that through its revelation they should publish new doctrine, but in order that with its assistance they should religiously guard and faithfully expound the revelations transmitted by the Apostles, that is to say, the deposit of faith (*fidei depositum*). All the venerable Fathers have embraced, and all the holy doctors have venerated and followed *their* apostolic doctrine, fully knowing that this see of St. Peter remains always untainted by any error according to the Saviour's divine promise made by the Prince of the Apostles—"I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail, and do you one day confirm your brothers".

This gift then of truth and of faith which does not fail was divinely bestowed on Peter and his successors in this chair that they might perform their high duty for the salvation of all, that they might keep the flock of Christ from the poisonous food of error and nourish it on heavenly doctrine, that the whole Church might be preserved in unity without cause for schism, and on its firm foundation stand against the gates of Hell.

But since in this age, in which the efficacy of the Apostolic office is more than ever needed, there are

not a few who object to its authority; we think it necessary solemnly to assert the prerogative which the Son of God has deigned to unite with the supreme pastoral office.

Accordingly we, faithfully adhering to the tradition which goes back to the origin of Christianity, for the glory of the Saviour, for the exaltation of the Catholic religion and the salvation of Christian peoples, we with the approval of the Sacred Council teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed, that when the Roman Pontiff speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when discharging the office of the Shepherd and Doctor of all Christians, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority defines a doctrine to be held by the Universal Church concerning faith or morals, he enjoys (by divine assistance promised to him in the blessed Peter) that infallibility by which the Divine Redeemer wished his Church to be instructed in the definition of doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not by virtue of the consent of the Church.

Whoever shall presume to contradict this our definition—which God forfend—let him be anathema.

I have thought it well to quote the whole of this Fourth Chapter of the Constitution, for this reason. Dr. Schulte, Professor of Canon Law at Prague, published a very severe criticism of the dogma immediately after the Council.[1] A reply to it was

[1] *Das Unfehlbarkeits-decret v. 18 Juli 1870.* Schulte employs official documents, though he leans weightily on Acton and—much less—on Kenrick. Cf. his important *Die Stellung der Konzilien, Päpste u. Bischöfe von historischen u. kanonistischen Standpunkte*, to which Fessler directs his attention. Schulte's *Stellung der Konzilien*, pp. 71 ff., 245 ff., deals with fundamentals. Cf. Granderath, III. ii. pp. 309-16.

written by Mgr. Fessler,[1] who had acted as Secretary of the Council; and one of Fessler's points was that Schulte was unfair because he extracted the final definition from the context of the chapter in which it occurs. Fessler contended that the definition assumes a different aspect when taken in connexion with the whole context. The definition must be associated with the historical explanations which precede.

In examining the scope and compass of the dogmatic definition of Infallibility, as to which many have very vague and exaggerated ideas, we must consider in the first place the position of Fessler. He was Secretary of the Council, and his book was approved by the Pope. Its tendency and object are to mitigate and narrow the bearings and consequences of Infallibility so far as he can; at all events, his exposition does not fall into the error of exaggerating the compass of the Pope's *infallibile magisterium*. But it has no official authority. The Pope's approbation did not in any way commit him to Fessler's interpretation. You remember how the two opposite interpretations of the *Syllabus*, that of Schrader and that of the Bishop of Orleans, both received Papal approval.

You observe that in the definition the Infallibility of the Pope is limited in two ways: (1) He is only infallible when he speaks *ex cathedra*; and (2) he is only infallible in matters of *fides* and *mores*.

The term *ex cathedra* is technical, and the defini-

[1] *Das vatikanische Konzilium*, Vienna, 1871, is good, but "The True and False Infallibility of the Popes" is Fessler's real reply to Schulte.

tion explains what it means. The Pope speaks *ex cathedra* when he speaks as *omnium Christianorum pastor et doctor*. But the Church recognises in the Pope other functions besides those of the supreme doctor and teacher of revealed truth. She recognises in him the supreme priest, the supreme legislator in ecclesiastical affairs, and the supreme judge *in causis ecclesiasticis*. Thus, according to the definition, the Pope is not infallible when he is performing the duties of supreme priest, supreme lawgiver, or supreme judge, but only when he exercises the office of the sovran doctor.

Again, there are four principal kinds of ecclesiastical matters which are subject to the sovran power of the Pope: matters of faith, matters of morals, matters of discipline, and matters of ecclesiastical administration. It is the duty of all to obey the Pope in all these things; but the definition declares his infallibility in the first two. He is infallible in matters of faith and morals, but not in matters of discipline and administration. The reason is evident; faith and morals are regarded as permanent and unalterable, discipline and administration as temporary and changeable.[1]

Now how are we to know that an utterance of the Pope on a matter of faith or morals is *ex cathedra*? Are all Papal Bulls, Encyclicals, etc., on such matters to be taken as *ex cathedra*, and if not, by what mark are we to know that such a document contains an infallible decision made *per assistentiam divinam*?

[1] There is a careful discussion in Frommann, *Geschichte u. Kritik des vatikanischen Concils*, from p. 304 onwards. He also gives many relevant references.

Fessler lays down that the decision need not be *ex cathedra* unless the Pope expressly declares his intention of proclaiming a doctrine of faith or morals by virtue of his supreme doctoral authority—as an integral part of revealed truth and one which ought to be held by the Church.

It is clear that the Pope alone can determine the extent, the limits, and the object of a decision *ex cathedra*. In other words, no human authority can dictate to him on the subject. But Fessler rightly points out that this does not mean that the Pope can extend his infallible decisions to judicial matters which are not contained in divine revelation. The Swiss bishops, in a Pastoral Instruction which was approved by Pius IX., explained the matter as follows: "It does not depend on the Pope's caprice or good pleasure to make any doctrine the subject of a dogmatic definition; he is limited to divine revelation and its truth; he is bound and limited by the symbols of faith already existing and by previous definitions of the Church. He is bound by the constitution of the Church; by the divinely revealed doctrine which affirms that beside religious society exists a civil society, and beside the ecclesiastical hierarchy exists the power of temporal authorities invested in their own domain with full sovranty."

Of course a great deal depends in this argument on what divine revelation means. Pope Pius IX. defined the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, and the Catholic Church, which holds that doctrine, is bound to hold that it is divinely revealed. What is to hinder the discovery being made that the Virgin's mother was also immaculately conceived,

and that this is divinely revealed? Revelation is too wide and elastic a conception to constitute a very definite limit or guarantee.

To return to Fessler's doctrine as to the marks by which a definition *ex cathedra* may be known. He applies it to a number of cases. He takes the principal Papal Bulls which have caused most offence by their doctrine of the right of the Pope to control, or interfere with, secular authority, and he professes to show that these Bulls, so far as they lay down this doctrine, do not come within the scope of the Vatican definition, and are not utterances of the Pope speaking infallibly *per assistentiam divinam*.[1]

To examine the validity of Fessler's principles let us take what is admittedly the most drastic of the Papal Bulls in asserting the superiority of Papal to secular authority in the secular sphere, the Bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII.[2] It is not only the most drastic, but to an ordinary intelligence it seems unequivocally clear in its meaning. The *Unam Sanctam* lays down the following principles: In the power of the Roman Church there are two swords, the temporal and the spiritual. While both are in the power (*in potestate*) of the Church, the spiritual is to be wielded *by* the Church, the temporal *for* the Church; the former by the hand of the priest, the latter by the hands of kings and soldiers, but by the direction and sufferance of the priest (*ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis = Papae*). But the one sword must be under the other, and the temporal authority must be subject to the spiritual. The spiritual

[1] Does Fessler suggest that the Pope is sometimes infallible, but nobody knows *when*?

[2] Published in 1302.

power has to institute the secular power and to judge it, if it is not good. Therefore, if the secular power strays from the right way it will be judged by the spiritual power, whence if the highest spiritual power deviates from the right way it will be judged by God alone. Whoever resists this power resists the ordinance of God. The Bull ends with the words: *Porro subesse Romano pontifici omni creaturae humanae declaramus, dicimus, deffinimus, et pronunciamus, omnino esse de necessitate salutis.* "So we declare, say, define, and pronounce that it is entirely necessary for salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff."

The doctrine of the two swords seems to have been first put forward in that form in the twelfth century by St. Bernard. The Bull lays down, as you can see quite clearly, and it supports its several assertions by quotations from Scripture, the doctrine of the *potestas directa* of the Church over temporal affairs. This was the doctrine maintained by the Papacy and ecclesiastical exponents of the Church system from the twelfth to the end of the sixteenth century. It was held by Becket and John of Salisbury as well as St. Bernard. It was triumphantly put in practice by Innocent III. It implied that the secular power was entrusted to princes simply as servants of the Church, who were responsible to the Pope for its exercise. It implied the power of the Pope to depose kings.

In the seventeenth century this doctrine made way for that of the *potestas indirecta*. This new teaching was due to Bellarmine, and was adopted by his order, the Jesuits. It ascribed to the Pope only an indirect power over temporal things. By this the

Pope can only intervene *ratione peccati*, that is, he can only call the secular power to account, command it, or punish it, in case it opposes the higher aims of the spiritual power or endangers religion and the Church. The Pope cannot directly depose a sovran, but he can indirectly contribute to his deposition by declaring in the interests of religion that his subjects are no longer bound to obey him. This indirect power is not secular, it is spiritual, and it only touches the secular sphere if secular authority interferes with religion and so ceases to be secular.

At first this modification of the older theory was so offensive to Rome that Bellarmine's book *De summo pontifice* (1581–3) was put on the Index (by Sixtus V.). But the Popes soon convinced themselves that the new theory virtually amounted to the same thing as the old, and that "indirect power" was a more suitable and convenient expression, and in the seventeenth century Bellarmine's form of the doctrine was established. Whether the power be called direct or indirect, there is no practical difference; the only way, *e.g.*, in which a Pope can depose a prince is by announcing to his people that they are released from their obligations as subjects.

Has this doctrine been reasserted by the Vatican decree? Fessler says no. No part, he contends, of the Bull *Unam Sanctam* is a definition *ex cathedra de fide et monitu*, except the last sentence (which I quoted in Latin), and that refers exclusively to the spiritual power of the Pope, not to the temporal sword.

Now I may first point out that in this Fessler, and others who take the same line (like Martin[1] and

[1] He issued three pastoral letters in 1871.

Hergenröther),[1] differs entirely from the view and interpretation of the Jesuits and ultramontanes who were responsible for the Vatican decree. Here is what the *Civiltà Catholica* said on the subject (and I have explained before what the authority of this organ is) shortly before the Council: "After the Council, the Bull *Unam Sanctam* will acquire its full force. The subordination of the State to the Church is not merely proved by reason; it is the common doctrine of the Fathers and teachers of the Church. Pope Boniface VIII. in his dogmatic Bull *Unam Sanctam* teaches expressly that the secular power must be subject to the spiritual." I might quote other interpreters, such as Molitor, who wrote after the Council, on this subject.

But if we turn to the Bull itself we can see that Fessler's attempt to weaken its authority will not bear examination. He maintains that the purpose of the Bull is simply to define the spiritual supremacy of the Pope. This makes the decree of Boniface superfluous, in fact an absurd anachronism. Nobody denied the supremacy of the Pope in spiritual matters; why in the world should he write a Bull to define it? The occasion of the Bull was the struggle of Boniface with Philip the Fair. Why should the Pope summon a Council to Rome in order dogmatically to define his primacy, which no one disputed? And what is the connexion of the rest of the document with the final definition? The last sentence is introduced by *porro*, a word which Fessler, Hergenröther, and the rest leave out of account. It is regularly used in Papal

[1] He wrote in the *Archiv für kath. Kirchenrecht*, vol. xxv. pp. cxvii-cxxxi.

documents as an alternative phrase to *proinde* or *etiam*. Thus it adds a further and final statement to the preceding declarations, and thus it is quite inadmissible either to refer it merely to the primacy or to discriminate it from the preceding declarations, as though they were undogmatic and it alone dogmatic.

Conscious of the difficulty of thus isolating the final sentence from the whole context of the document, and seeing that Boniface clearly intended to define dogmatically the doctrine of the two swords, Martin curiously holds that though this is true we must consider not the Pope's intention but the actual phrase. And as the phraseology of the last sentence is ambiguous and might, apart from the context, be interpreted of the spiritual power only, we are not obliged to believe that the Pope does possess the power of the two swords. This method of interpretation would reduce the doctrine of Infallibility *ad absurdum*. What sort of infallibility does a Pope possess who intends to define one thing and defines something else? These explanations, I may observe in general, controvert all the common-sense rules of the Roman Canonists, who lay down explicitly that *verba intelligenda non secundum quod sonant sed secundum mentem profantis*.

The true conclusion undoubtedly is that the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII. has been confirmed by the Vatican decree, and that its doctrine is binding *de fide* on members of the Church of Rome.

The next lecture will be concerned with the fall of the temporal power.

VII

THE FALL OF THE TEMPORAL POWER

Of all countries there was perhaps none to which the proclamation of Infallibility was more obnoxious than Austro-Hungary. Under the Concordat the tendency had been to deprive the laity of the share in the administration of Church property which they had before enjoyed, to transfer the rights of the priests to the bishops and of the bishops to the Pope. But recently, since the Liberal party had come into power, there had been an energetic movement to reverse all this, to associate the laity in religious concerns. The Hungarian bishops had agreed, and a new Church constitution had been adopted for Hungary in October 1869, of which the aim was to free the people from clerical control and relieve the Church from encroachments on the part of the State. The bishops and the government had worked together, and their work was threatened with destruction by the new decrees. On July 30 Beust instructed the Austrian ambassador at Rome to denounce the Concordat.[1] The ground was that the party with which Austria had treated in 1855 had changed

[1] *Collectio Lacensis*, pp. 1716-21. Beust's despatch is in the *Collectio*, pp. 1721-3.

its legal identity by the proclamation of Infallibility.[1]

It is highly significant that the Catholic power, whose supremacy in Germany it had been one of the great objects of the ultramontanes to maintain, and whose loss of that supremacy had been a severe blow to the Vatican, should now declare itself so promptly and so definitely in an anti-Vatican sense.

War was declared on July 19, 1870. If, as most people thought, a French victory was certain, Rome had everything to gain.[2] The strengthening of the French Empire, whose support, though sometimes vacillating, had up to the present secured her temporal power, and recently had rendered the holding of the Council practicable, was not the only consideration; there was also the fact that the defeat of Prussia would prevent the unity, for which Prussia was working, of South Germany with North. But deeply interested though the Vatican was in the war, it is another thing to say that the war was the result of a conspiracy in which the ultramontanes participated. This was commonly believed; and Bismarck asserted it in a speech in the Reichstag in 1874 (December 5): "That when the war was begun against us there was understanding with Roman policy; that the Council was on that account cut short; that the execution of the Conciliar decrees, perhaps even their completion, would have had a

[1] Friedenberg, *Aktenstücke*, p. 155; Wolfsgruber, *Kardinal Rauscher*, pp. 209 ff.; Beust, *Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderte*, ii. p. 406; Frommann, pp. 215-25.

[2] Castagnola in the *Rivista storica del risorgimento Italiano*, i. p. 1.

different issue if the French had conquered; that at that time, in Rome as well as elsewhere, the victory of the French was counted on as a certainty,[1] that at the French Court Catholic influences really determined the decision for war, a decision which was very hard for the Emperor Napoleon to take; that peace had been firmly resolved, and this resolve was overthrown by influences whose connexion with Jesuit principles has been proved—of all this I am fully in a position to testify. You can believe me that I know all about this, not only from papers which have been discovered, but also from communications I have received from the circles in question."[2] These assertions of Bismarck must be discounted, because they were uttered at the time of the struggle of the Prussian government with the Vatican and the ultramontanes over the May laws. There is no proof hitherto produced of anything that can be called a conspiracy, but it remains true that ultramontane interests, as well as the interests of Napoleon's government, would have profited by a French victory.[3] The part which the Empress played must be considered uncertain. It is generally supposed that she threw all her influence into the scale for war; and she is commonly reported to have said: "C'est ma guerre!" But now—I have this on private information—she repudiates this responsibility; she denies having even uttered those famous words; and says she can prove by documentary evidence that

[1] Cf. Nurnberger, *Papauté et États de l'Église*, iii. p. 510.

[2] *Politische Reden*, vi. (1893) p. 232; *Gesamm. Werken*, xi. (1929) p. 382.

[3] Busch, *Our Chancellor*, ii. p. 60.

she made attempts to prevent the war.[1] I will only observe that those whose interest it was to consolidate the French Empire might have been waiting for a war, to be declared in 1874, and might have tried to hinder it from breaking out in 1870. This was the true point of the situation. Napoleon wanted war after his alliances were completed, Bismarck wanted it before, and Bismarck forced the hands of the French government.

When the crisis was acute, just before the decisive incident of the Ems telegram, Napoleon sounded Italy and received assurances that this country would not be on the side of the enemy.[2] When war was declared on the 19th, Austria and Italy formed an alliance for an armed neutrality, and the treaty included an article that Austria should ask France to withdraw her troops from the Roman State, the evacuation to take place on conditions conformable to the wishes of Italy. But on July 26 the French Premier, the Duc de Gramont, told the Italian ambassador Nigra that France would not depart from the September Convention, and at

[1] Sir C. Grant Robertson and the Rev. F. A. Simpson do not unhesitatingly accept her proof. Bury had probably just heard of the interview with Maurice Paléologue in April 1906. The Empress was technically correct in denying that she had actually boasted of her responsibility for the war; in any case a circumstantial and authoritative denial of the particular boast of "C'est ma guerre" had been issued as early as 1874. But it does not follow that in *fact* she did not throw all her influence into the scale for war. Denials of that no serious student of the subject would take seriously; and to do the Empress justice she did not always deny that herself. She tells her story in Paléologue's *Conversations with the Empress Eugénie*, published last year. The great work of Oncken on *Napoleon's Rheinpolitik* reveals her important political rôle.

[2] *Nuova Antologia*, Ninth Series, vol. lvi. pp. 9, 14.

the same time sent to Vienna forbidding Austria to interfere with the Roman question.[1] Napoleon confirmed this a week later; and the Empress is reported to have said: "Rather the Prussians in Paris than the Italians in Rome".[2] Yet at the same time Napoleon was preparing to recall the troops. On July 30 Gramont telegraphed to Banneville to prepare the Pope.[3] When Pius learned from Antonelli the French decision, he said: "Now is the time for prayer, but everything will end well".[4] France could explain the recall, as she could explain the retention of the troops, on the ground of the September Convention, and she was now concerned above all things to obtain the help of Victor Emmanuel and 60,000 Italian troops.[5] The King was personally very anxious to help; his daughter, for one thing, was the wife of Prince Napoleon. But Italian feeling was entirely against it, the Lanza ministry was against it, and a council of war, which was held to consider it, proved that it was impossible. It would have meant raising much more than 60,000 to take the field with the French; the frontier on the Bavarian side and the Roman frontier would have to be guarded. There were also republican enterprises to be considered; Mazzini was in Italy; he was presently arrested.[6]

On August 19 the French regiment left Cività Vecchia; their departure was the signal for the cry

[1] *Revue des deux Mondes*, Third Période, 26th part (1878), p. 492.
[2] Cf. Lanza's speech in *La liberazione di Roma*, p. 51.
[3] Favre, *Rome et la République française*, pp. 32 ff., 36 ff.
[4] H. d'Ideville, *Les Piémontais à Rome*, p. 151.
[5] *Nuova Antologia*, Ninth Series, vol. lvi. p. 19.
[6] Tavallini, *La vita . . . di G. Lanza*, ii. p. 5.

for Rome. The government was besieged with clamorous crowds; for the moment it simply placed 30,000 men on the Papal frontiers. Prince Napoleon arrived at Florence on the 20th, but he was to learn that in the face of Italian feeling, Victor Emmanuel, if he sent a single soldier to the help of the Emperor, would be sacrificing his throne.[1]

The ministry were inclined to be dilatory; probably they wished their hands to be forced, and besides this there was friction between the King and the Prime Minister.[2] But the pressure of Rattazzi and the opposition urged them on. A ministerial council was held on August 28 to consider the Roman question—especially, should Rome be the capital of Italy, or what should be its position, and what arrangements should be made for the Papacy. The only definite result of this council was the decision that it should be forbidden to publish the dogma of Infallibility in Italy, though, if it were published, no punishment should be inflicted except in cases where disturbance was caused.

Then came the news of the catastrophe of Sedan on September 2; France was now completely eliminated from the situation; the opposition called on the ministry to occupy Rome immediately.[3] There were strong reasons for haste; there was serious republican agitation, which threatened the Pope as well as the King; and it could hardly be said that the September Convention, which Napoleon had broken

[1] Rattazzi, *Rattazzi et son temps*, ii. p. 340.

[2] Tavallini, ii. p. 28; Castagnola, p. 21; Rattazzi, ii. pp. 348 ff.

[3] Van Duerm, *Vicissitudes politiques du pouvoir temporal des papes*, p. 403.

himself, was binding. This was forcibly represented to the King by the Liberal noble, the Count di San Martino, and under the King's influence the ministry decided to occupy the Papal State,[1] but San Martino was first to proceed to Rome and communicate the decision to the Pope, guaranteeing complete liberty for his spiritual authority.[2] The journal *L'Opinione*, the *journal officiel*, immediately denied the truth of the statement.[3] The reason for this false denial was that the ministry wished to seem to be forced by public opinion to adopt the course on which they had resolved. A manifesto which the Roman republicans issued, when the news arrived that a Republic had been proclaimed at Paris, showed that there was no time to lose. On September 7, the Foreign Minister, Visconti Venosta, issued a circular to the Catholic powers explaining the necessity of the step which Italy was about to take, as one in the interests of the Papacy itself.[4] The action of the Italian government was indeed at the moment somewhat embarrassed by the friction between the King and his Prime Minister, Lanza. There was a double friction, for Lanza opposed the King both on the question of helping France and on the question of immediately occupying Rome. The friction was so great that Lanza resigned, but it was no time for a change of government, and a reconciliation was effected.

San Martino proceeded to Rome to announce the decision of Italy. He saw Antonelli on the 9th, and

[1] Rattazzi, ii. p. 349 ff.
[2] Castagnola, p. 34.
[3] Rattazzi, ii. p. 377.
[4] Printed in Favre, p. 368.

communicated the instruction. The important passage was:

We reserve to ourselves the right to send our troops into Roman territory when circumstances convince us of the necessity, but we will permit the population to arrange for the administration of its own affairs. The government of the King and his forces will confine themselves entirely to conservative action, and to the protection of the imprescriptible rights of the Romans and of the interest felt by the whole Catholic world in the independence of the Pope.[1]

Next day Martino delivered a letter of the King to the Pope in an interview which was somewhat stormy.[2] These communications were met by a simple *non possumus*, and Martino telegraphed to Florence Antonelli's answer that the Pope would not open the gates to Victor Emmanuel's soldiers.

General Cadorna immediately crossed the Roman frontier, and on September 11 issued a proclamation, assuring the people that the Italians had come to protect the liberty of the citizens and that the independence of the Pope would be better guarded by free citizens than by foreign soldiers. Cadorna himself advanced on Rome.[3] A part of the army under Bixio marched to Cività Vecchia, which received him peacefully on September 16. Meanwhile the French government had recalled the French volunteers, who were known as the Antibes legion.

The commander of the Papal troops was General Kanzler, and on the 15th Cadorna sent a formal

[1] Castagnola, p. 38; D'Ideville, p. 169.
[2] Castagnola, p. 39; Rattazzi, ii. p. 356.
[3] The proclamation is in *La liberazione di Roma*, p. 128.

message to him, asking permission to enter Rome for the purpose of preserving order. Kanzler replied that the Pope was determined to resist, and the resolution was not altered by the surrender of Cività Vecchia. On the 17th Cadorna encamped outside Rome.

Count Arnim now intervened. He obtained an armistice for twenty-four hours, hoping to bring the Papal court to reason, but he was not listened to. Cadorna began to attack on the 20th. He had been instructed to seize Rome but not to occupy the Leonine city in which the Pope resided. Pius, of course, was aware that resistance was futile, but he had determined to surrender only at the sword's point, under the sheer pressure of actual violence; and he gave orders to protract the defence till a breach was made in the walls, and then to surrender.[1] The breach was made about ten o'clock near the Ponta Pia; and the foreign diplomatists, who had been with the Pope at his wish all the morning since the attack began, proceeded to General Kanzler, to be present at the arrangement of the capitulation. The terms were that all Rome should be occupied by the Italians except. the Leonine city.[2] Next day the Papal army was disbanded and left Rome.

During the next few days, however, it was found necessary to send Italian troops into the Leonine quarter and the Castle of St. Angelo, in order to secure the Pope's safety, in consequence of tumults. This was done by the Pope's own wish.

There were no small apprehensions that the Pope

[1] D'Ideville, pp. 185, 190, 192. [2] Cadorna, p. 203.

might decide to flee from Rome, as he had done himself at the beginning of his Pontificate.[1] Antonelli was strongly opposed to the idea of flight; the General of the Jesuits as strongly advocated it. He thought it would be only for a brief period, that flight would ensure European intervention, that he would come back in triumph and regain his territory.[2] Antonelli knew better than to cherish such a vision. His influence prevailed.

The next step was to incorporate Rome and Roman territory in the kingdom of Italy by a plebiscite. The voting was held on October 2. In Rome itself 40,785 voted for incorporation against a minority of only 46. The total vote in Rome and the provinces together was 133,681 for and 1507 against. The Roman aristocrats voted largely for union, *e.g.* Duke of Sermoneta, the Dorias, the Odescalchis.[3]

After the plebiscite had been presented to the King at Florence, he accepted and confirmed it by a royal decree, in which he promised to secure the Pope by laws of guarantee.[4] Such a promise did not in any way mollify the Pope. His first reply was the Bull *Postquam Dei munere* on October 20, by which he suspended to a more opportune time the reassembling of the Council, because the "sacrilegious invasion" would deprive it of peace and freedom.[5] On November 1 he issued the Encyclical *Respicientes ea omnia*, which placed under the Church's ban

[1] *Politia segreta Italiana*, p. 414. [2] Cappelletti, iii. p. 253.
[3] D'Ideville, pp. 240 ff.; *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), October 25, 1870.
[4] Cadorna, p. 279. [5] *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 497.

the usurpers and their coadjutors; Victor Emmanuel was not specified by name.

The advisability of leaving Rome was now pressed more and more on Pius by the Jesuits. The Italian government did their best to prevent the adoption of such a course; they knew that the Pope's flight, though it might not lead to active intervention, would greatly embarrass the government and seem to put them in the wrong. Decrees were issued, by which the Pope's person was declared inviolable as the King's; the Italian press laws were not to apply to the Papal press, and the Papal Bulls and rescripts were exempted from censorship.[1]

But any sort of a reconciliation or *modus vivendi* was extremely difficult, for causes of friction of various kinds were constantly occurring. One of the most serious was the question of a Royal Palace at Rome. The Italians demanded the Quirinal for this purpose. Antonelli refused to give the keys, and the Italian officials broke in the doors.

It is remarkable that the hopes of the Catholics, which had in recent times relied on France, now turned for a moment towards France's conqueror. The Archbishop of Gnesen, Posen, Ledochowski, visited the German camp at Versailles, with an address from his diocese, suggesting that he should intervene on behalf of the Papal States which were the possession of Christendom and could not be touched without violation of the rights of 200,000,000 Catholics.[2] At the same time the Pope proposed himself as a mediator between France and Prussia.

[1] *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), November 2 and 6, 1870.
[2] *Ibid.*, November 19, 1870.

The offer was, of course, rejected, and there could be no question of Prussia's interference with Italy.[1] A few days after the Italian occupation of Rome in September, Bismarck had remarked: "The Pope must unquestionably continue to be a sovran, but how? One might do more for him if the ultramontanes were not everywhere opposing us. I am accustomed to pay people back in their own coin."[2]

Victor Emmanuel entered Rome on the last day of 1870. In the following months the main question was to define precisely the relation of the Papacy to Italy. Some governments had thought of proposing a Conference of Catholic Powers; it was an idea which Gladstone and Beust favoured. But it was allowed to drop; it was felt that the discussion would involve great difficulties, and Antonelli recognised that it would probably only issue in an approval by the Powers of what Italy had done. So Italy settled the question for herself by the Guarantee Law of May 13, 1871.

By this law[3] the Pope's person is inviolable under the same sanctions as the King's ; but this is not in any way to limit the free discussion of religious subjects, on the ground that such discussion is treasonable to the Pope. The same marks of honour are to be shown by the government to the Pope as to other sovrans, and he is to have the precedence which other Catholic sovrans accord to him. He shall be able to keep the usual number of Papal guards to defend his person and palace. He will receive from the government every year three million and a quarter

[1] Busch, *Graf Bismarck*, i. p. 334. [2] Busch, i. p. 205.
[3] Printed in Scaduto, *Guarentigie pontificie*, pp. 72 ff.

lire, and the same sum will be owed when the Papal chair is vacant. This sum is to enjoy immunity from taxation. The Vatican, the Lateran, with their gardens, and the palace of Castel Gardolfo are to belong to the Pope and not to be taxed. The government guarantees the free assembly of conclaves for election of a Pope; and renounces all right of confiscating papers or any documents in the Papal offices which are engaged in spiritual work. The civil authorities will protect the Papal officials. Foreign ambassadors to the Pope will enjoy the usual immunities of diplomatic agents. The Pope can have his own post office and telegraph, and the right to frank letters and telegrams through the State post offices. He will have perfectly free communication with the Italian bishops and with the whole of Catholic Christendom. These are the most important provisions of the section which deals with the privileges of the Pope.[1] Another section concerns general relations of the State with the Church. Freedom of meeting is guaranteed to the Catholic clergy. Italian bishops are released from the obligation of taking an oath to the King, and the government resigns all claims to assist in the appointments to the higher offices in the Church, while reserving the right of sanctioning episcopal appointments. But it is ordained that only Italian citizens shall be eligible as bishops, except in the case of the six suburbicarian bishoprics which are appointed to Cardinals. All forms of royal permission for publication of ecclesiastical decrees, such as *placet regium* and *exequatur*, are abolished. But ecclesiastical decisions as to

[1] Bolton King, *History of Italian Unity*, ii. pp. 380-81.

Church property shall be subject to government confirmation.

The Bill was not pleasing either to the radicals, who thought that the Papacy was treated too leniently, or to the ultramontanes, who regarded the Parliament which passed it as foes of the Church and the occupation of Rome as a sacrilege. In Italy in general it was regarded as a temporary and opportunist measure. Yet it proved permanent, and in 1878 was included among the fundamental laws of the State. It could, however, at any moment be altered by the Italians themselves, since it is purely Italian law, and no international contract underlies it.

The Pope never recognised the law. He could not compromise, he said, with a violation of right, and his successors[1] have maintained this attitude.[2] He never touched the large annual sum which the law allowed him. Two days after the passing of the law he issued an Encyclical (May 15, 1871) declaring that this law was a *nova et inaudita sacrilegii forma*, and the guarantees were in themselves far from securing the requisite independence to the government of the Church.[3] The word guarantee was an outrage; it implied the imposition of laws upon the Pope, who is appointed the interpreter of divine law and natural law.

In one minor matter the Pope was saved from an injury by the intervention of France. The Italians had intended to confiscate and nationalise the art collections of the Vatican. The French government induced them to forgo this intention.

[1] Till 1929.

[2] *Revue des deux Mondes*, May 1, 1873, p. 118.

[3] Printed in Favre, p. 404.

It was some consolation to Pius that during the last months of 1870 and the year 1871 virtually all the bishops of the minority in the Vatican Council sent him in their complete submission, including the Bishop of Orleans.[1] Hefele, who had assured Döllinger again and again in 1870 that he could and would never submit, nevertheless yielded in April and promulgated the new decrees.[2] His resolution was not strong enough to face isolation. Strossmayer held out; but even he submitted in the next pontificate in February 1881.[3]

Before the occupation of Rome the question had not been settled whether Rome should be the capital of Italy—the residence of the King and the seat of government. The general feeling in Italy was strongly in favour of this change; the general cry was *Roma capitale!* The feeling rested on an idea, on the historic memories which encircled the city of the Seven Hills, on the magic of the Roman name. But many politicians were opposed to the notion; there was an obvious embarrassment in settling the obnoxious sacrilegious government next door to the Papal Palace. The French minister, Jules Favre, was anxious that Rome should be made the titular capital, but that the Parliament and the government offices should remain at Florence.[4] The Lanza ministry hesitated for months; at last in June they decided to yield to the popular wish, and it was settled

[1] Granderath, III. ii. pp. 254-5. Cf. Ollivier, ii. p. 381; Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, iii. p. 165.

[2] Granderath, III. ii. pp. 209-18; Schulte, pp. 217, 220, 223, 227, 230; Friedrich, III. ii. pp. 809-11, 1037.

[3] Granderath, III. ii. pp. 238-40; Schulte, pp. 251, 261, 263; *Collectio Lacensis*, p. 999 c.

[4] Favre, p. 125.

that from July 1 Rome would be the capital of the Italian kingdom. There were other considerations which influenced them in this decision besides the popular pressure. This was the geographical position. Rome even without its historic prestige would have been a compromise between the claims of the North and the claims of the South. The South would have liked Naples—they were dissatisfied with Florence; the North would never have tolerated the selection of Naples.[1] To Rome neither could object. It was also to be taken into account that Rome, if it had not become the capital, would have probably been a hotbed of revolution—ground where republicans of the school of Mazzini would have prosecuted schemes of revolution.

The next important question with which the government had to deal was Church property in Rome and the Roman province. Here more than one-third of the land was in the dead hand. In the interests of economical progress it was of the first importance to apply here the measures which had been applied to Italy in 1867. Accordingly two laws were introduced—one for the dissolution of monasteries, which were quite out of proportion to the number of the inhabitants, and one for the transfer of Church property, by sale and partly by confiscation. In the eyes of the Pope this was an act of robbery;[2] the extreme Radicals thought it too lenient. The Bills were passed in June 1873. On the other hand, a non-government proposal for expelling the Jesuits from Italy was defeated.[3]

[1] Rattazzi, ii. p. 424. [2] Tavallini, ii. p. 97.
[3] Stepischnegg, i. p. 421.

The Jesuits were at this time once more attracting prominent attention in Europe. They were engaged in a bitter struggle in the new German Empire. The antagonism between the Vatican and Berlin had dated from the defeat of Austria, which meant the transference of the supremacy in Germany from a Catholic to a Protestant power. The ultramontanes had made every effort to thwart the political union of Germany under the Prussian king. That union had been accomplished simultaneously with the fall of the temporal power, and for the next year in Italy and Germany alike the mediaeval principles of the Papacy were in sharp collision with the claims of the victorious modern State and the principles of Liberalism. For the Prussian no less than the Italian government found it necessary to rest its policy on Liberalism and Liberal support. The object of the Liberals was to make effective the principle that the State should be omnipotent, and that it should be unsectarian.

The politicians who represented Catholic interests in the new Reichstag organised themselves in the party known as the Centre. Bismarck replied to their opposition by showing favour to the Old Catholics both in the schools and the Church. The Old Catholics were those who refused to accept the decrees of the Vatican Council, and this heresy had caused much ecclesiastical trouble in Bavaria.[1] Döllinger had been duly excommunicated, but the University of Munich replied by electing him Rector by an overwhelming majority of votes.[2] Bismarck

[1] Granderath, III. ii. pp. 343-63.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 272-90.

forced Old Catholic teachers on Catholic schools. He then abolished the special Catholic department of the Ministry of Public Worship. This was a preliminary to drastic changes. In the first month of 1872 Dr. Falk was appointed Minister of Public Worship, and under his administration was waged the struggle known as the *Kulturkampf*. The name is appropriate and pregnant. It was a struggle between two different ideals of civilisation, between the ecclesiastical order of the Middle Ages and the secular order of modern society.

On the 14th of May Bismarck announced open war in words that are often quoted: "After the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church which have been recently promulgated, it will not be possible for a secular government to conclude a Concordat with the Papacy, unless that government effaces itself to the last degree and in a way to which the German Empire at least will not consent. Do not be apprehensive. We will *not* go to Canossa, either bodily or spiritually!"[1]

Next day the debate began on a Bill for the banishment of the Jesuits. All the German bishops took the side of the Order, though hitherto they had not loved it overmuch. I will quote part of the speech of Prince Hohenlohe, because it shows the convictions of a temperate statesman who was a Catholic:

If the problem before us were to sit in judgment on the deeds of the Jesuits during the three centuries of their existence, it would indeed be difficult. But this is not the point. We have not to trouble ourselves with the deeds of individual Jesuits, but *with*

[1] Hahn, *Geschichte des "Kulturkampfes" in Preussen*, pp. 72 f.

the Order as a whole. . . . I am heartily ready to concede to a previous speaker that many Jesuits in all times have been distinguished by their learning, blameless lives, and the practice of all works of Christian compassion. . . . But if I concede to individual Jesuits all justice, and if I admit that patriotic Jesuits exist, I must also assert the opinion expressed by Herr von Radowitz, that the advantages to the Catholic Church in Germany which may be expected from the Jesuits stand in no proportion to the disturbances and dangers which their presence entails. . . . The disturbances have appeared, and we are in the presence of dangers sufficiently indicated by the report of the Commission and the petitions against the Jesuits.

What astonishes me about the whole Jesuitical and anti-Jesuitical movements of our day is that the Jesuits and their friends wonder that the modern State abhors them. And yet the Society of Jesus has taken upon itself to make war on the modern State, and its members declare with perfect openness that their purpose is to maintain the unity of ecclesiastical doctrine and the ecclesiastical life in rigid connexion with the Church as the centre of their system. In this of itself lies no danger, but the interpretation which has been put on this original declaration of the Founder contains a distinct declaration of war by the Society of Jesus against the foundations of our life as a State. I will not enter on the question whether the Encyclical of December 8, 1864, and the Syllabus is a decision of the Pope *ex cathedra* or not—this is a question controverted inside the Church itself—but there can be no doubt that this Syllabus forms the guide for the action of the Jesuit Order and the goal of their endeavours. Their writings leave not the slightest doubt about that. . . .

Let me remind you that the Syllabus declares

war on progress, liberty, and modern civilisation; condemns as pernicious errors freedom of the press, freedom of education, religious toleration, and also the freedom of conscience. . . . All writers of the Order advocate these principles; therefore I must accept the fact that the Order adopts them as such; and then the Jesuits marvel when this world condemned by them opens its eyes and asks itself: "Can we tolerate in our midst an institution which is cutting the foundations of our existence from under our feet?" . . .

The Order which advocates these propositions is an organised multitude based on a discipline far stricter than any military organisation. . . . The Order is a power which every member of this meeting has, or at least will have, an opportunity of recognising. Shall we allow this hostile multitude to spread their principles by the power which the cure of souls, the confessional and education give? . . . If we are not to give up our own being, we cannot longer tolerate such a state of affairs. . . .

The conclusion I derive from these premises is that it would be best to agree on a Bill based on the example of Switzerland, which simply forbids the Jesuit Orders.[1]

The Bill against the Jesuits was passed. They and some affiliated congregations, especially the Redemptorists, were banished by an Imperial Statute of the 4th of July from the German Empire. Before the end of the year the German ambassador was recalled from the Vatican.[2]

The government went on to bring the clergy, all of whom sided with the Pope, under the power of

[1] *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, vol. ii. pp. 74-6.
[2] Hahn, p. 159.

the State. For this purpose they passed three sets of laws, known as the May laws, from 1873 to 1875. Every candidate for the priesthood was required to have studied for three years at a university and passed an examination in history and philology; and to enforce this, bishops were required to give notice of every ecclesiastical nomination. The State claimed the right to supervise theological seminaries. Civil marriage was made obligatory for the whole Empire. In 1875 all monasteries were dissolved. The Pope wrote to the Prussian bishops, declaring the laws null and void.[1] The government demanded a declaration from the bishops that they accepted the new laws, and the salaries of those who refused were not paid. The contest was long protracted; the clergy issuing manifestoes and protests, the government prosecuting and punishing.

It is generally admitted that the *Kulturkampf* was a political mistake. Bismarck virtually went to Canossa afterwards. For a few years later a new strongly protectionist economic policy caused a breach with his supporters, the National Liberals, and he was forced to seek the support of a coalition of the Conservatives and the Catholic Centre. This new policy meant concessions to the Centre, in fact a surrender of the cause for which he had prosecuted the *Kulturkampf*. Practically all the anti-ecclesiastical measures which had been passed were gradually withdrawn between 1880 and 1893, with the exception of Civil Marriage.

Pope Pius IX. died on February 7, 1878, and here I bring these lectures to a close.

[1] Hahn, p. 159.

His Pontificate will always be memorable for two things: for the movement which revived the ecclesiastical claims of the Middle Ages in a most extreme form, and for the fall of the temporal power. The significance of the abolition of the Pope's temporal sovranty, apart from what it meant for the unity, lay in the breach with the mediaeval side. Perhaps we are too close to it still to see fully its great historical importance. Mr. Gladstone was one of the few statesmen who comprehended that it was a change of vast importance—a change which, just because it meant a change in the realm of ideas, might be more profound and far-reaching than the political changes of great magnitude which had recently attracted far more attention.[1] And not less than Prince Hohenlohe did he understand the significance of the *Syllabus* and the Vatican decrees, as he showed in the vehement pamphlet which he published on the subject—*The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance*—in 1874, in which he described the Jesuits as the "deadliest foes that mental and moral liberty have ever known".[2]

We have recently seen a continuation of the struggle in France and another victory for the

[1] Granderath, III. ii. pp. 321-4. Cf. Morley, *Life of Gladstone* (1906 ed.), ii. pp. 123-9, 520; Thureau-Dangin, *Renaissance Catholique en Angleterre*, iii. pp. 159-60; Mourret, *Le Concile du Vatican*, p. 334.

[2] *The Vatican Decrees*, p. 58. Cf. the three articles by Dr. Zirngeibl on "J. v. Döllinger u. die liberale katholische Bewegung" in *Deutschland Ergänzungsblätter*, 1870, October and November, pp. 385, 466, 528. Cf. also Prince Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, under his diary in November 1870: "When one reflects upon the moral decadence, the complete absence of honour shown by the Bishops, one shudders at the influence which Jesuit control in the Catholic Church exercises upon human nature". In his *Briefe*, p. 106, Döllinger writes: "The Jesuits are incarnate superstition combined with despotism".

modern State. The victory is not surprising. For the fact which gives us most cause for thought, and which I have endeavoured to bring out in these lectures, is that the Papacy, based as it is in mediaeval ideas, has maintained and in many ways increased its moral power and influence, in an atmosphere which is repugnant to it, in the midst of social and political institutions, tendencies, and ideas to which it is fundamentally opposed.

THE POPES

1775 Pius VI. (Braschi).
1800 Pius VII. (Chiaramonti).
1823 Leo XII. (Della Genga).
1829 Pius VIII. (Castiglioni).
1831 Gregory XVI. (Capellari).
1846 Pius IX. (Mastai-Ferretti).
1878 Leo XIII. (Pecci).

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